Tuomi v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr.

• Decision Date: 13 November 2020
• Docket Number: No. 17-14373,17-14373
• Citation: 980 F.3d 787
• Parties: Anton TUOMI, Petitioner-Appellant, v. SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Attorney General, State of Florida, Respondents-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

980 F.3d 787

Anton TUOMI, Petitioner-Appellant,

v.SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Attorney General, State of Florida, Respondents-Appellees.

No. 17-14373

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

November 13, 2020

Arthur Louis Wallace, III, Arthur Wallace Attorney At Law, PLLC, Hallandale Beach, FL, for Petitioner-Appellant.

Anton Tuomi, Okeechobee, FL, Pro Se.

Luke Robert Napodano, Pam Bondi, Attorney General's Office, West Palm Beach, FL, for Respondents-Appellees.

Before ROSENBAUM, JILL PRYOR, and BRANCH, Circuit Judges.

BRANCH, Circuit Judge:

Anton Eric Tuomi, a Florida prisoner, is serving a 15-year minimum-mandatory term of imprisonment after a jury convicted him of aggravated battery, in violation of Florida Statute § 784.045(1)(a)(1). He appeals the district court's denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition and obtained a certificate of appealability from this Court on whether the district court erred in concluding that: (1) Tuomi was not denied his right to counsel when the state court accepted Tuomi's motion to withdraw his guilty plea without first appointing him new counsel or providing him an opportunity to confer with counsel; (2) Tuomi's appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to argue that Tuomi had been denied his right to counsel before withdrawing his guilty plea; and (3) Tuomi's appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise a claim that Tuomi did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to counsel, in violation of Faretta v. California , 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). After careful review and with the benefit of oral argument, we affirm.

I. Background

In 2010, Tuomi was charged with felony battery and criminal mischief. On the morning his trial was to set begin, he entered a negotiated guilty plea in exchange for a sentence of two years’ imprisonment. After judgment was entered in his case, Tuomi's counsel filed a motion to withdraw the guilty plea, to withdraw from representation, and to appoint conflict-free counsel, pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.170(1),¹ alleging that Tuomi's plea was involuntary and that she had misled Tuomi. Specifically, counsel asserted that she advised Tuomi to accept the negotiated plea offer of two years’ imprisonment based on an incorrect criminal punishment scoresheet, and under the correct scoresheet, Tuomi would have been subject to no longer than one year of imprisonment. Counsel asserted that she was ineffective for failing to advise Tuomi that the scoresheet was incorrect and in failing to advise him that he should not be subject to more than one year of imprisonment.

She asserted that an evidentiary hearing was required, that the nature of the allegations under Florida law required her to withdraw as counsel, and that Tuomi was entitled to relief.²

At the hearing on the motion, Tuomi's counsel advised the court that Tuomi had the right to withdraw his plea because he had accepted the plea based on an incorrect scoresheet and, under a correct scoresheet, he likely would not have been subject to more than a year of incarceration.³ The prosecutor responded that, while she did not necessarily agree that the plea should be vacated, she believed the best thing to do would be to appoint new counsel for Tuomi and hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether his plea was voluntary or not. The court permitted Tuomi to address the court. Tuomi stated that he was "coerced" and "under duress" when he entered the negotiated plea and "wasn't really quite aware of ... the proper sentence." The court then asked Tuomi "[s]o you want to have your trial now?" and Tuomi stated "I would love to have another trial, Your Honor." The prosecutor then advised the court that, if the plea were withdrawn, the state would amend the charge to aggravated battery and Tuomi would be facing a 15-year mandatory-minimum sentence. The prosecutor also stated that the "plea offer had nothing to do with the scoresheet," and that the state was going to seek a prison sentence regardless of the scoresheet because of Tuomi's "violent history." The trial court asked the prosecutor whether the state wanted to have an evidentiary hearing on Tuomi's motion regarding the voluntariness of his plea or "just have a trial with this fellow," and the prosecutor stated "[l]et's just have a trial." Accordingly, the trial court granted Tuomi's counseled motion to withdraw his plea and ordered that new counsel be appointed to represent him.

