Tumoe v. Barr
| Decision Date | 23 July 2020 |
| Docket Number | 4:19-cv-00194 |
| Citation | 474 F.Supp.3d 997 |
| Parties | Daddy Stanley TUMOE, Plaintiff, v. William BARR, U.S. Attorney General; Chad Wolf, Acting Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security; Kenneth T. Cuccinelli, Acting Director of U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Services; Marta Nickols, Field Office Director of U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Services, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Iowa |
Benjamin David Bergmann, Jessica Donels, PARRISH KRUIDENIER DUNN, BOLES GRIBBLE GENTRY, BROWN & BERGMANN, L.L.P., 2910 GRAND AVENUE, DES MOINES, IA 50312, 515 284 5737, 515 284 1704 (fax), bbergmann@parrishlaw.com, for Plaintiff Daddy Stanley Tumoe.
Kristin Elaine Olson, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S OFFICE - DSM, 110 E COURT AVE, SUITE 286, DES MOINES, IA 50309, 515-473-9309, 515-473-9298 (fax), kristin.olson@usdoj.gov, for Defendants Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Attorney General, U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Services.
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN PART AND GRANTING IN PART
Before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, filed on March 13, 2020. ECF No. 19. Plaintiff filed his resistance on April 23. ECF No. 23. Defendants replied on May 12. ECF No. 27. The Court heard oral argument on June 10. ECF No. 29. The parties then filed supplemental briefing on June 17. ECF Nos. 31–32. The matter is fully submitted.
Plaintiff Daddy Stanley Tumoe is a native citizen of Liberia who, after eight years in the United States, seeks the burdens and privileges of American citizenship. ECF No. 19-2 ¶¶ 1, 9. Whether that is possible hinges on how one views some paperwork he completed a decade ago. See id. ¶ 3; ECF No. 23-2 ¶¶ 3, 4.
In 2010, Plaintiff submitted an electronic entry for the Diversity Immigrant Visa Program. ECF No. 19-2 ¶ 3. His entry did not mention the five children he had fathered.1 Id. ¶ 2; ECF No. 23-2 ¶ 4. In 2011, the program's lottery selected him for further processing, and officials requested he complete more paperwork. ECF No. 19-2 ¶ 5. That paperwork asked Plaintiff to "List Names, Dates and Places of Birth, and Addresses of ALL Children." Id. ¶ 6. Plaintiff wrote "N/A" across the blank lines for his response. Id. ; see also ECF No. 15 at 176.
In May 2012, a local consular official interviewed Plaintiff for his application. ECF No. 19-2 ¶ 7. During that interview, Plaintiff swore that his forms were "true and complete" and "that any willfully false or misleading statement or willful concealment of a material fact made by me" could have various negative consequences. ECF No. 15 at 178. Plaintiff received a visa that day and entered the United States on May 21, 2012, as a lawful permanent resident. See id. at 144; ECF No. 19-1 at 11.
Plaintiff then sought American citizenship in 2017. ECF No. 19-2 ¶ 10. This time, he said he had six children. Id. ¶¶ 11, 14. In a 2018 interview with a consular official, Plaintiff acknowledged he had not listed his children on his visa application years earlier. Id. ¶ 15. Asked why, Plaintiff said "[t]he rules say only the people applying with [him] should be listed on the applications."2 Id. (alteration in original). Plaintiff had not petitioned for his children to join him in the United States. ECF No. 15 at 52.
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) denied Plaintiff's naturalization petition on July 25, 2018. ECF No. 19-2 ¶ 17. Plaintiff "was ineligible for naturalization because he was inadmissible to the United States at the time of his entry on May 21, 2012," the agency concluded. Id. ¶ 18. Plaintiff requested a review hearing. Id. ¶ 19. He also submitted an affidavit in which he swore that he had not listed his children on the original visa application because he " ‘misunderstood the rules for the Diversity Visa Lottery Application,’ ‘filled out [the] form without the assistance of an attorney,’ and ‘thought that [he] was only supposed to include the people applying for visas on the application.’ " Id. ¶ 20 (alteration in original). On March 12, 2019, USCIS affirmed the denial of Plaintiff's naturalization application. Id. ¶ 21.
On July 1, 2019, Plaintiff sought review by this Court. Id. ¶ 24. He brought claims under 8 U.S.C. § 1421(c) and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 702 et seq. He has since acknowledged his APA claim must be dismissed. ECF No. 23 ¶ 4. Regarding his § 1421(c) claim, this Court's review is de novo, and it must "make its own findings of fact and conclusions of law." § 1421(c).
"[S]ummary judgment is an extreme remedy, and one which is not to be granted unless the movant has established his right to a judgment with such clarity as to leave no room for controversy and that the other party is not entitled to recover under any discernible circumstances." Robert Johnson Grain Co. v. Chem. Interchange Co. , 541 F.2d 207, 209 (8th Cir. 1976). It is designed to avoid "useless, expensive and time-consuming trials where there is actually no genuine, factual issue remaining to be tried." Anderson v. Viking Pump Div., Houdaille Indus., Inc. , 545 F.2d 1127, 1129 (8th Cir. 1976).
"A party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense—or the part of each claim or defense—on which summary judgment is sought." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Summary judgment is proper when the record, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and giving that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences, shows there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See id. ; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) ; Harlston v. McDonnell Douglas Corp. , 37 F.3d 379, 382 (8th Cir. 1994). A disputed issue is "genuine" when the evidence produced "is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A fact is "material" if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." See id.
Summary judgment also can be appropriate when the parties, as here, agree on the material facts but disagree on the governing law. Odom v. Tripp , 575 F. Supp. 1491, 1493 (E.D. Mo. 1983). This includes disputes over "statutory construction involving legislative history and policy." Nat'l Gerimedical Hosp. & Gerontology Ctr. v. Blue Cross of Kansas City , 479 F. Supp. 1012, 1015 (W.D. Mo. 1979), aff'd , 628 F.2d 1050 (8th Cir. 1980), rev'd on other grounds , 452 U.S. 378, 101 S.Ct. 2415, 69 L.Ed.2d 89 (1981). However, courts tread lightly when granting summary judgment requires adopting a novel interpretation of law that could affect many litigants to come. E.g., Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Teleprompter Corp. , 251 F. Supp. 302, 305 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
When a summary judgment motion is filed, the moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact based on the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and affidavits, if any. See id. at 323; Anderson , 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. If the moving party has carried its burden, the nonmoving party must then go beyond its original pleadings and designate specific facts showing that there remains a genuine issue of material fact that needs to be resolved by a trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). This additional showing can be by affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories, or admissions in the record. Id. ; Anderson , 477 U.S. at 257, 106 S.Ct. 2505.
"[I]t has been universally accepted that the burden is on the alien applicant to show his eligibility for citizenship in every respect." Berenyi v. Dist. Dir., Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. , 385 U.S. 630, 637, 87 S.Ct. 666, 17 L.Ed.2d 656 (1967). The U.S. Supreme Court "has often stated that doubts ‘should be resolved in favor of the United States and against the [person seeking citizenship].’ " Id. (citing United States v. Macintosh , 283 U.S. 605, 626, 51 S.Ct. 570, 75 L.Ed. 1302 (1931) ). Of course, the present question is not whether Plaintiff is "eligib[le] for citizenship in every respect," Berenyi , 385 U.S. at 637, 87 S.Ct. 666, but whether the Government is entitled to summary judgment on a theory that is both very narrow and, yet, exceedingly broad.
"[N]o person shall be naturalized unless he has been lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent residence in accordance with all applicable provisions of this chapter." 8 U.S.C. § 1429. "The [Immigration and Nationality Act] defines the term ‘lawfully admitted for permanent residence’ as meaning ‘the status of having been lawfully accorded the privilege of residing permanently in the United States.’ " Arellano-Garcia v. Gonzales , 429 F.3d 1183, 1186 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20) ). Because Congress's definition is circuitous, the Eighth Circuit has deferred to the Attorney General's interpretation. Id. (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. , 467 U.S. 837, 842–43, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984) ).
The Attorney General interpreted the word "lawfully" to mean "compliance with substantive legal requirements, not mere procedural regularity." Id. (collecting cases). Courts have thus held that an immigrant who was, in fact, inadmissible yet nonetheless obtained lawful-permanent-resident status—through fraud or the government's mistake—did not "lawfully" obtain that status and, thus, cannot be naturalized. See id. ; see also Injeti v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs. , 737 F.3d 311, 316 (4th Cir. 2013) (citing Walker v. Holder , 589 F.3d 12, 19 (1st Cir. 2009) ). Under this reasoning, to become a truly lawful permanent resident, one must be, in fact, "admissible." See 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a)(2).
Congress spelled out specific grounds in which an immigrant...
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