Young v. Indiana Dept. of Natural Resources

Decision Date09 June 2003
Docket NumberNo. 20A03-0205-CV-161.,20A03-0205-CV-161.
Citation789 N.E.2d 550
PartiesGlen Michael YOUNG, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES, et al, Appellee-Defendants.
CourtIndiana Appellate Court

John C. Theisen, Holly A. Brady, Theisen & Associates, Mark D. Scudder, Barnes & Thornburg, Fort Wayne, IN, Attorneys for Appellant.

Stever Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Frances Barrow, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.

OPINION

ROBB, Judge.

Following his termination from the Indiana Department of Natural Resources (the "DNR"), Glen Michael Young filed a suit against the DNR and several of its officers (the "officers") in their individual and official capacities for violations of his federal and state constitutional rights.1 During the jury trial, at the end of Young's case, the DNR and the officers moved for a directed verdict, which the trial court took under advisement. The jury found that the DNR and the officers had violated Young's state and federal constitutional rights, but assigned a $115,000.00 award only to the DNR and only relating to Young's state constitutional claim. Following the jury verdict, the trial court denied the DNR's and the officers' Motion for Directed Verdict. The parties each filed post-trial motions, which were denied by the trial court. Both parties now appeal. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

Issues

Young raises four issues for our review, which we consolidate and restate as whether the trial court erred in declining to correct legally inconsistent jury verdicts.

The DNR and the officers raise two issues on cross-appeal for our review, of which we find the following dispositive: whether the trial court erred in denying the DNR and the officers' Motion for Directed Verdict.

Additionally, Young raises one issue for our review which we restate as whether the trial court erred in declining to award Young his attorney's fees and costs as a prevailing party of a Section 1983 claim.

Facts and Procedural History

Young became a conservation officer for the DNR in October 1979. From 1979 through 1990, Young and the other officers of the DNR relied upon the Elkhart County Communications Center (the "Communications Center") for dispatching and emergency communications. In October 1990, the Communications Center made the decision to cease dispatching for the DNR. After the Communications Center made that decision, Young began communicating with the DNR's chain of command about his concerns regarding the lack of communications posed to his safety, the safety of his fellow officers, and the safety of the public. Young continued to write letters to the chain of command for almost seven years in an attempt to address the problems with communications.

After receiving no response from the chain of command, Young began contacting his state representatives. Beginning April 13, 1996, Young contacted Marvin Reigsecker, Sr., state senator for Elkhart county, and the following state representatives: Phil Warner, Dick Mangus, and Dean Mock. Young's communications with all of these representatives regarded the safety of the DNR officers without dispatch from the Communications Center.

Approximately one month after Young began contacting the representatives, Young became the subject of an internal investigation. As a result of the investigation, the officers terminated Young's employment.2

Following his termination, Young filed a complaint against the DNR and several DNR employees and officers in their individual and official capacities. The basis of Young's complaint was that he was terminated in retaliation for exercising his constitutional right to petition the government for redress of grievances and freedom of speech. It was Young's position that the officers became upset and terminated his employment when he went outside the chain of command by speaking with his state representatives. During the jury trial, at the close of Young's case, the DNR and the officers filed a Motion for Directed Verdict. They argued that Young failed to exhaust administrative remedies and that Young's complaints to his state representatives concerned his own safety and did not raise issues of public concern. The trial court took the motion under advisement and ultimately denied the motion following the jury verdict.

Following a six-day jury trial, the jury returned a verdict finding against the officers for violating Young's right to petition the government for redress of grievances under the United States Constitution and actionable under 42 U.S.C.1983, but awarded no damages for this claim. Additionally, the jury returned a verdict finding against the DNR and the officers for violating Young's federal constitutional right to petition the government for redress of grievances, but again awarded no damages for this claim. Finally, the jury returned a verdict against the DNR and the officers for violating Young's state constitutional right to petition the government for redress of grievances and awarded damages of $115,000.00 against only the DNR.

Following the entry of judgment, Young filed a Motion to Correct Errors and a Motion for Clarification of Judgment and Injunctive Relief. In these motions, Young sought to attribute damages against the DNR and the officers for each claim on which they were found liable. Young also filed a Motion for Reinstatement and Injunctive Relief, seeking reinstatement to his previous position and an injunction against the officers to prevent future violations of his constitutional rights. Finally, Young filed a Petition for Award of Costs and Petition for Award of Attorneys' Fees. The DNR also filed a Motion to Correct Errors, arguing that there is no cause of action for damages against the DNR under the Indiana Constitution.

