Turchick & Kempter v. Hurd & Titan Const.

Decision Date28 April 1983
Docket NumberNo. 81CA1123,81CA1123
Citation674 P.2d 969
PartiesTURCHICK & KEMPTER v. HURD & TITAN CONST. Joseph TURCHICK, and Frank Yanni, Plaintiffs, and Keith T. Kempter and John Roberts, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Tom HURD, d/b/a N & J, Inc. & Construction, Defendant-Appellant, and Titan Construction Company, Inc., Traveler's Indemnity Company, Inc., Haseldon-Langley Construction, Inc., Safeco Insurance Company of America, Inc., Hensel-Phelps Construction Company, Inc., Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, Inc., and Adolphson and Peterson Construction Company, Seaboard Surety Company, Defendants. . II
CourtColorado Court of Appeals

Stephen B. Schuyler, Denver, for plaintiffs-appellees.

Porterfield, Richtsmeier & Penney, Wendell B. Porterfield, Jr., Denver, for defendant-appellant.

PIERCE, Judge.

Defendant, Tom Hurd, doing business as N & J, Inc. & Construction (Hurd), seeks review of the trial court's denial of his motion to alter or amend or vacate a default judgment under C.R.C.P. 54(b). We dismiss the appeal.

The chronology of procedural events relevant to our disposition is as follows.

Plaintiffs, Keith Kempter and John Roberts (Kempter), along with Joseph Turchick and Frank Yanni, filed a complaint in June 1976, alleging in their first claim that Hurd and, in their fourth claim, that Hurd, Adolphson and Peterson Construction Company, and Seaboard Surety Company (Adolphson), had breached certain terms of certain employment contracts. Kempter sought unpaid journeyman wages from Hurd, Adolphson, and all other party defendants named as jointly and severally liable; statutory interest accrued from Hurd alone; and, attorney's fees from all party defendants, named as jointly and severally liable. Turchick sought unpaid union wages and attendant benefits from Hurd, Adolphson, and several other party defendants, named as jointly and severally liable.

A partial default judgment was entered against Hurd in December 1976, naming only John Roberts and Keith Kempter as creditors and Hurd as debtor. The final paragraph of this judgment reads:

"-c-ounsel for plaintiffs may later present, via testimony or affidavit, evidence concerning the claims of the remaining plaintiffs, JOSEPH -sic- TURCHICK and FRANK YANNI."

No other judgment favoring either of the remaing plaintiffs ever became a part of the judgment docket.

Thereafter, several other rulings and proceedings occurred, but none were pertinent to this appeal until this defendant filed a motion for new trial, or in the alternative, to alter or amend the judgment. This motion was denied in February 1979.

In March 1981 Hurd filed his answer and another motion to amend or alter or vacate the 1976 judgment. This motion is the subject of this appeal. The trial court entered orders denying the motion finding as follows: "ORDERS--the motion is denied. The court finds the length of time between the filing of the motion and the judgment was not reasonable pursuant to Rule 60(B) -sic- of .... The court believes the defendant, Tom Hurd, should have brought this matter to the court's attention before four (4) years past -sic- since the entry of the judgment. The court previously heard a motion to alter or amend (1979) and denied the same. It was the court's desire at that time to make a final judgment and allow the parties to appeal the ruling if they deemed it appropriate."

The court then issued an order in accord with C.R.C.P. 54(b) to certify the September 1981 order as final and appealable.

The sole issue presented for review is whether the September 1981 order, denying Hurd's motion to alter, amend or vacate the default judgment entered against him in 1976, is properly before this court for review.

Initially, we note that a C.R.C.P. 54(b) certification, for purposes of appeal, is proper only when there has been a "final decision on one or more but fewer than all the multiple claims raised." Harding Glass Co., Inc. v. Jones, 640 P.2d 1123 (Colo.1982), citing Seatrain Shipbuilding Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 444 U.S. 572, 100 S.Ct. 800, 63 L.Ed.2d 36 (1980); see also Alexander v. Colorado Springs, 655 P.2d 851 (Colo.App.1982).

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6 cases
  • Corporon v. Safeway Stores, Inc.
    • United States
    • Colorado Court of Appeals
    • August 22, 1985
    ...Multiple Claims Requirement, 43 Va.L.Rev. 229 (1957). To the extent this view may be inconsistent with Turchick & Kempter v. Hurd & Titan Construction Co., 674 P.2d 969 (Colo.App.1983), we decline to follow While the decision to certify an order or partial judgment under C.R.C.P. 54(b) is d......
  • Kempter v. Hurd
    • United States
    • Colorado Supreme Court
    • January 31, 1986
    ...respondent. NEIGHBORS, Justice. We granted certiorari to review the court of appeals' decision in Turchick & Kempter v. Hurd & Titan Construction Co., Inc., 674 P.2d 969 (Colo.App.1983). The district court certified a default judgment entered against one of three defendants in favor of two ......
  • Colorado Dept. of Revenue, Motor Vehicle Div. v. Brakhage
    • United States
    • Colorado Supreme Court
    • April 13, 1987
  • Public Service Co. of Colorado v. Linnebur
    • United States
    • Colorado Court of Appeals
    • April 26, 1984
    ...Glass Co. v. Jones, supra. An interlocutory judgment may not be cured and made appealable by use of C.R.C.P. 54(b). Turchick v. Hurd, 674 P.2d 969 (Colo.App.1983). Thus, the certification of the trial court is not binding upon an appellate court. Moore & Co. v. Triangle Construction & Devel......
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