Tuetken v. Tuetken

Decision Date22 September 2010
Docket NumberNo. W2008-00274-SC-R11-CV.,W2008-00274-SC-R11-CV.
Citation320 S.W.3d 262
PartiesElizabeth Sams TUETKENv.Lance Edward TUETKEN.
CourtTennessee Supreme Court

Kay Farese Turner and Rachael Emily Putnam, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, Elizabeth Sams Tuetken.

Adam N. Cohen and Mitchell D. Moskovitz, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellee, Lance Edward Tuetken.

OPINION

JANICE M. HOLDER, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which CORNELIA A. CLARK, GARY R. WADE, WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., and SHARON G. LEE, JJ., joined.

JANICE M. HOLDER, C.J.

We granted appeal in this case to determine the trial court's scope of review of the parties' arbitration award. After thoroughly reviewing the record, we conclude that the parties entered into binding arbitration governed by the Tennessee Uniform Arbitration Act (“TUAA”) and reaffirm our holding in Pugh's Lawn Landscape Co., Inc. v. Jaycon Development Corp., 320 S.W.3d 252, 254 (Tenn.2010), that the judicial review of an arbitration award is confined to the grounds enumerated in the TUAA. The provision in the parties' arbitration agreement modifying the trial court's scope of review therefore is invalid, and the invalidity of this provision is a mutual mistake justifying rescission of the parties' agreement to arbitrate. Because our holding necessitates additional proceedings on remand, we further hold that parenting issues may not be submitted to binding arbitration in Tennessee because such arbitration eliminates the trial court's determination of the children's best interests. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals, vacate the judgment of the trial court, and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. Facts and Procedural History

Elizabeth Sams Tuetken (Mother) filed a complaint for divorce in the Shelby County Circuit Court on March 13, 2001, against Lance Edward Tuetken (Father). The trial court entered a final decree of divorce on January 31, 2003, incorporating a parenting plan reflecting the trial court's ruling on issues related to the parties' son and daughter, who were ages eleven and six, respectively, at the time of trial. The parenting plan designated Mother as the primary custodial parent and required Father to pay child support. The parenting plan also addressed the children's schedules, the allocation of decision-making authority between Mother and Father, the children's daily care, and the rights of each parent when the children were not in his or her care.

In 2004 and 2005, Mother and Father filed cross-motions for civil contempt, each alleging that the other had failed to abide by one or more provisions in the parenting plan. In addition, Mother requested that Father's child support be modified to reflect an increase in his earnings. In anticipation of the entry of a consent order permitting arbitration of the parties' disputes, an arbitration hearing was held on June 20, 2006. On June 27, 2006, a “Parenting Arbitrator” submitted preliminary findings of fact and conclusions of law to the parties and requested that the parties review the document for clerical errors.

On June 28, 2006, the trial court entered a “Consent Order Appointing Parenting Arbitrator” (“consent order”). The consent order embodied the parties' agreement to arbitrate and provided the Parenting Arbitrator with the authority “to make decisions regarding the best interests of the parties' minor children.” 1 The consent order detailed the manner in which an appeal from the Parenting Arbitrator could be initiated. The consent order also stated, There is no confidentiality as to any evidence presented at such hearings.

The Parenting Arbitrator was required to decide all issues and to set forth findings of fact and conclusions of law if requested by either party. The parties agreed that a party challenging the Parenting Arbitrator's ruling was required to file a motion with the trial court within ten calendar days of receipt of the Parenting Arbitrator's ruling. The consent order further provided that [i]n the event of an appeal, the decision of the arbitrator shall be binding on the parties pending the resolution of the matter by the Trial Court, and said decision shall carry with it a presumption of correctness.” The parties also initialed a provision acknowledging “that the orders of the Parenting Arbitrator can be reviewed by the Court.” If neither party filed a timely objection, “the Parenting Arbitrator shall cause his or her order to be signed by the Court.”

Father filed a motion in the trial court objecting to the Parenting Arbitrator's June 27, 2006 decision. The Parenting Arbitrator thereafter filed amended findings and conclusions with the trial court requiring the parties to complete their child support worksheets and participate in another arbitration hearing to resolve issues concerning the education of the parties' son. Father filed a motion to continue the parties' second scheduled arbitration until his objections to the Parenting Arbitrator's June 27, 2006 decision could be heard by the trial court. He also filed a petition in the trial court to reduce his child support.