The trial court denied all post-trial motions. The trial court denied the DNR's and the officers' Motion to Correct Errors, finding that Indiana law allows a party to bring a cause of action for damages directly under the Indiana Constitution. The trial court also found that, even if such a claim did not exist, the defendants waived the argument by failing to object to the jury instructions.

The court also denied Young's motions, declining to attribute damages to the DNR and the officers on each claim for which they were found liable, declining to order the DNR to reinstate Young or issue an injunction, and declining to award attorneys' fees or costs. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision
I. Motions to Correct Errors

A trial court has considerable discretion to grant or deny motions to correct error. Dughaish ex rel. Dughaish v. Cobb, 729 N.E.2d 159, 167 (Ind.Ct.App. 2000), trans. denied. We will reverse only if the trial court has abused its discretion. Id. However, as here, when the motion involves a question of law, we review de novo and owe no deference to a trial court's legal conclusions. State v. Rans, 739 N.E.2d 164, 165 (Ind.Ct.App.2000), trans. denied.

A. Legally Impossible Verdicts

Although the jury found the DNR and the officers liable for violating Young's state and federal right to petition the government for redress of grievances, the jury awarded damages only against the DNR and only on the state claim. Young contends that this award is contrary to law and reason and that the trial court erred in declining to attribute the DNR's liability to the federal claim as well. Young asserts that the state and federal claims have the same elements and therefore, it is legally impossible to satisfy the elements for one and not the other.

Young notes that Jury Instruction Number 16 provided the jury with the elements of Young's claims under both the federal and the state right to petition the government for redress of grievances. Instruction Number 16 read:

[Young] claims that the defendants discharged him from his employment with the Indiana Department of Natural Resources because he exercised his right to petition the government for redress of grievances guaranteed by the Constitutions of the United States and Indiana. In order to prevail on this claim, [Young] must prove all the following facts by a preponderance of the evidence:

1. That [Young] petitioned the government for redress of a grievance;

2. That the petition was a substantial or motivating factor in the decision to terminate [Young];

3. That [Young] was damaged; and

4. That the termination was the proximate cause of [Young's] injuries.

Appellant's Appendix at 147. Young notes that the instruction makes no distinction between the state and federal right to petition the government for redress of grievances. Because the instruction makes no distinction between the rights, Young contends that it was contrary to law for the jury to award damages for his state claim but not for his federal claim.

Additionally, Young contends that the jury verdict was contrary to law because the award of damages was limited to only one defendant. Although the jury found that both the DNR and the officers violated Young's constitutional rights, the jury attributed the award only to the DNR. Young contends that, as a legal entity, the DNR can act only through its employees. Therefore, Young contends that the trial court erred in declining to adjust the jury verdict to hold the DNR and the officers jointly and severally liable for the damage that arose from his termination.

The DNR contends, however, that Young waived his right to object to the jury verdicts. It cites DDR Computer Serv. Bureau v. Davis, 411 N.E.2d 722 (Ind.Ct.App.1980), for the proposition that Young needed to object to the jury verdict before the jury was dismissed in order to preserve the issue on appeal. In DDR, this court stated:

It was incumbent upon DDR to object to the verdict form as soon as it was returned. Had an objection been interposed, the trial court could have apprised the jury of the irregularity and a proper verdict could have been reached. When the jury was
...

To continue reading

Request your trial
11 cases
  • Daffron v. Snyder
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • September 19, 2006
    ...a trial court's denial of an award of attorney's fees under section 1988 for an abuse of discretion. Young v. Ind. Dep't of Natural Res., 789 N.E.2d 550, 560 (Ind.Ct. App.2003), trans. denied. However, "when a trial court denies attorney's fees to a prevailing party under section 1988 as a ......
  • Franciose v. Jones
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • May 29, 2009
    ...to correct error. A trial court has considerable discretion to grant or deny motions to correct error. Young v. Ind. Dep't of Natural Res., 789 N.E.2d 550, 554 (Ind.Ct. App.2003), trans. denied. We review the trial court's ruling on a motion to correct error for an abuse of discretion. Id. ......
  • Barker v. City of West Lafayette
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • December 12, 2007
    ...As a general matter, we review an award of attorney fees under this statute for an abuse of discretion. Young v. Indiana Dep't of Natural Res., 789 N.E.2d 550, 560 (Ind.Ct.App.2003), trans. denied. "A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is clearly against the logic and effec......
  • Ags Capital Corp. v. Product Action Intern.
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • April 11, 2008
    ...a full trial of the merits or by consent decree or settlement that grants them the relief sought. Young v. Indiana Dep't of Natural Res., 789 N.E.2d 550, 560 (Ind.Ct.App.2003), trans. denied. Neither situation is present here. Inherent in the definition of preliminary judgment is the fact t......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT