Tuggle v. Dept. of State Police, Docket No. 255034.
| Decision Date | 13 December 2005 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 255034. |
| Parties | William G. TUGGLE and Vincent L. Yurkowski, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF STATE POLICE and Director of the Department of State Police, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
Steven J. Vander Ark, Grand Rapids, for the plaintiffs.
Michael A. Cox, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, and James E. Long, Assistant Attorney General, for the defendants.
Before: WHITBECK, C.J., and BANDSTRA and SMOLENSKI, JJ.
Plaintiffs appeal as of right the circuit court's grant of summary disposition for defendants1 and denial of plaintiffs' cross-motion for summary disposition.2 We affirm.
Plaintiffs' original action in this matter requested declaratory and mandamus relief regarding defendants' classification of plaintiffs' 1985 convictions of attempted breaking and entering an unoccupied dwelling3 as specified felonies.4 Plaintiffs contended that the specified felony classification of their convictions was erroneous and improperly impeded their right to own firearms under Michigan and federal law.
The primary issue in this matter involves the interpretation of what constitutes a "specified felony" under MCL 750.224f, which provides:
(1) Except as provided in subsection (2), a person convicted of a felony shall not possess, use, transport, sell, purchase, carry, ship, receive, or distribute a firearm in this state until the expiration of 3 years after all of the following circumstances exist:
(a) The person has paid all fines imposed for the violation.
(b) The person has served all terms of imprisonment imposed for the violation.
(c) The person has successfully completed all conditions of probation or parole imposed for the violation.
(2) A person convicted of a specified felony shall not possess, use, transport, sell, purchase, carry, ship, receive, or distribute a firearm in this state until all of the following circumstances exist:
(a) The expiration of 5 years after all of the following circumstances exist:
(i) The person has paid all fines imposed for the violation.
(ii) The person has served all terms of imprisonment imposed for the violation.
(iii) The person has successfully completed all conditions of probation or parole imposed for the violation.
(b) The person's right to possess, use, transport, sell, purchase, carry, ship, receive, or distribute a firearm has been restored pursuant to section 4 of Act No. 372 of the Public Acts of 1927, being section 28.424 of the Michigan Compiled Laws. [This entails going before the local concealed weapons board and seeking restoration through application of the individual's right to possess firearms.]
* * *
(4) This section does not apply to a conviction that has been expunged or set aside, or for which the person has been pardoned, unless the expunction, order, or pardon expressly provides that the person shall not possess a firearm.
(5) As used in this section, "felony" means a violation of a law of this state, or of another state, or of the United States that is punishable by imprisonment for 4 years or more, or an attempt to violate such a law.
(6) As used in subsection (2), "specified felony" means a felony in which 1 or more of the following circumstances exist:
(i) An element of that felony in the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another, or that by its nature involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.
(ii) An element of that felony is the unlawful manufacture, possession, importation, exportation, distribution, or dispensing of a controlled substance.
(iii) An element of that felony is the unlawful possession or distribution of a firearm.
(iv) An element of that felony is the unlawful use of an explosive.
(v) The felony is burglary of an occupied dwelling, or breaking and entering an occupied dwelling, or arson.
Both plaintiffs pleaded guilty of attempted breaking and entering an unoccupied dwelling in 1985. According to plaintiffs, they broke into the Lake Shore Beverage Company with the intent to steal beverages. Plaintiffs were sentenced to probation, which they successfully completed. Plaintiffs' criminal records reflect that they were found guilty and convicted, under MCL 750.110, of the attempted felony of breaking and entering a building with the intent to steal. Plaintiffs assert that defendant Michigan State Police [MSP] has used offense codes to classify crimes based on the criminal convictions reflected in the computerized records and that this information is then used to "flag" individuals disqualified from purchasing firearms.
Plaintiff Tuggle attempted to purchase a firearm in 2001, but he was turned away because the MSP concluded that he had committed a specified felony5 and had not complied with the requirements of MCL 750.224f, in order to be eligible to have his right to possess a firearm restored. Because plaintiffs had not sought restoration of their firearm rights through their local gun board pursuant to MCL 750.224f(2)(b), the MSP's position was that plaintiffs' convictions for specified felonies disqualified them from owning firearms. In contrast, plaintiffs alleged that their rights to own firearms were automatically restored under the statute in effect at the time of their convictions, which precluded felons from owning firearms for eight years following the completion of the felon's sentence. In the alternative, plaintiffs contended that their crimes were not specified felonies and that their right to own firearms had been automatically restored three years after successful completion of their probation.6
Plaintiffs requested a judgment declaring that attempted breaking and entering an unoccupied building was not a specified felony, that their rights to own and possess firearms were restored not later than 1995, and that the MSP records disqualifying plaintiffs from owning firearms were erroneous.7 Plaintiffs also requested a writ of mandamus directing the MSP to maintain their criminal records without marking them as ineligible to own firearms.
Defendants filed a motion for summary disposition under both MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (C)(10), arguing that plaintiffs had committed specified felonies under MCL 750.224f(6)(i), because the elements of their felony convictions entailed the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the property of another person. Defendants also argued that plaintiffs had failed to establish a prima facie case for mandamus relief. The circuit court granted summary disposition in defendants' favor, explaining that
the crime of breaking and entering an unoccupied dwelling unquestionably is a felony that[,] by its nature, involves substantial risk that physical force against the property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense. Therefore, this Court holds that this felony is a "specified felony."
The trial court did not reach plaintiffs' arguments relating to the propriety of mandamus relief. It is from this order that plaintiffs appeal as of right.
We review de novo both the trial court's decision to grant defendants' motion for summary disposition and questions of statutory interpretation.8
It is a goal of the judiciary "to give effect to the intent of the Legislature by reviewing the plain language of the statute."9 "`Unless defined in the statute, every word or phrase should be accorded its plain and ordinary meaning, taking into account the context in which the words are used.'"10 Statutes are to be interpreted to give weight to all language contained therein so as not to render any portion of the statute surplusage or nugatory.11
Plaintiffs couple the rules of statutory interpretation with the maxim that the expression of one thing means the exclusion of another, or expressio unius est exclusio alterius.12 According to plaintiffs, the inclusion of breaking and entering of an occupied dwelling as a separately listed specified felony in MCL 750.224f(6)(v) strongly implies that breaking and entering an unoccupied building is excluded from the definition of a specified felony. To adopt defendants' reading of the statute, which includes breaking and entering an unoccupied building as a crime involving the attempted or threatened use of force against the property of another in the general definition of a specified felony provided by MCL 750.224f(6)(i), plaintiffs contend, would impermissibly render the specified felonies listed in MCL 750.224f(6)(v) surplusage to the general definition. Further, according to plaintiffs, the only possible legislative reason for specifically listing breaking and entering an occupied dwelling as a specified felony would be to differentiate that crime from breaking and entering an unoccupied dwelling.
We note that the rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius is a rule of statutory interpretation meant to help ascertain the intent of the Legislature, and "[i]t does not automatically lead to results."13 The rule does not subsume the plain language of the statute when determining the intent of the Legislature.14 Defendants argued before the trial court that the plain language of MCL 750.224(6), which states that a "`specified felony' means a felony in which 1 or more of the following circumstances exist," indicates that the Legislature contemplated and accepted the fact that some specified felonies could be considered specified felonies under more than one provision of the definition in MCL 750.224f(6). We agree. For example, we note that an individual could be convicted of a crime...
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