Tuleta v. Med. Mut. of Ohio

• Decision Date: 06 February 2014
• Docket Number: No. 100050.,100050.
• Citation: 6 N.E.3d 106
• Parties: Anthony TULETA, et al., Plaintiffs–Appellees v. MEDICAL MUTUAL OF OHIO, et al., Defendants.
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

6 N.E.3d 106

Anthony TULETA, et al., Plaintiffs–Appellees

v.MEDICAL MUTUAL OF OHIO, et al., Defendants.

No. 100050.

Court of Appeals of Ohio,

Eighth District, Cuyahoga County.

Feb. 6, 2014.

Barbara Langhenry, Director of Law, Alejandro V. Cortes, William M. Menzalora, Assistant Directors of Law, Cleveland, OH, for Appellants.

Henry W. Chamberlain, Chamberlain Law Firm, Avon, OH, David A. Hamamey, II, Hamamey Law Firm, L.L.C., Middleburg Heights, OH, John J. Sheehan, Jr., Sheehan Law, Euclid, OH, for Anthony and Elenny Tuleta.

Timothy J. McGinty, Cuyahoga County Prosecutor, Brian R. Gutkoski, Assistant County Prosecutor, Cleveland, OH, for Cuyahoga County, Ohio, et al.

Lindsey A. Carr, Christopher G. Keim, Frantz Ward L.L.P., Cleveland, OH, for Medical Mutual of Ohio, et al.

Before: BOYLE, A.J., E.A. GALLAGHER, J., and BLACKMON, J.

MARY J. BOYLE, A.J.

{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Michael McGrath, appeals from the trial court's interlocutory order denying his motion to dismiss. He raises one assignment of error for our review:

The trial court erred as a matter of law and improperly denied defendant-appellant Chief of Police Michael McGrath's motion to dismiss because he is immune from liability under R.C. Chapter 2744.

{¶ 2} After review, we reverse and remand.

Procedural History

{¶ 3} In October 2012, plaintiff-appellee, Anthony Tuleta, filed his complaint against Medical Mutual of Ohio, Bruce Sieniawski, Cuyahoga County, the Cuyahoga County Prosecutor's Office, several individual county prosecutors, the city of Cleveland and McGrath, the chief of police for the city of Cleveland (“Chief McGrath”). He brought five claims against defendants: malicious prosecution, abuse of process, breach of confidentiality and/or inducing breach of confidentiality, and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Tuleta's wife, also a plaintiff in the case, brought a consortium claim against defendants.

{¶ 4} According to Tuleta's complaint, the alleged facts are as follows. Medical Mutual was Tuleta's health insurance carrier. Sieniawski worked for Medical Mutual, providing investigatory services for the company. Tuleta alleges that Sieniawski was “one of the original individuals who brought about criminal prosecution against” him.

{¶ 5} Tuleta asserts that the city of Cleveland and Chief McGrath, as well as Cuyahoga County and county prosecutors, “investigated, charged, indicted and prosecuted” him with malice and without probable cause. Tuleta also claims that defendants obtained privileged medical information from his physician without his consent, and specifically alleges that defendants induced his physician to give them the confidential medical information.

{¶ 6} Tuleta further alleges that as a result of defendants' actions in investigating and maliciously prosecuting him, the Cuyahoga County Grand Jury indicted him in 2009 on six counts of drug possession and one count of aggravated theft for offenses that allegedly occurred between the years 2003 and 2007. Tuleta asserts that “[t]he prosecution of [him] on these criminal matters was ultimately ended” in his favor when the Ohio Supreme Court declined to accept the state's appeal on October 19, 2011.

{¶ 7} Medical Mutual and Sieniawski answered the complaint. The county and city defendants moved to dismiss the complaint.

{¶ 8} The trial court granted the county's motion to dismiss in its entirety. Regarding the city defendants, the trial court granted the city's motion, but denied Chief McGrath's.¹ The trial court ruled that “[a]ccepting plaintiff's allegations of malice as true, defendant Michael McGrath could be liable as to at least one of the counts contained in the complaint.” It is from this interlocutory order that Chief McGrath appeals.

Pleading Standard

{¶ 9} In challenging the trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss, Chief McGrath argues that this court should apply the federal court's heightened pleading standard set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). Chief McGrath contends that for Tuleta to survive a motion to dismiss, Tuleta was required to set forth facts that demonstrate his “plausible entitlement to relief.” We will therefore examine Twombly in light of Chief McGrath's arguments, as well as Twombly's implications—if any—on Ohio's pleading standard.

