Turner v. Edwards
| Decision Date | 10 May 1940 |
| Docket Number | No. 32304.,32304. |
| Citation | 292 N.W. 257,207 Minn. 455 |
| Parties | TURNER v. EDWARDS et al. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Appeal from District Court, Swift County; Harold Baker, Judge.
Action by Rose Turner against Eugene N. Edwards and others to quiet title to certain realty. From a judgment in favor of the defendants, the plaintiff appeals.
Judgment affirmed.
John I. Davis, of Benson, and F. C. Anderson, of Herman, for appellant.
Frank A. Barnard, of Benson (Appel & Morton, of St. Paul, of counsel), for respondents.
Plaintiff brought this action to quiet title to certain real estate basing her claim on a tax title. She appeals from a judgment in defendants' favor.
The property involved is in the city of Benson, Swift county. It constituted the homestead of one J. N. Edwards prior to his death on January 24, 1930. Thereafter, a life estate therein was decreed to his widow, Alvira T. Edwards, one of the defendants in this action, and the remainder to his children and grandchildren by a former marriage, the other defendants herein. Plaintiff is a daughter of Alvira T. Edwards by a former marriage and lives in Minneapolis. Her mother occupied the premises until September, 1936, when she moved to Minneapolis to reside with plaintiff.
Mrs. Edwards failed to pay the 1929 taxes and the property was sold at tax sale on May 11, 1931, to plaintiff for $193.63. A certificate of tax judgment sale issued to her. She also purchased the property at tax sale each of the succeeding years to and including 1936 and there issued to her a similar certificate each of such years. She paid the 1935 and 1936 taxes when they became due and procured receipts therefor. In May, 1936, plaintiff presented her 1931 certificate to the county auditor of Swift county, whereupon he issued and caused to be served on Alvira T. Edwards, the occupant, a notice of expiration of time for redemption. No redemption was made. Plaintiff thereafter instituted this action to quiet title to the premises.
The trial court, among other things, found that there was collusion between the life tenant and plaintiff to defeat the rights of the remaindermen and that the tax judgment was void; it ordered judgment dismissing the action with prejudice. Plaintiff's alternative motion for amended findings of fact or a new trial was denied. Thereafter she moved for a determination of the amount of the taxes paid and an order adjudging the same to be a lien. It was denied and plaintiff then moved for an order vacating the previously-mentioned order for judgment and for an order determining the amount of taxes paid and adjudging the same to be a lien. These motions and plaintiff's further motion for a new trial were denied. Judgment was entered dismissing the action with prejudice and denying plaintiff any lien for taxes paid.
On this appeal it is contended: (1) That the trial court erred in permitting evidence to be introduced to prove fraud and collusion; (2) that the evidence does not sustain a finding of fraud or collusion on the part of plaintiff and the life tenant; and (3) that plaintiff is entitled to a lien on the premises for the amount of the taxes paid by her. It is not here argued, as it was below, that the trial court erred in so far as it based its conclusion that the tax judgment was void upon the fact that the property in question was inadequately described in the proceeding culminating in the sale thereof for delinquent taxes.
1. Plaintiff alleged in her complaint that she was the owner of certain described land and in possession thereof. The basis of her claim was not referred to or set out in the complaint. The answer denied that plaintiff was the owner of the land or entitled to its possession. Upon trial, plaintiff produced, in support of her claim of ownership, a certificate of tax judgment sale. Defendants introduced evidence tending to show that this title was procured by fraud and collusion. Appellant argues that this evidence was not admissible under the pleadings. It is true that as a general rule fraud is new matter to be specially pleaded and is inadmissible under a general denial. See 3 Dunnell, Minn.Dig., 2d Ed., section 3836, and 5 Dunnell, Minn.Dig., 2d Ed., section 7585. This rule, however, has no application where a written instrument is introduced in support of a general allegation not disclosing its existence. In Reeves & Co. v. Cress, 80 Minn. 466, 83 N.W. 443, it was held that when a writing is introduced in support of an allegation in a pleading which does not in any way indicate the existence thereof, it cannot be required that the opposite party shall anticipate its production and allege in his pleading fraud in its procurement in order to introduce evidence of such fraud. See, also, Adamson v Wiggins, 45 Minn. 448, 48 N.W. 185. Plaintiff's allegation of ownership did not disclose to defendants that she was relying on a tax deed. Defendants could not, therefore, under the rule of the Reeves case, be required to have alleged fraud in order to introduce evidence thereof.
