Turner v. Estate of Turner

• Decision Date: 18 October 1983
• Docket Number: No. 1-1182A325,1-1182A325
• Citation: 454 N.E.2d 1247
• Parties: Allen L. TURNER, Appellant, v. ESTATE of David G. TURNER, Appellee. Allen L. TURNER, Appellant, v. ESTATE of Barbara J. TURNER, Appellee.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

Page 1247

454 N.E.2d 1247

Allen L. TURNER, Appellant, v. ESTATE of David G. TURNER, Appellee.

Allen L. TURNER, Appellant, v. ESTATE of Barbara J. TURNER, Appellee.

No. 1-1182A325.

Court of Appeals of Indiana,

First District.

Oct. 18, 1983.

Rehearing Denied Nov. 30, 1983.

Larry D. Combs, Franklin, for appellant.

John P. Wilson, Greenwood, for appellees.

RATLIFF, Judge.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Johnson County Superior Court (Superior Court) declared Allen L. Turner (Allen) a constructive trustee of his intestate share of his parents' estates. The court also ordered certain life insurance proceeds to be held in trust by his guardian ad litem pending the outcome of this appeal.

Allen appeals from both the imposition of the constructive trust and the court's refusal to release the life insurance proceeds. We reverse.

FACTS

Allen shot and killed his parents, David and Barbara Turner, on May 20, 1980. The following day Allen was charged with their murders in the Johnson County Circuit Court. On September 23, 1981, Allen was found not responsible by reason of insanity ¹ for his parents' deaths.

Both David and Barbara Turner died intestate leaving as their sole heirs at law their three children, Allen, Linda, and Janet. Accordingly, each child was entitled to an intestate share from each estate. Allen's share totalled $39,299.99. Also, as a beneficiary of a life insurance policy covering his mother's life, Allen was entitled to $3,879.57 in proceeds.

Following their parents' deaths, Linda and Janet were appointed as administratrices of the resulting estates. Thereafter, they successfully petitioned the Superior Court to appoint a guardian ad litem for Allen on grounds of incompetence.

At the conclusion of Allen's criminal trial, ² the sisters renewed a previously filed

                petition requesting the Superior Court to terminate Allen's right to receive his intestate share.  Following a hearing, the court entered judgment in favor of the estates. 3  Therein, the court found that inasmuch as the provisions of Indiana Code section 29-1-2-12 4 were grounded in equity and looked to substance over form, Allen should not be permitted to benefit from his wrongdoing, and therefore, should serve as constructive trustee of his intestate share of the estates.  Further, the court ordered that the insurance proceeds claimed by Allen should be held in trust by his guardian pending the outcome of the present appeal
                

ISSUE

Allen has delineated nine separate issues in his brief. However, we believe the issue stated below adequately addresses Allen's concerns.

Did the trial court err in finding Allen must serve as a constructive trustee of his intestate share and be precluded from receiving the life insurance proceeds?

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

The trial court erred in finding Allen should serve as constructive trustee of his intestate share, and that he should be precluded from receiving the insurance proceeds during the pendency of this appeal. We therefore reverse the trial court and find that Allen should be allowed to receive his intestate share as well as the insurance proceeds.

Allen's fundamental contention is that because he was not convicted of murdering his parents, Indiana Code section 29-1-2-12 is inapplicable in the present case. Consequently, Allen argues, the trial court's reliance thereon in ordering him to serve as constructive trustee was erroneous.

In support of his argument, Allen analogizes the instant case to criminal cases wherein an insanity defense is successfully asserted. In such instances, the defendant is said to lack any wrongful intent and is, therefore, not subject to punishment for an otherwise illegal act. It follows, Allen submits, that inasmuch as he was found to lack any wrongful intent in the killing of his parents--and was not subject to punishment therefore--he should not be punished now by being deprived of his intestate share. ⁵

As authority for his argument Allen directs us to the cases of In re Estate of Vadlamudi, (1982) 183 N.J.Super. 342, 443 A.2d 1113, and In re Eckardt's Estate, (1945) 184 Misc. 748, 54 N.Y.S.2d 484. In the latter case it was held the wife could not be denied her share of insurance proceeds and other assets from her husband's estate following her acquittal for his murder on grounds of insanity.

The court concluded that "legally the wife committed no wrong, not knowing at the time the nature and quality of her act and that therefore she is entitled to take as distributee. The same principle is applied to the life insurance proceeds." Eckardt, 184 Misc. at 755, 54 N.Y.S.2d at 490.

