Turner v. Korneman
| Docket Number | 4:20-CV-0899-RHH |
| Decision Date | 20 March 2023 |
| Parties | BRADLEY G. TURNER, Petitioner, v. SHERIE KORNEMAN, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
This matter is before the Court on the Petition of Bradley G Turner (“Petitioner”) for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (ECF No. 1.) The State has filed a response. (ECF No. 13.) The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1). (ECF No. 15.) For the following reasons, the petition will be denied.
The facts that form the basis for Petitioner's convictions are set forth in the Missouri Court of Appeals' opinion denying Petitioner's direct appeal. As the appellate court summarized:
Throughout the trial, the question of whether Defendant killed [Victim] was undisputed; Defendant admitted to killing Victim on November 19, 2014. However, Defendant's defense was based on his assertion that the murder was justified, as it was an act of self-defense. An autopsy of Victim showed five stab wounds, including a 3-inch wound which penetrated his left lung, a 3-inch wound to his abdomen which penetrated the liver, a 4-inch wound to Victim's lower back which penetrated his kidney, and a 3-inch stab wound to the center of his chest, which penetrated his heart and eventually caused his death.
Resp't Ex. E at 2-3. Petitioner was convicted by a jury in St. Francois County of the class B felony of voluntary manslaughter (Count I), and the unclassified felony of armed criminal action (Count II).[1]Petitioner was sentenced to consecutive terms of imprisonment in the Missouri Department of Corrections for fifteen years on Count I and twenty years on Count II, for a total of thirty-five years' imprisonment. After his conviction, Petitioner appealed his convictions and sentences to the Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District. On October 10, 2017, the Court of Appeals issued its per curiam order and memorandum affirming the conviction. State v. Turner, 529 S.W.3d 931 (Mo. App. E.D. 2017). On November 3, 2017, the Court of Appeals issued its mandate.
On January 22, 2018, Petitioner filed a pro se motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to Missouri Supreme Court Rule 29.15. Resp't Ex. G, at 9-15.[2]On April 30, 2018, acting through counsel, Petitioner filed an amended motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to Missouri Supreme Court Rule 29.15. Id. at 17-31. In the amended motion, Petitioner asserted two claims of ineffective assistance of counsel: 1) trial counsel was ineffective for submitting instructions on voluntary manslaughter and involuntary manslaughter as lesser included offenses of murder in the first degree and murder in the second degree against Petitioner's wishes, and 2) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call Petitioner's mother, Marsha Barton, as a witness. On November 27, 2018, the motion court held an evidentiary hearing. The following witnesses testified: Petitioner, Petitioner's trial counsel Ryan Martin and Sarah Jackson, Petitioner's mother Marsha Barton, and trial prosecutor Benjamin Campbell. Resp't Ex. F. After the hearing, the motion court entered an order denying both claims on the merits. Resp't Ex. G, at 32-35.
On appeal from the denial of his motion for post-conviction relief, Petitioner raised the two ineffective assistance claims raised in the motion court. Resp't Ex. H. On November 26, 2019, the Missouri Court of Appeals found the claim to be without merit and affirmed the judgment of the motion court. Turner v. State, 590 S.W.3d 403 (Mo. App. E.D. 2019).
In the instant pro se petition, Petitioner brings two claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel: 1) trial counsel was ineffective for submitting instructions on voluntary manslaughter and involuntary manslaughter as lesser included offenses of murder in the first degree and murder in the second degree, and 2) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call Petitioner's mother as a witness. (ECF No. 1.)
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, a district court “shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). “[I]n a § 2254 habeas corpus proceeding, a federal court's review of alleged due process violations stemming from a state court conviction is narrow.” Anderson v. Goeke, 44 F.3d 675, 679 (8th Cir. 1995).
Federal courts may not grant habeas relief on a claim that has been decided on the merits in State court unless that adjudication:
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2). “A state court's decision is contrary to . . . clearly established law if it applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases or if it confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a [Supreme Court] decision . . . and nevertheless arrives at a [different] result.” Cagle v. Norris, 474 F.3d 1090, 1095 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 15-16 (2003)). A state court “unreasonably applies” federal law when it “identifies the correct governing legal rule from Court's cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular state prisoner's case,” or “unreasonably extends a legal principle from [the Supreme Court's] precedent to a new context where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it should apply.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 407 (2000). A state court decision may be considered an unreasonable determination “only if it is shown that the state court's presumptively correct factual findings do not enjoy support in the record.” Ryan v. Clarke, 387 F.3d 785, 790-791 (8th Cir. 2004) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)).
A state court's factual findings are presumed to be correct. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 293 (2010). Review under § 2254(d)(1) is limited to the record before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits. Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 180-81 (2011). Clear and convincing evidence that state court factual findings lack evidentiary support is required to grant habeas relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Wood, 558 U.S. at 293.
Petitioner raises two claims. Each claim was raised in his amended motion for postconviction relief and on appeal from the denial of his post-conviction motion. Therefore, Petitioner exhausted his claims in state court and they are ripe for resolution here.
In Ground One, Petitioner contends that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his counsel submitted jury instructions for voluntary manslaughter. Specifically, trial counsel submitted instructions for voluntary manslaughter and involuntary manslaughter as a lesser-included offense to the homicide charge against Petitioner's wishes and inconsistent with his self-defense theory. Petitioner argues that trial counsel admitted that the only theory of defense at trial was self-defense, and the facts of the case clearly supported the self-defense theory and negated the elements of first and second degree murder as Petitioner was acquitted on those charges. Petitioner further argues that trial counsel's reasoning for the submission-that the jury would probably want to convict him of “something”-was based on an unreasonable presumption that the jury would not be impartial.
The Missouri Court of Appeals denied Petitioner relief on this claim. Resp't Ex. J. The Court explained that Petitioner's counsel presented the theory of self-defense, which was consistent with Petitioner's wishes.
Counsel testified at the evidentiary hearing that his theory from the “very beginning” was self-defense and he “was arguing for self-defense all day long.” The jury did not know Movant submitted the instruction on the lesser-included offense. Movant testified at trial he informed counsel he wanted an “all or nothing” defense and did not want counsel to submit voluntary manslaughter to the jury. However, Movant's counsel testified at the evidentiary hearing that while he did not specifically recall discussing the decision to submit the voluntary manslaughter instruction with Movant, it was something he would “typically talk to a client about.” Counsel also testified that he did not recall Movant asking him not to submit any lesser-included offenses and pursue an “all or nothing” defense but if Movant had told him that, counsel would not have submitted the instruction. Moreover, the prosecuting attorney testified he would have submitted the instruction had counsel for Movant not done so. The motion court is responsible for determining the credibility of the witnesses at an evidentiary hearing, and we defer to such determination.
The Court must review Petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim under a “doubly deferential” standard. Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009). First, a petitioner must overcome the high bar of Strickland v. Washington by showing that (1) counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) petitioner was sufficiently prejudiced such that “the result...
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