Tuerk v. Department of Licensing

• Decision Date: 07 December 1992
• Docket Number: No. 14499-9-II,14499-9-II
• Citation: 841 P.2d 61,67 Wn.App. 872
• Court: Washington Court of Appeals
• Parties: Maxine M. TUERK, Appellant, v. The DEPARTMENT OF LICENSING; Mary Faulk, Director, and John Doe Faulk, husband and wife; Karen Jarvis and John Doe Jarvis, husband and wife; Sandra Spencer and John Doe Spencer, husband and wife; Donna Ashman and John Doe Ashman, husband and wife, Respondents.

Page 872

67 Wn.App. 872

841 P.2d 61

Maxine M. TUERK, Appellant, v. The DEPARTMENT OF LICENSING; Mary Faulk, Director, and John Doe Faulk, husband and wife; Karen Jarvis and John Doe Jarvis, husband and wife; Sandra Spencer and John Doe Spencer, husband and wife; Donna Ashman and John Doe Ashman, husband and wife, Respondents.

No. 14499-9-II.

Court of Appeals of Washington Division 2.

Dec. 7, 1992.

As Modified on Denial of Reconsideration Feb. 11, 1993.

Russell A. Austin, Jr., Kargianis, Austin & Osborn, Seattle, for appellant.

Kenneth O. Eikenberry, Atty. Gen., and Elizabeth J. Erwin, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tort Claims Div. Lacey, for respondent.

ALEXANDER, Judge.

Maxine Tuerk appeals an order of the Thurston County Superior Court granting summary judgment in favor of the State of Washington Department of Licensing and certain employees of the Department, and against Tuerk. She claims that the trial court erred in concluding that the Department could deny Tuerk's application for renewal of her real estate broker's license because of her failure to provide her home address and telephone number. We reverse.

Maxine Tuerk first became licensed as a real estate broker in 1969. By statute, real estate brokers must renew their license annually by paying a license fee to the Department of Licensing. ¹ Over the years, Tuerk consistently refused to supply certain information to the Department when renewing her broker's license, arguing that she was not required to divulge the information.

In 1982, Tuerk refused to supply the Department with her home address on her annual license renewal application. Consequently, the Department filed a "Statement of Intent to Deny License Application." Tuerk's attorney entered into negotiations with the Department, and an agreement was eventually reached between Tuerk and the Department which provided that the Department would renew her broker's license. Tuerk and the Department also stipulated that "neither party shall take further action based on the circumstances giving rise to the statement of intent to deny license application."

In 1987, the Department of Licensing promulgated the following regulation:

WAC 388-124C-010 Licensee's responsibilities ...

(3) It is the responsibility of each and every licensee to keep the director informed of his or her current home address.

In August 1988, Tuerk moved her business office, filled out a change of business address form with the Department, and paid the appropriate fee. Tuerk refused, however, to answer a question on that form which called for her to disclose her home address and telephone number. Although the Department asked repeatedly for this information, Tuerk steadfastly refused to disclose it on the grounds that the law did not require her to do so.

At about the same time, Tuerk sent her annual fee and license renewal application to the Department. Again she did not provide her home address and telephone number. Despite numerous requests, Tuerk refused to provide that information. As a consequence, the Department refused to process her license renewal application and Tuerk's real estate broker's license expired in November 1988. It has not since been renewed.

Tuerk's attorney has indicated in briefing and oral argument before this court that the Department is in possession of Tuerk's home address. He also asserts that Tuerk has not changed her residence since 1972. The record neither supports these assertions nor contradicts them. Tuerk's counsel also indicates that he has offered to supply the Department with affidavits attesting to the fact that Tuerk is a resident of Snohomish County, Washington.

In 1989, Tuerk brought suit in Thurston County Superior Court against the Department, its Director and certain employees of the Department, asking for a mandatory injunction requiring the Department to return or reissue her license, and for damages. She claimed that the Department's refusal to process her request for license renewal violated due process and her civil rights. She also asserted a host of negligence claims. Tuerk and all of the defendants moved for summary judgment. The trial court denied Tuerk's motion and granted the defendants' motion. It dismissed Tuerk's complaint, concluding that the Department was justified in refusing to renew Tuerk's license for her failure to provide the requested information.

The central issue presented by this appeal is whether the Department of Licensing possesses legal authority to require a licensed real estate broker to provide her current home address each time the broker renews her license.

As noted above, the case was decided in Thurston County Superior Court on cross-motions for summary judgment. Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." CR 56(c). On review of an order of summary judgment, the reviewing court engages in the same inquiry as the trial court. Both parties concede that there are no issues of fact. Thus, the issue is whether either of the parties is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. This requires us to interpret one statute and a regulation.

"Interpretation of a statute is solely a question of law and within the conventional competence of the court...." American Legion Post No. 32 v. Walla Walla, 116 Wash.2d 1, 5, 802 P.2d 784 (1991). In construing a statute, a court's paramount duty is to give effect to the intent of the Legislature. Yakima v. International Ass'n of Firefighters Local 469, 117 Wash.2d 655, 669, 818 P.2d 1076 (1991). When a statute is not ambiguous, the Legislature's intent must be determined by the language alone. Multicare Med. Ctr. v. Department of Soc. & Health Servs., 114 Wash.2d 572, 582, 790 P.2d 124 (1990). A statute is not ambiguous unless it is susceptible to more than one meaning. Yakima, 117 Wash.2d at 669, 818 P.2d 1076.

Applying those principles, it is clear that RCW 18.85.140, the license renewal statute, is unambiguous. It does not expressly require licensees to divulge their home address when renewing their broker's license. By its terms, it only requires payment of a fee upon renewal. There is no suggestion that Tuerk refused to tender the appropriate fee to the Department.

The Department asserts that WAC 303-124C-010 gives it the authority to require applicants for renewal of real estate broker's licenses to provide their home address. Tuerk concedes the existence of that regulation and she does not challenge the Department's authority to enact it. She argues only that the regulation does not require a real estate broker to tell the Department her address each time an application for renewal of license is submitted to the Department. We agree. WAC 388-124C-010 merely provides that "it is a licensee's...