Tully v. Kenmore-Tonawanda Union Free Sch. Dist.

• Decision Date: 08 July 2022
• Docket Number: 513,CA 21-00794
• Citation: 207 A.D.3d 1215,171 N.Y.S.3d 693
• Parties: Stephanie TULLY, Plaintiff-Appellant-Respondent, v. KENMORE-TONAWANDA UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, Anthony Ramunno, Defendants-Respondents-Appellants, et al., Defendant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

207 A.D.3d 1215

171 N.Y.S.3d 693

Stephanie TULLY, Plaintiff-Appellant-Respondent,

v.KENMORE-TONAWANDA UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, Anthony Ramunno, Defendants-Respondents-Appellants, et al., Defendant.

513

CA 21-00794

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department, New York.

Entered: July 8, 2022

GROSS SHUMAN, P.C., BUFFALO (SARAH P. RERA OF COUNSEL), FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT-RESPONDENT.

HURWITZ & FINE, P.C., BUFFALO (BRIAN M. WEBB OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS-APPELLANTS.

PRESENT: WHALEN, P.J., SMITH, PERADOTTO, AND WINSLOW, JJ.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is unanimously modified on the law by granting the motion in its entirety and dismissing the amended complaint against defendants Kenmore-Tonawanda Union Free School District and Anthony Ramunno, and as modified the order is affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: Plaintiff commenced this action seeking to recover damages for injuries she allegedly sustained while riding in a school bus operated by Kenmore-Tonawanda Union Free School District and Anthony Ramunno (defendants) and defendant Kenmore-Tonawanda Department of Transportation when the bus drove over a large bump in the road, thereby causing plaintiff to be lifted out of her seat and strike her head on a bar above the emergency exit door. Plaintiff appeals and defendants cross-appeal from an order that granted those parts of defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the amended complaint, as amplified by the bill of particulars, with respect to the significant disfigurement, permanent consequential limitation of use (PCLU), and 90/180-day categories of serious injury against them, and denied defendants’ motion with respect to the significant limitation of use (SLU) category (see Insurance Law § 5102 [d] ). We agree with defendants that Supreme Court erred in failing to grant the motion in its entirety, and we therefore modify the order accordingly.

We note at the outset that the court properly granted the motion with respect to the significant disfigurement category because plaintiff, in opposition to the motion, abandoned any claim under that category (see Endres v. Shelba D. Johnson Trucking, Inc. , 60 A.D.3d 1481, 1482, 876 N.Y.S.2d 593 [4th Dept. 2009] ).

We reject plaintiff's contention on her appeal that the court erred in granting the motion with respect to the PCLU category. In order to satisfy the serious injury threshold under Insurance Law § 5102, a plaintiff must present "objective proof of ... injury"; "subjective complaints alone are not sufficient" ( Toure v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc. , 98 N.Y.2d 345, 350, 746 N.Y.S.2d 865, 774 N.E.2d 1197 [2002] ; see Weaver v. Town of Penfield , 68 A.D.3d 1782, 1784, 891 N.Y.S.2d 795 [4th Dept. 2009] ). Thus, with respect to the PCLU category specifically, "a plaintiff must ‘submit objective proof of a permanent injury’ to establish a qualifying serious injury" ( Gamblin v. Nam , 200 A.D.3d 1610, 1613, 161 N.Y.S.3d 550 [4th Dept. 2021] ). "[A] ‘minor, mild or slight limitation of use [is] classified as insignificant within the meaning of the [no-fault] statute’ " ( Gaddy v. Eyler , 79 N.Y.2d 955, 957, 582 N.Y.S.2d 990, 591 N.E.2d 1176 [1992] ).

Here, we conclude that defendants met their initial burden with respect to the PCLU category by submitting, inter alia, plaintiff's medical records and the affirmed independent medical examination (IME) reports of a neurologist and a neuropsychologist, who each examined plaintiff on behalf of defendants and opined that there was no objective medical evidence of a serious injury (see Koneski v. Seppala , 158 A.D.3d 1211, 1213, 70 N.Y.S.3d 625 [4th Dept. 2018] ; Downie v. McDonough , 117 A.D.3d 1401, 1402, 984 N.Y.S.2d 710 [4th Dept. 2014], lv denied 24 N.Y.3d 906, 2014 WL 5366461 [2014] ). The IME neurologist concluded that there was no convincing evidence that plaintiff sustained a concussion because, among other things, all imaging studies of her brain, including multiple MRIs, had been normal and it could not be said within a reasonable degree of medical certainty that plaintiff exhibited symptoms that would lead to the conclusion that she sustained a concussion (cf. Snyder v. Daw , 175 A.D.3d 1045, 1046, 106 N.Y.S.3d 710 [4th Dept. 2019] ). Importantly, the IME neurologist noted that neuropsychological testing conducted five months after the bus incident by plaintiff's own clinical neuropsychologist revealed a "largely normal cognitive examination" of a patient with "average intellectual reasoning" and "cognitive functioning ... within normal limits," and with none of the weaknesses on the exam representing "a clinically significant cognitive deficit

." The IME neuropsychologist likewise concluded that, in the aggregate, his neuropsychological evaluation supported and expanded upon the conclusions of plaintiff's clinical neuropsychologist insofar as plaintiff did not have, nor would she be expected to have, any causally related cognitive deficits due to the incident and, instead, had significant affective disorder underlying her various subjective mental and physical complaints (see Flisch v. Walters , 42 A.D.3d 682, 683, 839 N.Y.S.2d 602 [3d Dept. 2007] ). Although plaintiff asserts that defendants’ own submissions raise a triable issue of fact because the IME neurologist ostensibly diagnosed her with post-traumatic headaches

and occipital neuralgia related to the incident, that assertion lacks merit inasmuch as the IME neurologist specified that such assessment was based upon plaintiff's subjective complaints only, which is insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact (see

Beaton v. Jones , 50 A.D.3d 1500, 1502, 857 N.Y.S.2d 384 [4th Dept. 2008] ). Additionally, defendants’ submissions demonstrated that any post-traumatic concussive symptoms experienced by plaintiff following the incident, such as headaches, had not "in any way incapacitated [her] or interfered with [her] ability to work or engage in activities at home" ( Licari v. Elliott , 57 N.Y.2d 230, 239, 455 N.Y.S.2d 570, 441 N.E.2d 1088 [1982] ; see

McKeon v. McLane Co., Inc. , 145 A.D.3d 1459, 1461, 44 N.Y.S.3d 277 [4th Dept. 2016] ; cf.

Cook v. Peterson , 137 A.D.3d 1594, 1595-1596, 28 N.Y.S.3d 501 [4th Dept. 2016] ).

The burden thus shifted to plaintiff, who failed to submit objective proof of a permanent consequential injury (see McKeon , 145 A.D.3d at 1461, 44 N.Y.S.3d 277 ). Contrary to plaintiff's contention, we conclude that the affirmation of her treating neurologist, which consists of a recitation of the treatment he provided to plaintiff based on her subjective reports of headaches and related symptoms followed by a conclusory opinion that plaintiff sustained significant and consequential limitations, "is insufficient to raise an issue of fact because it fails to address the absence of objective findings on the ... MRI scans, [and] relies upon subjective complaints of ... headaches" ( Smith v. Reeves , 96 A.D.3d 1550, 1552, 946 N.Y.S.2d 750 [4th Dept. 2012] ; see Downie , 117 A.D.3d at 1403, 984 N.Y.S.2d 710 ; Solarzano v. Power Test Petro, Inc. , 181 A.D.2d 631, 631, 582 N.Y.S.2d 10 [1st Dept. 1992], lv denied 80 N.Y.2d 759, 589 N.Y.S.2d 309, 602 N.E.2d 1125 [1992] ).

We also reject plaintiff's contention on her appeal that the court erred in granting the motion with respect to the 90/180-day category. To recover under that category, a person must sustain "a medically determined injury or impairment of a non-permanent nature which prevents the injured person from performing substantially all of the material acts which constitute such person's usual and customary daily activities for not less than [90] days during the [180] days immediately following the occurrence of the injury or impairment" ( Insurance Law § 5102 [d] ). Thus, "[t]o qualify as a serious injury under the 90/180[-day] category, there must be objective evidence of a medically determined injury or impairment of a non-permanent nature ... as well as evidence that plaintiff's activities were curtailed to a great extent" ( Baldauf v. Gambino , 177 A.D.3d 1307, 1308, 111 N.Y.S.3d 773 [4th Dept. 2019] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Licari , 57 N.Y.2d at 236, 455 N.Y.S.2d 570, 441 N.E.2d 1088 ).

Here, even assuming, arguendo, that the cervical MRI performed three months after the incident showing, inter alia, a disc herniation/protrusion at C4-5 and small posterior disc bulges mildly effacing the thecal sac at C6-7 constituted objective evidence of a medically determined injury or impairment of a non-permanent nature, defendants nonetheless met their initial burden by establishing that plaintiff's activities were not curtailed to a great extent during the applicable period. Plaintiff went to work after the incident, did not seek medical treatment for a week, and thereafter did not miss any time from work or school during the six months following the incident (see Baldauf , 177 A.D.3d at 1308, 111 N.Y.S.3d 773 ; Robinson v. Polasky , 32 A.D.3d 1215, 1216, 822 N.Y.S.2d 183 [4th Dept. 2006] ). The purported restrictions mentioned in defendants’ moving papers and now relied upon by plaintiff on appeal do not raise a triable issue of fact regarding whether plaintiff was prevented from performing substantially all of her daily activities. While plaintiff testified that she had a slight lifting restriction at her job at a pizzeria following the incident, she acknowledged that she did not submit any medical documentation to her employer for any restriction at work and, in any event, plaintiff maintained her full work schedule, and her claimed restriction of no longer being able to lift sauce buckets and cheese bins constitutes, at most, "some slight curtailment" of her daily activities, which is insufficient to raise a triable issue under the 90/180-day category ( Licari , 57 N.Y.2d at 236, 455 N.Y.S.2d 570, 441 N.E.2d 1088 ; see LaBeef v. Baitsell , 104 A.D.3d 1191, 1192, 960 N.Y.S.2d 809 [4th Dept. 2013] ). Add...