Tunica County v. Gray

• Decision Date: 23 July 2009
• Docket Number: No. 2008-CA-00952-SCT.,2008-CA-00952-SCT.
• Citation: 13 So.3d 826
• Parties: Tunica COUNTY, Mississippi v. Christina Bell GRAY, Milton Bell, Charles C. Bell And Garmillia Ann Bell, Individually and as The Wrongful Death Heirs of Clarence Leon Bell, Deceased, and The Estate of Clarence Leon Bell, by and Through its Administratrix, and Renee Dowd.
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

13 So.3d 826

Tunica COUNTY, Mississippi v. Christina Bell GRAY, Milton Bell, Charles C. Bell And Garmillia Ann Bell, Individually and as The Wrongful Death Heirs of Clarence Leon Bell, Deceased, and The Estate of Clarence Leon Bell, by and Through its Administratrix, and Renee Dowd.

No. 2008-CA-00952-SCT.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

July 23, 2009.

Daniel J. Griffith, Cleveland, attorney for appellant.

Edward P. Connell, Jr., Clarksdale, attorney for appellees.

EN BANC.

LAMAR, Justice, for the Court.

¶ 1. In this case we are called upon to determine whether Mississippi Code Section 41-39-5 imposes an actionable duty on county boards of supervisors with regard to disposition of unclaimed bodies. The trial court found that the statute creates an actionable duty, and that the Tunica County Board of Supervisors violated that duty by authorizing the cremation of an unclaimed body before the expiration of the statutory waiting period. The trial court awarded damages to the family of the deceased. Finding error, we reverse and render.

FACTS

¶ 2. On April 12, 2001, Clarence Leon Bell was arrested by Tunica County Sheriff's Department deputies for disturbing the peace at Gold Strike Casino in Tunica. Bell was transported to the Tunica County jail where he was ultimately placed as the sole occupant in a padded cell. Several hours later, Bell was found dead in the cell, with a portion of his orange jumpsuit wrapped around his neck. Another portion of the jumpsuit rested in Bell's hand, suggesting suicide by strangulation.

¶ 3. Tunica County Interim Coroner Jesse Powell was called to the scene. After EMTs were not able to revive Bell, the cell was locked, and the Mississippi Highway Patrol was called to investigate the death. That day, Bell's body was sent to Pearl for an autopsy, where Dr. Steven Hayne concluded that the death was caused by suicide due to ligature hanging.

¶ 4. On the date of death, Powell began efforts to locate the family of the deceased. He derived Bell's social security number and date of birth from the jail's booking card, which also listed Bell's address as 667 North Ridge Road, Castle Rock, Colorado. No phone number was listed on the booking card. Powell contacted the Douglas County (Colorado) Sheriff's Department and, aided by the local victim assistance coordinator, spoke with a woman at the address, Ms. Dillman. Dillman made no mention of Bell's family and stated that, although Bell had once lived at the address, she had neither seen nor heard from him for more than ten years.

¶ 5. Also on the date of death, Powell checked both the FBI's National Crime Information Center database and the Automated Fingerprint Identification System fingerprint database, neither of which produced any leads. Powell contacted Gold Strike Casino, but was able to obtain only an old address and no details regarding next of kin or other contact information.

¶ 6. Powell next spoke with a Tunica County deputy, who had had prior experience with Bell. The deputy stated that, in an earlier conversation, Bell had mentioned having family around Holly Springs, but Bell did not know whether they still lived there. Powell then contacted the coroners of the surrounding counties to determine if they might be aware of any family of the deceased. The coroner in Holly Springs told Powell that "a lot of Bells live over here," and that he would attempt to locate any family members still in the area.

¶ 7. Bell's body was returned from the autopsy in Pearl on Friday, April 13, the day after death. Because Tunica County has no morgue, the body was held at a local funeral home.¹

¶ 8. By letter dated Monday, April 16, 2001, Powell formally notified the Tunica County Board of Supervisors (hereinafter "the Board") that he had "come into possession of the body of Clarence Leon Bell" and that, albeit without success, he had "tried diligently to contact the family." Powell's letter also stated that the "body has not been claimed for a period of more than forty-eight hours of its acquisition by me." Powell testified that he informed the Board that he had information that there might be family of the deceased in Marshall County, and that, although efforts were being made to locate them, no family yet had been found.

¶ 9. By letter dated Friday, April 20, 2001, the Board authorized Powell to cremate the body, noting that reasonable efforts had been made to notify the decedent's family members and other interested parties, and the body remained unclaimed. The letter further stated, "It has been five days since the notice we received from [Powell]." Upon receipt of the letter, Powell issued a Medical Examiner Cremation Certificate to Larry Hickerson, funeral director of Memorial Funeral Home. The cremation occurred on the same day.

¶ 10. The day after the cremation, Saturday, April 21, 2001, the coroner in Holly Springs called Powell and stated that "the family will be calling you in just a few minutes." However, Powell was not contacted by any of the deceased's family until May 4, 2001, twenty-two days after Bell's death.

¶ 11. On May 4, 2001, Christina Bell Gray was notified for the first time that her brother, Clarence Leon Bell, had passed away.² Gray immediately called her brother, Milton Bell, and the two, along with Gray's boyfriend Roy Tubbs, drove to Tunica and met with Powell that day.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 12. Gray, Milton Bell, Charles Bell, and Garmilla Ann Bell (hereinafter "Plaintiffs"), the siblings of the decedent, filed the instant action against Tunica County on June 17, 2004,³ asserting that the county was negligent in handling the remains of Clarence Leon Bell.⁴ The Plaintiffs claimed that they had suffered damages "for inconveniences associated with claiming the remains, denial of the opportunity to view the body, and denial of the opportunity to choose the manner of disposing of the remains and for destruction by cremation of the remains."

¶ 13. Following a bench trial before the Circuit Court of Tunica County, the court entered judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs and awarded compensatory damages in the amount of $5,000 for each plaintiff, for a total judgment of $20,000. The court found that the Board had violated the mandatory provisions of Mississippi Code Section 41-39-5, which prescribes a waiting period before cremation of unclaimed dead bodies. Miss.Code Ann. § 41-39-5 (Rev.2005). The court further found that, as a result of the Board's failure to comply with statutory requirements, the Plaintiffs had suffered injuries.

ANALYSIS

¶ 14. As the basis for establishing liability on the part of the county, the Plaintiffs allege a violation of Mississippi Code Section 41-39-5, a statute which provides a procedure for the disposition of unclaimed dead bodies. Miss.Code Ann. § 41-39-5 (Rev.2005). Tunica County argues that the statute was created for the purpose of governing public health and does not impose an actionable duty on county boards of supervisors. Tunica County further asserts that the Plaintiffs' claims are barred by judicial, administrative, or discretionary immunity. Finally, Tunica County argues that the Plaintiffs cannot recover damages under this set of facts and cannot show causation.

¶ 15. Enacted by the Mississippi Legislature in 1964, Mississippi Code Section 41-39-5 provides:

Any ... coroner, or other person acquiring possession of a dead human body or portion thereof which is not claimed for burial or cremation within forty-eight hours of its acquisition shall give written notice thereof to the board of supervisors, or a member thereof, of the county in which the dead body or portion thereof is located, furnishing such identification of the decedent as may be available, and the board of supervisors shall make reasonable efforts to notify members of the decedent's family or other known interested persons, and, if the dead body or portion thereof shall not be claimed for burial or cremation by any interested person within five days of the aforementioned written notice, the board of supervisors shall, as soon as it may think appropriate, authorize and direct the burial or cremation and burial of the residue of such dead body or portion thereof. ...

Miss.Code Ann. § 41-39-5 (Rev.2005).

¶ 16. Without determining whether or not the county violated this statute, we note that a mere violation of a statute or regulation will not support a claim where no private cause of action exists. "[T]he general rule for the existence of a private right of action under a statute is that the party claiming the right of action must establish a legislative intent, express or implied, to impose liability for violations of that statute." Doe v. State ex rel. Miss. Dep't of Corrections, 859 So.2d 350, 355 (Miss.2003). This Court has declined to find a "private right of action for violations of various statutes and regulations" in the absence of legislative intent. Id. See also Moore ex rel. Moore v. Mem'l Hosp. of Gulfport, 825 So.2d 658 (Miss.2002); Allyn v. Wortman, 725 So.2d 94 (Miss.1998).

¶ 17. In Doe, this Court considered whether the Uniform Act for Out-of-State Parolee Supervision created a private cause of action for a woman who was raped by a parolee. Miss.Code Ann. § 47-7-71 (Rev.2004). In reaching the conclusion that no private cause of action existed, this Court adopted the analysis of a Wisconsin district court:

To determine whether a statute creates a private right of action in favor of a particular plaintiff, a court must analyze the statute itself and any relevant legislative history. The focal point is the legislative body's intent in enacting the statute. Unless the legislative intent can be inferred from the language of the statute, the statutory structure, or some other source, the essential predicate for implication of a private remedy simply does not exist.

In this case, nothing points in favor of implying a private right of action for Hodgson. The Uniform Act [for Out-of-State...