Turner v. Connecticut Co.

• Decision Date: 14 June 1917
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: TURNER v. CONNECTICUT CO.

101 A. 88

91 Conn. 692

TURNER

v. CONNECTICUT CO.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

June 14, 1917.

Appeal from Superior Court, Fairfield County; Edwin B. Gager, Judge.

Petition by John C. Turner and others against the Connecticut Company. From judgment of court, on appeal from Public Utilities Commission, petitioner Turner appeals. Affirmed.

Petition for a reduction in the rates of fare charged by the respondent between certain points on one of its lines running from Stamford to Norwalk, which rates were alleged to be unreasonable, brought to the Public Utilities Commission, who heard and denied the petition; and thence by appeal to the superior court; facts found and judgment rendered confirming the action of the Public Utilities Commission, from which the petitioner Turner appealed.

The Connecticut Company operates seven electric street car lines on its Stamford division which converge at Atlantic square in Stamford. Two of these lines run outside of Stamford, one to Sound Beach and one to Noroton, and five terminate at suburban points in Stamford. Passengers riding from Atlantic square to Noroton bridge, a distance of 2.33 miles, pay one five-cent fare, and another fare from that point to Noroton village and points beyond. Passengers riding from Atlantic square to Sound Beach and the five suburban lines pay one five-cent fare, and on three of these lines ride less than the distance from the square to Noroton bridge, while on three they ride a greater distance, viz. to Springdale, 35 miles; to Sound Beach, 3.22 miles, and to Shippan Point, 2.79 miles. The New York and Stamford Railway Company operates an electric street car line which converges at said Atlantic square. Passengers riding by this line from the square to Cos Cob, another suburb of Stamford, pay one five-cent fare and ride 3.8 miles. Passengers on all of these lines may transfer at the square from one of these lines to any of the others. The village of Noroton was originally a part of Stamford, and in all of its associations is closely connected with Stamford. In point of healthfulness, natural beauty, and the character of its population it is a desirable place to live, and is in no particular inferior to Springdale or Cos Cob. Since the electric street car line was built through Noroton two houses have been built between the Noroton bridge turnout and St. Luke's Church, and 14 houses have been built west of and within one quarter of a mile of the Noroton bridge. Since the electric street car line was built to Springdale and the five-cent fare established between Springdale and Stamford, 170 houses have been built in Springdale, and its population has increased rapidly and largely.

On February 24, 1915, the appellant, together with nine other residents of Darlen, petitioned the Public Utilities Commission— "to order a fare extension or 'lap over' so called, operative in both directions between the said Noroton river bridge and said St. Luke's Church, or to make such other adjustment of fares as may be necessary or advisable, so as to give a single five-cent rate or charge for each passenger between Atlantic square and St. Luke's Church."

The term "lap over" is one used in reference to electric street car lines to denote the distance which a passenger is allowed to ride beyond a given fare limit before he is required to pay another fare, or upon taking a car going in the opposite direction, the distance which he may ride before reaching a given fare limit at which he will be required to pay a fare.

The Stamford division is one of the poorest earning divisions in the company's system, and the Stamford portion of the Stamford-Norwalk line of the Connecticut Company's system is one of the best earning lines in this division. The establishment of the proposed lap over to St. Luke's Church would extend the first five-cent limit out of Stamford, and thereby to some extent decrease the net earnings of the Stamford division.

In December, 1914, by agreement the towns of Stamford and Darien paid $2,500 on account of the cost of widening the said bridge over Noroton river and the Connecticut Company the balance of said cost, $3,162, and in addition $33,000 in making physical connection between its lines and Noroton river and providing other facilities for through traffic. The Connecticut Company thereafter laid its tracks across the bridge and thus connected its tracks, and this was the last step to complete a continuous line of electric street tracks between New York and Boston.

The Commission found and held that the facts before them did not establish the unreasonableness of the present rate, and therefore denied the petition. The superior court adjudged that the action of the Commission was reasonable and proper, and confirmed it and dismissed the appeal.

William T. Andrews and Peter Dondlinger, both of Stamford, for appellant. Seth W. Baldwin, of New Haven, for appellee.

WHEELER, J. (after stating the facts as above). The first seven assignments of error are assumed by the appellant to relate to the correction of the finding. In fact they relate to matters which are parts of the memorandum of decision. That is not made a part of the finding, so that its correction cannot be had. The cause is to be decided upon the facts found, not upon those contained in the memorandum of decision. Further, the agreed statements of facts which the appellant assumes to be a part of the record had no place in the record. They were not certified to by the trial court and made a part of the record. So far as we know, they were not necessarily before the trial court, and certainly were not necessarily the only facts in evidence. Counsel for the appellee say the appellant petitioner introduced oral testimony. Whether this is accurate or not, the appellant cannot secure the correction of the finding under the method of General Statutes, § 797, without having the evidence certified and made a part of the record. The assignments of error, aside from those relating to the correction of the finding, are varying ways of stating the single point that the trial court erred in holding that the action of the Commission was reasonable in finding and deciding that the present rates complained of were not unreasonable. The act regulating Public Service Corporations (Public Acts of 1911, c. 128) in section 23 provides that:

"Any ten patrons of any such company * * * may bring a written petition to the Commission alleging that the rates or charges made by such company * * * are unreasonable."

Thereupon, after hearing had, the Commission, if it finds such rates and charges to be unreasonable, may determine and prescribe just and reasonable maximum rates and charges to be thereafter made by such company, and said company shall not thereafter demand any rate or charge in excess of the maximum rate or charge so prescribed.

The limitation of rates to what are reasonable is the enactment in statutory form of an ancient rule of the common law. Raritan River R. Co. v. Traction Co., 70 N. J. Law (41 Vroom) 732, 743, 58 Atl. 332; Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 154 U. S. 362, 397, 14 Sup. Ct. 1047, 38 L. Ed. 1014; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Garrett, 231 U. S. 298, 311, 34 Sup. Ct. 48, 58 L. Ed. 229.

"To limit the rate of charge for services rendered in a public employment, or for the use of property in which the public has an interest, is only changing a regulation which existed before. It establishes no new principle in the law. but only gives a new effect to an old one." Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, 24 L. Ed. 77.

The remedy for the enforcement of reasonable rates provided by our act was new in this jurisdiction. So long as the company establishes reasonable rates, these cannot be lowered by commission or court. When it fails in this duty the Public Utilities Commission is authorized to prescribe just and reasonable maximum rates. And its authority, under this act, may be invoked whenever the rates as fixed are either so high or so low as to be...