Tuggle v. State, 49A05–1308–CR–413.

Decision Date22 May 2014
Docket NumberNo. 49A05–1308–CR–413.,49A05–1308–CR–413.
Citation9 N.E.3d 726
PartiesJulian TUGGLE, Appellant–Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee–Plaintiff.
CourtIndiana Appellate Court

9 N.E.3d 726

Julian TUGGLE, Appellant–Defendant,
v.
STATE of Indiana, Appellee–Plaintiff.

No. 49A05–1308–CR–413.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

May 22, 2014.


[9 N.E.3d 729]


Matthew D. Anglemeyer, Marion County Public Defender, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellant.

Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Brian Reitz, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.


OPINION

BAKER, Judge.

This case is about an individual who initially lied to the police when he told them that he was only a victim of an armed robbery and shooting. In actuality, the evidence later showed that appellant-defendant Julian Tuggle was also an actual perpetrator of Murder,1 a felony.

After Tuggle was admitted to Wishard Hospital (Hospital) in Indianapolis with a gunshot wound, a police detective was dispatched to the scene, commenced an investigation, and secured the clothing that Tuggle had worn into the hospital. The detective inferred that the clothing that Tuggle wore when the crimes were committed contained evidence of a crime, including a bullet hole and/or blood.

Although the detective seized the bag of Tuggle's clothing, no search or DNA testing was performed on the items until the police obtained a search warrant. However, after various tests were conducted on the clothing, a reported murder victim's DNA was discovered on Tuggle's clothing that the detective had secured. Tuggle was tried, convicted, and sentenced for the victim's murder.

Tuggle challenges the detective's seizure of the bag and the admission of the clothing into evidence, as well as the sufficiency of the evidence. We conclude that Tuggle's Fourth Amendment Rights under the United States Constitution and his rights in accordance with Article I Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution were not violated. The evidence demonstrated that the detective acted lawfully and reasonably in seizing the bag of Tuggle's clothing without a warrant. Also, the evidence was properly admitted at trial, and we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support Tuggle's conviction for murder. Thus, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

FACTS2

While in high school in Indianapolis, Tia Brady dated both Michael Torres and Darnell

[9 N.E.3d 730]

Lindsay. However, after graduating, Brady married another man and moved to Florida with him. The couple had a son and eventually started experiencing marital difficulties. Brady left Florida while her husband was deployed overseas in the air force and spent the summer of 2010 in Indianapolis at her mother's house. That summer, Brady rekindled her romance with Torres.

Although Brady returned to Florida for a while, Torres sent Brady $300 to come back to Indianapolis and stay with him. Brady agreed to return and later found out that Lindsay was also back in Indianapolis. Although Brady and Torres got along for a while, she eventually decided to stop talking to him and started dating Lindsay almost immediately.

On one occasion, Torres went to Brady's house, but she refused to talk to him. Torres then began messaging Brady through Facebook. On December 19, 2011, when Brady and Lindsay were living together at an apartment on Lily Lane in Indianapolis, Lindsay posted a message about Torres on Facebook. That same evening, Torres telephoned Brady's mother and stated that he was surprised about the message that Lindsay had posted.

At approximately 10:30 p.m. that evening, Richard Morales and Destiny Armstrong picked up Lindsay and drove him to a gas station. Tuggle and Torres drove to Brady's residence. At that time, Torres stated that he wanted to speak with Brady. Tuggle went with him, and they knocked on Brady's door. Brady looked through the eye-hole and noticed that Torres was holding a firearm. Torres, who Brady described as “angry,” demanded that she either open the door or he would shoot through the door. Tr. p. 195, 226–27. Brady was frightened so she hid in the bathtub and called 911.

At about this time, Lindsay returned to the apartment in Morales's vehicle. Lindsay saw people inside the doorway to his apartment and Morales explained that Lindsay became angry, stated “let me out ... my girl is in there,” and angrily asked, “who the f*ck is at my house?” Id. at 245–46. Lindsay ran inside, and Armstrong noticed an individual standing inside with a gun. Brady then heard the apartment's security door shut, some scuffling, and a gunshot. Morales and Armstrong, who were outside in their vehicle, heard two gunshots, started to drive away, and then heard another gunshot. Morales saw several people flee the scene running, but saw two men walking away who appeared to be unafraid. Morales subsequently explained that those two people “didn't look like they were running for their lives. Everybody else was scattering like roaches.” Id. at 253. Tuggle and Torres returned to the vehicle and drove away. Morales then dialed 911.

