Lansing Sch. Educ. Ass'n v. Lansing Bd. of Educ.

• Decision Date: 09 August 2011
• Docket Number: Docket No. 279895.
• Citation: 293 Mich.App. 506,810 N.W.2d 95,277 Ed. Law Rep. 1153
• Parties: LANSING SCHOOLS EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, MEA/NEA v. LANSING BOARD OF EDUCATION (ON REMAND).
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

277 Ed. Law Rep. 1153

293 Mich.App. 506

810 N.W.2d 95

LANSING SCHOOLS EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, MEA/NEA

v.LANSING BOARD OF EDUCATION (ON REMAND).

Docket No. 279895.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted Sept. 7, 2010, at Lansing.Decided Aug. 9, 2011, at 9:00 a.m.

White, Schneider, Young & Chiodini, P.C. (by Michael M. Shoudy, Okemos and Dena Lampinen Lorenz), for plaintiffs.

Thrun Law Firm, P.C., East Lansing (by Donald J. Bonato and Margaret M. Hackett), for defendants.

Before: SAAD, P.J., and FITZGERALD and BECKERING, JJ.

ON REMAND

SAAD, P.J.

Our Supreme Court remanded this case for consideration of issues raised but not addressed in this Court's previous opinion, Lansing Sch. Ed. Ass'n, MEA/NEA v. Lansing Bd. of Ed., 282 Mich.App. 165, 772 N.W.2d 784 (2009), rev'd 487 Mich. 349, 792 N.W.2d 686 (2010). Plaintiffs appeal the trial court's order that granted summary disposition to defendants on plaintiffs' claims for a declaratory judgment, mandamus, and other relief under MCL 380.1311a(1) of the Revised School Code. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we again affirm.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The facts and procedural history were set forth in our previous opinion:

Plaintiffs, Lansing Schools Education Association, MEA/NEA, Cathy Stachwick, Penny Filonczuk, Ellen Wheeler, and Elizabeth Namie, filed their complaint for a declaratory judgment, a writ of mandamus, and injunctive relief on April 9, 2007. Stachwick, Filonczuk, Wheeler, and Namie are teachers in the Lansing public school system and are members of the Lansing Schools Education Association, MEA/NEA, which is the exclusive bargaining representative for Lansing public school teachers. According to plaintiffs' complaint, students hit two of the teachers with a chair, one student slapped one of the teachers, and one student threw a wristband toward one of the teachers and it struck the teacher in the face. Plaintiffs further assert that school administrators were informed of each incident and the students were suspended, but they were not expelled.

Plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that the expulsion of the students is required by § 1311a(1) of the Revised School Code (RSC), MCL 380.1311a(1). Plaintiffs asked the trial court for a declaratory judgment on the rights and legal relations of the parties under the statute. Plaintiffs asserted that each incident constituted a physical assault by a student in grade six or above and that expulsion of each student was mandatory. In addition to a declaratory judgment, plaintiffs asked the trial court for a writ of mandamus ordering defendants to follow the statute and expel the students and to issue a permanent injunction to enjoin defendants from future violations of MCL 380.1311a(1). Plaintiffs further asked the court to find the school officials who failed to follow the statute guilty of a misdemeanor and to cancel the contract of the school superintendent or principal who failed to comply with the statute.

In lieu of an answer, defendants filed a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8). Defendants argued that plaintiffs lack standing to assert their claims under the RSC because they have no legally protected interest in the district's decision to suspend or expel students under MCL 380.1311a(1). Defendants further argued that the RSC does not create a private cause of action by teachers or education associations, but merely sets forth the powers and duties of the school board in disciplinary proceedings. According to defendants, a private cause of action cannot be inferred under the statute because exclusive remedies are set forth in MCL 380.1801 [293 Mich.App. 511] to 380.1816. Defendants maintain that, if plaintiffs had standing to bring their claim, MCL 380.1311a(1) provides that the school board has the sole power to determine whether a student physically assaulted a teacher and findings by a school board are generally deemed conclusive by our courts. Defendants claim that plaintiffs are not entitled to a writ of mandamus or declaratory judgment because there is no clear legal right of performance and the decision whether to expel the students involves the exercise of discretion.

In response, plaintiffs asserted that the Legislature enacted MCL 380.1311a(1) to provide safe environments for teachers and, therefore, teachers have a legal interest in teaching in a safe environment. Plaintiffs further asserted that the plaintiff teachers suffered injuries in fact when they were assaulted and their legally protected interest in their own safety was invaded when the assaults occurred. Further, plaintiffs opined, “By refusing to expel students as required by statute, Defendants invaded the Plaintiff Teachers' legally protected interest in having a safe work environment....” According to plaintiffs, they have standing to assert their claims for the above reasons and because, as a remedial statute, MCL 380.1311a(1) should be liberally construed in favor of the teachers. Alternatively, plaintiffs argue that a private cause of action should be inferred because there is no other adequate remedy or procedure to enforce the statute. Plaintiffs also maintained that the school board does not have the exclusive power to determine whether an assault occurred and that its duty to expel a student who commits an assault is not discretionary.

