Turner v. Dir. of Revenue
| Decision Date | 29 September 2020 |
| Docket Number | WD 83439 |
| Parties | Justin Richard TURNER, Respondent, v. DIRECTOR OF REVENUE, Appellant. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
J. Eric Mitchell, Clinton, MO, for respondent.
Eric W. McDonnell, Jefferson City, MO, for appellant.
Before Division Four: Cynthia L. Martin, Chief Judge, Presiding, Alok Ahuja, Judge and Edward R. Ardini, Jr., Judge
The Director of Revenue ("Director") appeals the trial court's judgment setting aside the suspension of Justin R. Turner's ("Turner") driving privileges pursuant to section 302.505.11 The Director argues on appeal that the trial court committed legal error by basing this decision on a finding that there was no evidence of criminal activity to support the officer's traffic stop. The Director also argues that the trial court erred in finding that there was no probable cause to arrest Turner for driving while intoxicated because no field sobriety tests were performed. We reverse the trial court's judgment and enter judgment in favor of the Director pursuant to Rule 84.14.
On February 20, 2019, at 1:01 a.m., Deputy Morgan Webb ("Deputy Webb") and Deputy Ethan Logan ("Deputy Logan") of the Henry County Sheriff's Office observed a white Chevrolet truck in a field of a city-owned park. It was snowing and snow had accumulated on the ground. The truck was unoccupied and appeared to be stuck in the field, as the ground was disturbed around its tires and there were ruts in the mud. Despite the cold temperatures, the truck was still warm. Deputy Webb testified that upon looking inside of the vehicle, he observed "a container of what appeared to be an alcoholic beverage." Deputy Webb's narrative report indicates the container was empty. Although there were footprints in the snow leading from the truck to a nearby restroom, a canvas of the area did not immediately reveal any potential driver.
During a search for the driver, dispatch notified Deputy Webb that the truck belonged to Turner. The registration for the white Chevrolet truck was also associated to a 2004 GMC.
Fifteen minutes after the deputies initially observed the truck in the field, they witnessed it leaving the area of the park. While following the truck, the deputies did not detect any traffic violations. However, because the park had closed at 11:00 p.m., and the truck was being driven from the park after being found stuck in the field with an empty alcohol container inside, Deputy Webb initiated a traffic stop and contacted the driver who was later identified as Turner. Deputy Webb's narrative report indicates that the deputies asked Turner why his truck was previously in the field and Turner responded that he "slid off the road and got stuck." The narrative report further states that the deputies did not observe slide marks in the snow on the road.
Deputy Webb indicated that he detected a strong odor of alcohol emanating from Turner and his truck, his eyes were watery, and his speech was slurred. Turner admitted to drinking alcohol earlier in the night. Deputy Webb testified that he attempted to perform field sobriety tests on Turner; however, Turner refused to perform the tests and stated to the deputies, "I can't," and "I won't pass them." Deputy Webb then arrested Turner for driving while intoxicated. At the police station, Turner submitted a breath sample which showed he had a blood alcohol content ("BAC") of .174 percent.
Following the breath test, Turner's driving privileges were suspended as a result of driving with a BAC in excess of the legal limit set forth in section 302.505.1. Turner requested an administrative hearing to review the suspension of his driving privileges. Following a hearing on May 1, 2019, an administrative hearing officer for the Director of Revenue affirmed the suspension. Thereafter, Turner filed a timely petition for trial de novo pursuant to section 302.535, and the Circuit Court of Henry County conducted a hearing. At that hearing, Deputy Webb, the investigating deputy, and Deputy Oakes, the breathalyzer operator, testified. The Director introduced one exhibit consisting of Deputy Webb's alcohol influence report and supporting documents. Turner affirmatively stated that he had no objection to the admission of the Director's exhibit, other than to object that there was no probable cause to arrest Turner.
On November 12, 2019, the trial court entered its "Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment," finding that the evidenced adduced by the Director was credible. The court ruled that there was no probable cause to arrest Turner "for an alcohol-related offense, in that: no field sobriety tests performed." Furthermore, on the issue of probable cause to arrest, the court found that there was The court did not make a finding as to Turner's BAC "due to finding insufficient evidence to justify initiating traffic stop and no probable cause for arrest."