Vadlamudi, like the present case, implicated a statutory provision which prohibited a killer from inheriting from the deceased; however, unlike our statute which requires a conviction, the New Jersey statute required only a showing that the killing was intentional. N.J.S.A. 3A:2A-83. In light of this statute, the New Jersey court held that, as a matter of law, one found not guilty by reason of insanity of murder could not be said to have perpetrated the act intentionally. Thus, the killer could not be denied a share of the victim's estate. Vadlamudi, 183 N.J.Super. at 349, 443 A.2d at 1117.

The issue herein raised is one of first impression in this state. Thus, while Allen has directed our attention to two of the relevant authorities, we believe a full understanding of the issue before us can only be gained by a reading of several additional decisions. A review of those cases, together with Vadlamudi, and Eckardt, reveals the decided trend is in Allen's favor.

In a case of first impression in California, that state's appellate court held a mother found not guilty by reason of insanity for the killings of her sons could not be denied her share of the proceeds from their estates. Estates of Ladd, (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 219, 153 Cal.Rptr. 888. The court noted that California's statutory provision which prohibited a killer from inheriting from the victim, did so only when the killing was "unlawfully and intentionally" perpetrated. Id. 91 Cal.App.3d at 222, 153 Cal.Rptr. at 892. Holding the mother's insanity rendered her incapable, as a matter of law, of killing her sons in an unlawful and intentional manner, the court concluded she could not be precluded from her share of their estates. Id. Cal.App.3d at 226-27, 153 Cal.Rptr. at 894.

Likewise, the Minnesota Supreme Court has held that an insane killer could not be denied his share in the victim's estate. Anderson v. Grasberg, (1956) 247 Minn. 538, 78 N.W.2d 450. Therein, the husband was found insane and therefore incapable of standing trial for the murder of his wife. Notwithstanding this lack of prosecution, the court held the husband's insanity prevented the killing from being an intentional act, and thus, he could not be precluded from succeeding to the couple's jointly held property. The court stated its rationale in these terms:

"In giving effect to the equitable doctrine that a person should not profit by his own wrong, a constructive trust may be imposed whenever the legal title to property is obtained under such circumstances that it would be unconscionable for the holder of the legal title to retain and enjoy the beneficial interest. When the killer is insane, however, examination is necessary to determine whether the basis upon which the doctrine rests still exists. Insanity has been recognized in all civilized countries as a defense against punishment for crime, and this has been so because, if the perpetrator is so mentally diseased that he does not have the intent or animus in the commission of the crime, the act lacks the elements which constitute the crime the law seeks to punish. These general principles would seem to apply with equal vigor in determining whether the survivor has committed a legal wrong in killing his joint tenant, for if his mind was so diseased that it was the disease and not his own will which caused the act to be committed, it cannot fairly be said that he has committed a wrong for which the law should upset the customary legal rights of property ownership."

Id. 247 Minn. at 546-47, 78 N.W.2d at 456 (footnotes omitted).

A similar result has been reached in both Florida and Texas. Hill v. Morris, (1956) Fla., 85 So.2d 847; Simon v. Dibble, (1964) Tex.Civ.App., 380 S.W.2d 898. In the former case, the Florida Supreme Court held a wife could not be denied her dower interest where she had killed her husband but was found not guilty by reason of insanity for his murder. In so finding, the court stated:

"The effect of the judgment of acquittal by reason of insanity was to establish conclusively that petitioner was not guilty of the public offense with which she was charged, because as a matter of criminal law she lacked the capacity to commit the crime.... [Moreover,] it establishes that she cannot in any event be subjected to the bar which the legislature has made an integral part of the Florida Probate Law. ⁶ If the bar should be extended, it is a task for the legislature."

Hill, 85 So.2d at 851 (emphasis original).

Like the result in Hill, the Texas appellate court concluded in Simon that a husband should be allowed to receive life insurance proceeds from a policy covering his wife following his acquittal for her murder on grounds of insanity. Simon, 380 S.W.2d at 899.

The foregoing trend is also reflected in a series of cases arising in New York. In re Fitzsimmons' Estate, (1970) 64 Misc.2d 622, 315 N.Y.S.2d 590; In re Estate of Wirth, (1969) 59 Misc.2d 300, 298 N.Y.S.2d 565; In re Estate of Lupka, (1968) 56 Misc.2d 677, 289 N.Y.S.2d 705; see also Eckardt's Estate. The facts in Lupka were similar to those in Anderson insofar as the husband was not prosecuted for his wife's murder, but rather, found insane and incapable of standing trial. As in Anderson, the Lupka court held that because of the husband's insanity, he lacked the requisite wrongful intent when he killed his wife, and...