The trial court heard oral argument on June 20, 2007, and granted defendants' motion for summary disposition. The trial court reasoned that, while MCL 380.1311a(1) requires the expulsion of a student who commits a physical assault, the Lansing School Board has the discretion to determine whether a physical assault occurred within the meaning of the statute. The court further concluded that trial courts should not oversee the individual disciplinary decisions of a local school board. Accordingly, the court issued a written order that granted summary disposition to defendants. [ Lansing Sch. Ed. Ass'n, 282 Mich.App. at 167–169, 772 N.W.2d 784.]

In our prior opinion, we affirmed the trial court's grant of summary disposition and held that plaintiffs lacked standing to maintain their lawsuit because they had failed to establish the elements for standing under Lee v. Macomb Co. Bd. of Comm'rs, 464 Mich. 726, 629 N.W.2d 900 (2001), overruled by Lansing Sch. Ed. Ass'n v. Lansing Bd. of Ed., 487 Mich. 349, 792 N.W.2d 686 (2010). Our Supreme Court reversed, overruling Lee and its progeny. The majority formulated a new standing doctrine: “[A] litigant has standing whenever there is a legal cause of action,” and “[w]here a cause of action is not provided at law, then a court should, in its discretion, determine whether a litigant has standing.” Lansing Sch. Ed. Ass'n, 487 Mich. at 372, 792 N.W.2d 686. “Further, whenever a litigant meets the requirements of MCR 2.605, it is sufficient to establish standing to seek a declaratory judgment.” Id. The Court applied this new test and held that “in this case, plaintiffs have standing because they have a substantial interest in the enforcement of MCL 380.1311a(1) that will be detrimentally affected in a manner different from the citizenry at large if the statute is not enforced.” Id. at 373, 792 N.W.2d 686. Pursuant to the Supreme Court's remand instructions, we now consider “whether plaintiffs meet the requirements of MCR 2.605” as well as the issues that we did not previously reach. Id. at 378, 792 N.W.2d 686.

II. ANALYSIS

A. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

This Court reviews de novo a trial court's decision on a motion for summary disposition in an action for a declaratory judgment. Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. Abalos, 277 Mich.App. 41, 43, 742 N.W.2d 624 (2007). A motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) tests the legal sufficiency of a claim by the pleadings alone to determine whether the plaintiff has stated a claim on which relief may be granted. Spiek v. Dep't of Transp., 456 Mich. 331, 337, 572 N.W.2d 201 (1998). The court accepts all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and construes them in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Maiden v. Rozwood, 461 Mich. 109, 119, 597 N.W.2d 817 (1999). A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8) is appropriately granted “where the claims alleged are ‘so clearly unenforceable as a matter of law that no factual development could possibly justify recovery.’ ” Id. (citation omitted.)

“A trial court's decision whether to issue a writ of mandamus is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” Carter v. Ann Arbor City Attorney, 271 Mich.App. 425, 438, 722 N.W.2d 243 (2006). “But whether defendant had a clear legal duty to perform and whether plaintiff had a clear legal right to the performance of that duty, thereby satisfying the first two steps in the test for assessing the propriety of a writ of mandamus, are questions of law, which this Court reviews de novo.” Id., citing Tuggle v. Dep't of State Police, 269 Mich.App. 657, 667, 712 N.W.2d 750 (2005). A trial court's decision whether to grant injunctive relief is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Pontiac Fire Fighters Union Local 376 v. City of Pontiac, 482 Mich. 1, 8, 753 N.W.2d 595 (2008).

B. LAW AND ANALYSIS

1. SECTION 1311a OF THE REVISED SCHOOL CODE

MCL 380.1311a(1) mandates the permanent expulsion of a student in grade 6 or above who commits a “physical assault at school against a person employed by the school board,” provided that the assault is reported to school officials. Under the statute, a “physical assault” consists of intentionally causing or attempting to cause physical harm to another through force or violence. MCL 380.1311a(12)(b). The statute specifically provides in pertinent part:

(1) If a pupil enrolled in grade 6 or above commits a physical assault at school against a person employed by or engaged as a volunteer or contractor by the school board and the physical assault is reported to the school board, school district superintendent, or building principal by the victim or, if the victim is unable to...