2. There is little conflict in the testimony which we now consider. It does not appear that Mrs. Edwards ever made any serious attempt to fulfill her duty to pay the taxes on the homestead. Yet, by writing to one of the remaindermen and stating that she had all she could do to keep up the taxes on the home, she implied that the taxes were being paid. The relations between Mrs. Edwards and plaintiff appear to have been very friendly. From the testimony it can be gathered that Mrs. Edwards paid the money for delinquent taxes most of the time, although she did so in the name of her daughter and, it is claimed, with Miss Turner's money. At the time the period for redemption expired, the amount required to redeem was considerably less than the value of the house and yet, so far as the record shows, Mrs Edwards made no effort to secure funds with which to pay the taxes and prevent the acquisition of title by her daughter. The period for redemption had but recently expired when Mrs. Edwards was acting as agent for plaintiff in an attempt to sell the property. It is not without significance that Mrs. Edwards, when she left the home, moved to Minneapolis to live with plaintiff. The net result of the transaction was that the life tenant lived in the homestead for about five years without paying the taxes, whereupon her daughter by a former marriage obtained legal title to the property, valued at about $5,000, for less than $1,000.
It may be added that the testimony shows quite clearly that both Mrs. Edwards and Rose Turner intended this result knowing that as a consequence the children of Mr. Edwards would be deprived of their interest in the home.
It is quite apparent here that what plaintiff did was to advance money to her mother for the purpose of paying the taxes. We quote from her testimony:
"
Collusion is a secret agreement and co-operation for a fraudulent or deceitful purpose. Webster's New International Dictionary [2d] 1935. It implies a secret understanding whereby one party plays into another's hands for fraudulent purposes. W. E. Bowen Improvement Co. v. Van Hafften, 209 Mo.App. 629, 238 S.W. 147; Brainerd Dispatch Newspaper Co. v. County of Crow Wing, 196 Minn. 194, 264 N.W. 779, 780; Lindstrom v. National Life Ins. Co. of United States, 84 Or. 588, 165 P. 675, 677. In its legal significance it involves an agreement between two or more persons to defraud another of his rights by forms of law or to obtain an object forbidden by law. Burt v. Clague, 183 Minn. 109, 235 N.W. 620. It is a general rule that fraud renders voidable everything into which it enters. The court will look through any form of instrument or proceeding, no matter how solemn, in order to prevent a party from profiting by his own fraud. It is immaterial that he has conformed to all the formal requirements of the law. 3 Dunnell, Minn.Dig., 2d Ed. & 1937 Supp., section 3834; Baart v. Martin, 99 Minn. 197, 108 N.W. 945.
The court could find, as it did, collusion between the life tenant and plaintiff.
3. Plaintiff concedes that her tax title is invalid not because of collusion, as found by the trial court, but because the property was improperly described in the certificate and notice. She contends, however, that, even though her title is invalid, she is entitled to a lien on the premises involved for the amount of the taxes and penalties paid by her with interest at the rate specified in the statute. She bases her claim on the provisions of 1 Mason Minn.St. 1927, section 2188, which gives a lien to a person whose tax title is declared invalid for any cause other than one which renders the tax embraced in the certificate void. Involved in this case, however, is a factor not covered by the statute and probably not even contemplated by it. The trial court found and, as we have indicated the evidence sustains such finding, that plaintiff and the life tenant colluded to defeat the interests of the remaindermen. That presents for determination the question as to whether plaintiff under such circumstances is in a position to acquire any greater interest than the life tenant would have acquired had she purchased the property at tax sale and thereafter caused a...
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