After the plea was vacated, the prosecutor filed an amended information charging Tuomi with aggravated battery and criminal mischief. Tuomi's newly appointed counsel filed a motion to withdraw based on a conflict of interest. The trial court granted the motion and appointed new counsel. Shortly thereafter, Tuomi filed a pro se request to discharge this counsel and requested that the trial court "appoint co[-]counsel to aid Mr. Tuomi and his defense as pro se lawyer."⁴

Tuomi also filed a handwritten "waiver of representation by counsel," asserting that he had diligently investigated the case, was ready for trial, and would be representing himself. A few weeks later, he filed an amended waiver of representation, averring that he did not suffer from any mental illness and was competent to represent himself at trial. The trial court ultimately granted the motion to withdraw counsel and entered an order stating that Tuomi would represent himself "at his request."

Tuomi therefore proceeded to trial without counsel. Prior to voir dire , the trial court conducted the following colloquy with Tuomi:

THE COURT: [ ] I am required by law to talk to you a little bit about your choice to have a trial without a lawyer.

MR. TUOMI: Uh-huh, Faretta?

THE COURT: Pardon me?

MR. TUOMI: It's called Faretta?

THE COURT: Right. Yeah, so a lawyer, as you know, has the experience and knowledge of the entire process, and the lawyer's job would be to argue for your side and present your best legal argument. Jury—what we're about to start is the jury qualification procedure, and they usually have—the lawyers usually have a desire or a thought about—the good ones, anyway, they have what type or person they think would be best for your case, so you—that's what you should think about, and we're going to ask these jurors questions about what they do for a living and what—you know, that sort of thing, personal information about them and go over some legal principles with them. So when I'm questioning them and when the other lawyer is questioning them, you should be looking at them and deciding, "Is this a juror that I think would be sympathetic to my situation or not," and—you know, so you will have the ability to—for six people, have the ability to say, "I don't want this person, that person," six of them, you get six peremptory challenges, we call them. Do you understand?

MR. TUOMI: Okay.

THE COURT: In other words, you can bump six of them. Do you have a list there of their names?

MR. TUOMI: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. You can write little information about them, whether you like them—you know, "This person is a plus person for me or a minus," on that sheet. A lawyer would know how to do that; a lawyer can also, of course, get witnesses here and question the witnesses and question other people and give you some advice about whether they think you should testify or not. They know when—they have the rules of evidence, and so they know when to object and that[ ] sort of thing."

MR. TUOMI: Right.

THE COURT: So that's the—you know, we lawyers—I'm a lawyer too, obviously—we always think it's a bad idea not to have a lawyer, but you have convinced me previously that you know about the system somewhat and that you are sincere in your desire to do it yourself, so—and we fired your lawyer, I guess, at your request, but—so I just want to make sure you're ready to continue.

MR. TUOMI: Yes.

The State then reviewed the charges against him and what the State believed the evidence would prove, and Tuomi stated "[i]t's up to the jury." Following the trial, the jury convicted Tuomi of aggravated battery.⁵ Tuomi was sentenced to a minimum-mandatory term of 15 years’ imprisonment as a prison releasee reoffender.⁶ Tuomi appealed, and Florida's Fourth District Court of Appeal summarily affirmed without explanation.

Tuomi then filed a pro se Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 motion for postconviction relief, arguing, among other things, that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to have conflict-free counsel in connection with his motion to withdraw his plea. The trial court summarily denied Tuomi's Rule 3.850 postconviction motion, concluding that his claims were "conclusively refuted by the facts and Exhibits in the State's response." Tuomi appealed and Florida's Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed without written opinion.

Thereafter, Tuomi filed a pro se state habeas petition with Florida's Fourth District Court of Appeal, pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.141(d), asserting, as relevant here, that his appellate counsel was ineffective for not raising the following issues on direct appeal: (1) that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel when the trial court failed to appoint conflict-free counsel to represent him on his motion to withdraw his plea, and (2) that Tuomi did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to counsel at trial, in violation of Faretta . The court summarily denied the habeas petition.

In 2016, Tuomi filed the underlying § 2254 federal habeas petition, asserting, among other claims, that the state court erred in denying his substantive conflict-free counsel claim and his ineffective-assistance-of-appellate-counsel claims. A magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation ("R & R"), recommending that the § 2254 petition be denied, which the district court adopted. This appeal followed.

II. Legal Standards

"We review de novo the legal conclusions reached by the district court in denying [a]...