The trial court entered an order on May 18, 2007, ruling that Father was required to submit all issues to the Parenting Arbitrator in accordance with the consent order and that Father's motions had been raised prematurely. The trial court therefore denied Father's motion objecting to the Parenting Arbitrator's June 27, 2006 decision and dismissed his petition to reduce child support.

The Parenting Arbitrator conducted additional arbitration hearings. On August 15, 2007, she submitted her findings of fact and conclusions of law to the trial court and to the parties. These findings addressed child support, the son's education, both children's uninsured medical expenses, transportation of the children between Mother and Father, and the parties' attorneys fees.

Father filed in the trial court a notice of objections to the Parenting Arbitrator's decision. On August 31, 2007, the trial court entered an order incorporating the Parenting Arbitrator's decision. In response to Father's motion seeking a ruling on his objections, Mother asserted that the parties had agreed to binding arbitration governed by the Tennessee Uniform Arbitration Act (“TUAA”) and that the TUAA permits modification of an arbitrator's decision only under limited circumstances. See Tenn.Code Ann. §§ 29-5-312 to -314 (2000).

On December 7, 2007, the trial court conducted a hearing on Father's objections. The trial court determined that it was not prohibited by the TUAA from modifying the Parenting Arbitrator's ruling. The trial court then modified the Parenting Arbitrator's ruling as to three issues and expressly reserved five issues for an evidentiary hearing in addition to any other issues not completely adjudicated.

Mother appealed the trial court's order modifying the arbitrator's ruling. She based her appeal on section 29-5-319 of the TUAA, which states that [a]n appeal may be taken from: ... [a]n order modifying or correcting an [arbitrator's] award.” 2 Tenn.Code Ann. § 29-5-319(a)(4) (2000). The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's modification of the Parenting Arbitrator's ruling holding that the parties had agreed to non-binding arbitration governed by Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 31.

II. Analysis

On appeal, the parties do not dispute that the Parenting Arbitrator's decision may be appealed to the trial court. The issue before us therefore concerns only the scope of the trial court's review. Mother asserts that the trial court should apply the narrow scope of review provided in the TUAA, which governs binding arbitration. Father, on the other hand, asserts that the trial court should apply the broader scope of review included in the consent order. Before addressing this issue, we will first determine whether the consent order entered by the trial court provided for non-binding arbitration pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 31, as held by the Court of Appeals.

A. Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 31

Rule 31 sets forth the procedures for court-annexed alternative dispute resolution, including non-binding arbitration.3 Tenn. Sup.Ct. R. 31. The goal of court-annexed alternative dispute resolution is to assist the parties in reaching voluntary settlements. See Tenn. Sup.Ct. R. 31 app. A, § 10. To this end, Rule 31 defines “Non-Binding Arbitration” as “a process in which a neutral person ... considers the facts and arguments presented by the parties and renders a decision which is non-binding.” Tenn. Sup.Ct. R. 31 § 2( l ). Pursuant to Rule 31, non-binding arbitration is initiated by the trial court's entry of an Order of Reference, which is permissible only with the parties' consent. Tenn. Sup.Ct. R. 31 § 3(a), (d).

Viewed in its entirety, we conclude that the consent order in this case does not invoke the provisions of Rule 31 related to non-binding arbitration. The parties' agreement vests decision-making authority in the Parenting Arbitrator and provides for an appeal procedure to the trial court. This procedure is foreign to Rule 31. Rule 31, section 21 provides that neutrals serving in non-binding arbitrations are subject to Rule 31, Appendix A, “Standards of Conduct for Rule 31 Neutrals.” In a subsection entitled “Neutral's Role,” Appendix A states that [i]n dispute resolution proceedings, decision-making authority rests with the parties. The role of the Neutral includes but is not limited to assisting the parties in identifying issues, reducing obstacles to communication, maximizing the exploration of alternatives, and helping the parties reach voluntary agreements.” Tenn. Sup.Ct. R. 31 app. A, § 1(b). Accordingly, in non-binding arbitration the parties may accept the result of the arbitration, thereby reaching a voluntary agreement, or they may disagree with the result of the arbitration and return to the court for a resolution in...

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