The Director appeals.
We review the trial court's judgment in a license revocation case as we do any other court-tried civil case. Nix v. Dir. of Revenue , 573 S.W.3d 156, 159 (Mo. App. W.D. 2019). " ‘[T]he trial court's judgment will be affirmed unless there is no substantial evidence to support it, it is against the weight of the evidence, or it erroneously declares or applies the law.’ " Id. (). While we defer to the trial court on issues of fact, including the resolution of contested evidence and credibility determinations, questions of law are reviewed de novo. White , 321 S.W.3d at 308. "We review declarations of law de novo. " Smith v. Dir. of Revenue , 560 S.W.3d 898, 902 (Mo. App. W.D. 2018) (quoting Auck v. Dir. of Revenue , 483 S.W.3d 440, 444 (Mo. App. E.D. 2016) ).
The Director raises two points on appeal, both of which concern the trial court's conclusion that the Director failed to meet its burden to establish grounds for suspending Turner's driver's license. The Director had the burden to establish the grounds for Turner's suspension by a preponderance of the evidence. Smith , 560 S.W.3d at 903 (quoting White , 321 S.W.3d at 309, n. 11 ). Section 302.505.1 sets forth the grounds for suspension:
The department shall suspend or revoke the license of any person upon its determination that the person was arrested upon probable cause to believe such person was driving a motor vehicle while the alcohol concentration in the person's blood, breath, or urine was eight-hundredths of one percent or more by weight, based on the definition of alcohol concentration in section 302.500[.]
Thus, "[t]o establish a prima facie case for suspension of a driver's license pursuant to section 302.505.1, the Director of Revenue ‘must present evidence that, at the time of the arrest: (1) the driver was arrested on probable cause for violating an alcohol-related offense; and (2) the driver's blood-alcohol concentration exceeded the legal limit of .08 percent.’ " Boggs v. Dir. of Revenue , 564 S.W.3d 693, 697 (Mo. App. W.D. 2018) (quoting Shanks v. Dir. of Revenue , 534 S.W.3d 381, 386 (Mo. App. W.D. 2017) ).
Here, the trial court expressly found the Director's evidence to be credible. Despite this finding, the trial court found the Director's credible evidence failed to sustain the Director's burden to establish probable cause to arrest Turner because no field sobriety tests were performed and because there was insufficient evidence to support initiating a traffic stop since the arresting officer did not testify that he suspected criminal activity. The Director's points on appeal thus claim error by the trial court in imposing hurdles to establishing probable cause to arrest that are not supported by the law.
We have elected to discuss the Director's points separately and out of order.
In its second point on appeal, the Director challenges the trial court's conclusion that the Director did not meet its burden to establish probable cause to arrest Turner because there was insufficient evidence to support a traffic stop as the arresting officer did not testify to any suspicion of criminal activity. The Director argues that this was legal error as it was not required to establish that there was a reasonable suspicion that Turner was engaged in criminal activity prior to his traffic stop.
There is no authority which supports imposing on the Director an obligation to establish a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity prior to a traffic stop. In fact, settled precedent in this State provides that the sufficiency of the legal basis to justify the initial traffic stop is immaterial in an administrative suspension hearing.
In Riche v. Director of Revenue , 987 S.W.2d 331 (Mo. banc 1999), our Supreme Court expressly held:
[N]either section 302.505.1 nor the constitution[ ] ... require that the arresting officer's initial stop be based upon probable cause. To the extent that [other Missouri cases] impose a probable cause requirement on the initial stop and apply the exclusionary rule in section 302.505 proceedings, they are overruled.
Id. at 336. Since Riche , our courts have consistently reinforced this holding. See Williams v. Dir. of Revenue , 521 S.W.3d 658, 663 (Mo. App. E.D. 2017) (); Barlow v. Fischer , 103 S.W.3d 901, 906 (Mo. App. W.D. 2003) ; Siehndel v. Russell-Fischer , 114 S.W.3d 449, 452 (Mo. App. W.D. 2003) (); Whitworth v. Dir. of Revenue , State of...
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