Tunstall v. Hopkins
| Decision Date | 21 June 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. C97-4069MWB.,C97-4069MWB. |
| Citation | 151 F.Supp.2d 1049 |
| Parties | Simon Curtis TUNSTALL, Petitioner, v. Frank HOPKINS, NSP Warden, Herbert Maschner, ISP Warden, Respondents. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa |
Stanley E. Munger, Jay E. Denne, Munger, Reinschmidt & Denne, Sioux City, IA, for petitioner.
Sharon K. Hall, Attorney General, Des Moines, LA, for respondents.
In his habeas corpus petition, Simon Curtis Tunstall ("Tunstall") asserts myriad claims in an effort to obtain relief from his conviction for first-degree murder and first-degree burglary. Tunstall's petition was originally referred to Magistrate Judge Paul A. Zoss for the filing of a Report and Recommendation, which Judge Zoss filed on September 5, 2000. In that Report and Recommendation, Judge Zoss addressed only one of Tunstall's claims, which coincidentally happened to be the first claim asserted by Tunstall in his petition, because Judge Zoss found that claim to be dispositive. Specifically, Judge Zoss recommended that Tunstall receive a new trial, because the trial court failed to voir dire the jury panel to determine whether any jurors had read a prejudicial newspaper article mid-trial. This court, however, rejected Judge Zoss's September 5, 2000, Report and Recommendation, see Tunstall v. Hopkins, 126 F.Supp.2d 1196 (N.D.Iowa 2000), and referred the matter back to Judge Zoss for the filing of a Supplemental Report and Recommendation in order to consider the remaining claims asserted by Tunstall in his habeas corpus petition. Pursuant to this court's directive, Judge Zoss addressed all of the remaining claims Tunstall asserted in his habeas corpus petition in a March 21, 2001, Supplemental Report and Recommendation. Ultimately, Judge Zoss recommends that Tunstall be granted a new trial because his trial attorney was ineffective in failing to seek the introduction of an individual's deposition testimony, specifically Dennis Jackson, into evidence. Both Tunstall and respondents have filed objections to Judge Zoss's March 21, 2001, thorough and comprehensive Supplemental Report and Recommendation.
Because the factual and procedural background of this case are set forth in the original September 5, 2000, Report and Recommendation filed by Judge Zoss, such background will only be restated here as the court deems necessary in analyzing Tunstall's claims. As Judge Zoss noted in the Supplemental Report and Recommendation, Tunstall's remaining claims consist of the following:
2. Tunstall's trial counsel was ineffective in failing to request voir dire of the jury panel to ascertain if the jurors read the newspaper article concerning Tunstall's case;
3. The trial court erred in allowing police officer Kelvin Smith to testify as to statements made by Dennis Jackson;
4. The trial court erred in denying codefendant Frasier an opportunity to testify about the violent and aggressive acts of the victim;
5. The trial court erred in limiting the cross-examination of Christine Buddi;
6. The trial court erred in allowing the prosecution to question co-defendant Simpson about previously suppressed evidence.
7. Ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to introduce the deposition of Dennis Jackson 8. Ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to move for a mistrial after the state amended the charges and excluded a theory of premeditation;
9. The trial court erred in admitting a knife into evidence;
10. The trial court erred in improperly instructing the jury; and
11. The trial court erred when it denied Tunstall's motion in arrest of judgment, or, in the alternative, motion for new trial.
In considering these claims, Judge Zoss initially addressed Tunstall's claims 2, 7, and 8, outlined above, because they all concern ineffective assistance of counsel claims, and then proceeded to address the remaining claims seriatim. Accordingly, this court will evaluate Tunstall's claims in a like order.
The standard of review to be applied by the district court to a report and recommendation of a magistrate judge is established by statute:
A judge of the court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made. A judge of the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate [judge].
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has repeatedly held that it is reversible error for the district court to fail to conduct a de novo review of a magistrate judge's report where such review is required. See, e.g., Hosna v. Groose, 80 F.3d 298, 306 (8th Cir.) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 860, 117 S.Ct. 164, 136 L.Ed.2d 107 (1996); Grinder v. Gammon, 73 F.3d 793, 795 (8th Cir.1996) (citing Belk v. Purkett, 15 F.3d 803, 815 (8th Cir.1994)); Hudson v. Gammon, 46 F.3d 785, 786 (8th Cir. 1995) (also citing Belk). However, the plain language of the statute governing review provides only for de novo review of "those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Because objections have been filed in this case, the court must conduct a de novo review of those portions of the Supplemental Report and Recommendation to which both Tunstall and respondents object.
Section 2254(d)(1) of Title 28, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996, provides as follows:
(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim—
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States[.]
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (emphasis added). As the United States Supreme Court explained in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000)., "[F]or [a petitioner] to obtain federal habeas relief, he must first demonstrate that his case satisfies the condition set by § 2254(d)(1)." Williams, 529 U.S. at 403, 120 S.Ct. 1495.
In Williams, the Supreme Court addressed the question of precisely what the "condition set by § 2254(d)(1)" requires. See id. at 374-391, 120 S.Ct. 1495 (); id. at 402-414, 120 S.Ct. 1495 ().1 In the portion of the majority decision on this point, the majority summarized its conclusions as follows:
[Section] 2254(d)(1) places a new constraint on the power of a federal habeas court to grant a state prisoner's application for a writ of habeas corpus with respect to claims adjudicated on the merits in state court. Under § 2254(d)(1), the writ may issue only if one of the following two conditions is satisfied—the state-court adjudication resulted in a decision that (1) "was contrary to ... clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," or (2) "involved an unreasonable application of ... clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." Under the "contrary to" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than this Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the "unreasonable application" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from this Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.
Id. at 432-424, 120 S.Ct. 1495 (emphasis added); see also Whitmore v. Kemna, 213 F.3d 431, 433 (8th Cir.2000) ( ).
The Court also clarified two other important definitions. First, the Court concluded that "unreasonable application" of federal law under § 2254(d)(1) cannot be defined in terms of unanimity of "reasonable jurists"; instead, "the most important point is that an...
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...relief but nor advanced on appeal is abandoned). Anderson v. Groose, 106 F.3d 242, 245 (8th Cir. 1997); see also Tunstall v. Hopkins, 151 F. Supp.2d 1049, 1064 (N.D.Iowa 2001) (stating that failure to renew a claim in appeal from denial of post-conviction relief raises a procedural bar to h......