A. History of Ohio's Pleading Standard

{¶ 10} Ohio adopted the Rules of Civil Procedure in 1970. Price v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 70 Ohio St.2d 131, 133, 435 N.E.2d 1114 (1982). With the adoption of these rules, which at that time were identical to the federal rules, Ohio has long been a notice-pleading state. See Sacksteder v. Senney, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 24993, 2012-Ohio-4452, 2012 WL 4480695;see also John B. Oakley & Arthur F. Coon, The Federal Rules in State Courts: A Survey of State Court Systems of Civil Procedure, 61 Wash.L.Rev. 1367 (1986).

{¶ 11} Like the federal counterpart, Civ.R. 8(A) provides that “[a] pleading that sets forth a claim for relief * * * shall contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the party is entitled to relief [.]” Also like the federal rules, Civ.R. 8(E)(1) states that “[e]ach averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct. No technical forms of pleading or motions are required[,]” and Civ.R. 8(F) mandates that “[a]ll pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice.”

{¶ 12} As the Fifth District pointed out in Grossniklaus v. Waltman, 5th Dist. Holmes No. 09CA15, 2010-Ohio-2937, 2010 WL 2546704, ¶ 26:

Under the notice pleading requirements of Civ.R. 8(A)(1), the plaintiff only needs to plead sufficient, operative facts to support recovery under his claims. Doe v. Robinson, 6th Dist. No. 1–07–1051, 2007-Ohio-5746, 2007 WL 3120279, ¶ 17. Nevertheless, to constitute fair notice, the complaint must still allege sufficient underlying facts that relate to and support the alleged claim, and may not simply state legal conclusions. See DeVore v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 32 Ohio App.2d 36, 38, 288 N.E.2d 202 (7th Dist.1972).

{¶ 13} Whether a complaint should be dismissed pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6) raises questions of law and is reviewed de novo. Stanfield v. Amvets Post No. 88, 2d Dist. Miami No. 06CA35, 2007-Ohio-1896, 2007 WL 1174445, ¶ 9. The function of a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is to test the legal sufficiency of a claim. State ex rel. Hanson v. Guernsey Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 65 Ohio St.3d 545, 548, 605 N.E.2d 378 (1992). It is well settled that “when a party files a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, all factual allegations of the complaint must be taken as true and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party.” Byrd v. Faber, 57 Ohio St.3d 56, 60, 565 N.E.2d 584 (1991), citing Mitchell v. Lawson Milk Co., 40 Ohio St.3d 190, 192, 532 N.E.2d 753 (1988).

{¶ 14} Five years after the Rules of Civil Procedure became effective, the Ohio Supreme Court adopted the “no set of facts” pleading standard set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). O'Brien v. Univ. Community Tenants Union, Inc., 42 Ohio St.2d 242, 245, 327 N.E.2d 753 (1975), syllabus. Specifically, the Ohio Supreme Court stated that in determining the sufficiency of the complaint, it “should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” (Emphasis added.) O'Brien at 245, 327 N.E.2d 753, quoting Conley at 45, 78 S.Ct. 99. Ohio courts have been applying this “no set of facts” pleading standard for nearly 40 years.

{¶ 15} Four years after the adoption of the Rules of Civil Procedure, and one year before the Ohio Supreme Court formally adopted Conley's “no set of facts” standard, this court noted that “few complaints fail to meet the liberal standards of Rule 8 and become subject to dismissal.” Slife v. Kundtz Properties, Inc., 40 Ohio App.2d 179, 182, 318 N.E.2d 557 (8th Dist.1974). We further emphasized that “the motion to dismiss is viewed with disfavor and should rarely be granted.” Id.

{¶ 16} Another Ohio appellate court explained that pursuant to the Rules of Civil Procedure:

[T]he complaint * * * need not state with precision all elements that give rise to a legal basis for recovery as long as fair notice of the nature of the action is provided. However, the complaint must contain either direct allegations on every material point necessary to sustain a recovery on any legal theory, even though it may not be the theory suggested or intended by the pleader, or contain allegations from which an inference fairly may be drawn that evidence on these material points will be introduced at trial.

Fancher v. Fancher, 8 Ohio App.3d 79, 83, 455 N.E.2d 1344 (1st Dist.1982).

{¶ 17} In York v. Ohio State Hwy. Patrol, 60 Ohio St.3d 143, 145, 573 N.E.2d 1063 (1991), the Ohio Supreme Court reaffirmed the “no set of facts” standard, reasoning:

[A] plaintiff is not required to prove his or her case at the pleading stage. Very often, the evidence necessary for a plaintiff to prevail is not obtained until the plaintiff is able to discover materials in the defendant's possession. If the plaintiff were required to prove his or her case in the complaint, many valid claims would be dismissed because of the plaintiff's lack of access to relevant evidence. Consequently, as long as there is a set of facts, consistent with the plaintiff's complaint, which would allow the plaintiff to recover, the court may not grant a defendant's motion to dismiss.

Id. at 145, 573 N.E.2d 1063.

B. The Federal Standard under Bell Atlantic v. Twombly

{¶ 18} Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), was a complex, antitrust case. The...