A neighbor, Andre Maurice Majors, also heard people fighting that evening, looked outside of his apartment, and saw Lindsay holding his right leg. Lindsay told Majors that he had been shot. Lindsay knocked on his apartment door, Brady opened it, and Lindsay fell inside. Majors then called 911. Brady saw a gun that she did not recognize, and placed it in a safe because she did not want Lindsay to be in any legal trouble.

Several Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Officers (IMPD) were dispatched to the scene and saw Lindsay on the ground lying halfway inside of the apartment. Just before Lindsay died of three gunshot wounds, he told the officers that Torres was involved in the shooting, and Brady gave the officers the gun that she put in the safe. Brady also told the officers that Tuggle was Torres's friend. Four spent

[9 N.E.3d 731]

shell casings were recovered from the scene, along with two spent bullets.

Later that evening, Torres called Brady's mother and told her that Lindsay had shot Tuggle. The next morning, Brady's mother found out the seriousness of Lindsay's injuries and again spoke to Torres. Torres expressed remorse, saying that he had “messed up,” and “shouldn't have did it.” Tr. p. 340. Torres also stated that he was going to turn himself in. Id.

Upon leaving the scene of the shooting, Torres drove Tuggle to Wishard Hospital where medical personnel—as is their typical routine in preparing to treat traumatic-injury victims for medical procedures—removed Tuggle's clothing and placed his clothing in a bag. Moreover, as part of their standard operating procedure, the hospital reported to IMPD that a gunshot victim had arrived at the hospital. In response, IMPD dispatched an officer to the hospital. Detective Greg Hagan arrived at Wishard at approximately 11:45 p.m. on the evening of the shooting, introduced himself to Tuggle, and began interviewing him. Tr. p. 382. Tuggle was described as alert and conscious and told Detective Hagan that he had been playing a dice game at the Meadows apartments, and that one of the other players shot and robbed him of $360. Tuggle specifically stated that he was shot at 4126 Meadows, in the basement of the apartment. Because Detective Hagan believed that Tuggle was a gunshot victim and had no reason to believe that he was involved in the other shooting, he took Tuggle's clothing to the crime lab in accordance with police procedure.

Detective Hagan subsequently learned that other IMPD detectives had responded to a shooting scene on Lily Lane around 11:00 p.m. that evening. Detective Hagan left Wishard and went to that location to see if he might assist with the investigation. Other officers informed Detective Hagan that Tuggle was mentioned as an acquaintance of Michael Torres, the shooting suspect. However, nothing indicated that Tuggle himself was a suspect. Detective Hagan had no further involvement in either the investigation of the shooting on Lily Lane or with regard to Tuggle's shooting.

IMPD Detective Thomas Lehn eventually became the lead detective in the Lindsay shooting. Initially, Tuggle was not a suspect in Lindsay's shooting. No eyewitness placed Tuggle at the Lily Lane address, and Tuggle again asserted that he was a shooting victim at the Meadows.

On February 10, 2012, Detective Lehn spoke with Tuggle, and Tuggle again maintained that he had been shot at the Meadows. Because of the coincidental timing of the shootings, Detective Lehn sought and obtained a search warrant to perform a buccal swab on Tuggle and for forensic testing on his clothing. Detective Lehn performed the swab testing on Tuggle, but he was not arrested because at the time, there was no evidence of Tuggle's involvement. However, Tuggle's clothing was subsequently tested and his jeans, shirt, and socks, and shoes tested positive for Lindsay's blood. Because of the evidence that linked Tuggle to Lindsay's shooting, the State charged Tuggle with murder on January 4, 2013.

Tuggle subsequently moved to suppress the DNA evidence, claiming that his clothing had been illegally seized. The trial court initially explained that

I show up at the hospital, I've been shot. If I'm telling the truth or if I'm lying and I got shot wherever I say I got shot and a detective is standing bedside, it's common practice for that detective to gather the clothing. To say it would be destroyed—I don't think—because you're dealing with someone who is potentially

[9 N.E.3d 732]

a victim at that point and you are preserving evidence on a separate case, where as you are looking for someone who may have shot this person.

Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied Tuggle's motion to suppress, holding that

The Court finds as a matter of fact that Defendant Tuggle was not considered to be a “suspect” in the commission of any crime at the time of the seizure of clothing alleged to belong to him. The Court finds as a matter of fact that neither incriminating nor exculpatory information or material was derived from any clothing alleged to belong to Defendant Tuggle prior to the acquisition of a search...

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