Turner v. Lewis

Decision Date08 February 2001
Citation749 N.E.2d 122,434 Mass. 331
Parties(Mass. 2001) ORRINA TURNER vs. DENISE LEWIS (and a consolidated case). 8256
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

County: Suffolk.

Present: Marshall, C.J., Greaney, Ireland, Spina, Cowin, & Sosman, JJ.

Summary:

Abuse Prevention. Protective Order. Statute, Construction. Words, "Family or household members," "Related by blood."

Civil action commenced in the Suffolk Division of the Probate and Family Court Department on September 10, 1999.

A request for an extension of a protective order was heard by Elaine M. Moriarty, J., and a motion for reconsideration was heard by her.

The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct appellate review.

Pauline Quirion for the plaintiff.

Rochelle Bobroff & Michael Schuster for American Association of Retired Persons & others, amici curiae, submitted a brief.

IRELAND, J.

This appeal raises the question whether the paternal grandparent of a child whose parents were not married is "related by blood" to the child's mother, and thus, has a right to invoke protection from domestic abuse under G. L. c. 209A. We answer yes.

The plaintiff in this case is the paternal grandmother of a ten year old child, whose parents were never married. The grandmother has custody of the child, and the child resides with her. The child's mother presently has visitation rights with the child, although she does not pay child support to the grandmother.

The grandmother makes the following allegations. On September 2, 1999, the mother entered the grandmother's home unannounced and without permission while the grandmother and the child were upstairs. The mother, who appeared "obviously high," yelled for the child and demanded that she come downstairs. The grandmother told her that the child was not at home. When the grandmother then attempted to descend the stairs, the mother blocked her, and punched and pushed her, saying, "You know what I want to do to you, don't you?" The mother then punched the grandmother again and pushed her up against the wall, causing the grandmother's head to hit a windowsill. After hitting the grandmother once more, the mother fled the scene in a van. The grandmother telephoned the police.

The grandmother subsequently filed a pro se complaint against the mother for protection from abuse under G. L. c. 209A. Although a Probate and Family Court judge granted the grandmother an emergency protective order, another Probate and Family Court judge declined to extend that order, because she found that the "[p]arties are [not] related by blood, marriage or household membership" as required by the statute. The grandmother filed a timely notice of appeal and also filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. She appealed that denial as well. We granted her application for direct appellate review, as well as her motion to consolidate her appeal from the denial of the motion to reconsider with her initial appeal. Because we conclude that the parties are "related by blood," we vacate the Probate and Family Court judge's decision denying an extension of the protective order, as well as the denial of her motion for reconsideration, and remand for an order consistent with this opinion.

In 1978, Massachusetts enacted G. L. c. 209A to address the problem of domestic violence through the provision of judicial remedies. St. 1978, c. 447, § 2. C.P. Kindregan, Jr., & M.L. Inker, Family Law and Practice § 57.4 (2d ed. 1996). "General Laws c. 209A, entitled 'Abuse Protection,' provides "a statutory mechanism by which victims of family or household abuse can enlist the aid of the state to prevent further abuse." Commonwealth v. Gordon, 407 Mass. 340, 344 (1990). Under G. L. c. 209A, a person "suffering from abuse from an adult or minor family or household member may file a complaint in the court requesting protection from such abuse" in various forms, including the issuance of a protective order, "(a) ordering the defendant to refrain from abusing the plaintiff" (emphasis added). G. L. c. 209A, § 3.

The question in this case is whether the abuse was perpetrated by a "family or household member."1 Under G. L. c. 209A, § 1, "family or household members" include persons who, among other categories, see note 1, supra, "(c) are or were related by blood or marriage or (d) hav[e] a child in common regardless of whether they have ever married or lived together." The grandmother claims that the parties are "related by blood" and have a "child in common," and thus, she qualifies for protection under the statute. Because we conclude that the parties are "related by blood" for the purposes of the statute, we need not reach the question whether they have a "child in common."2

When statutory language is clear and unambiguous, the statute must be given its plain meaning. Adoption of Derrick, 415 Mass. 439, 443-444 (1993). Bronstein v. Prudential Ins. Co., 390 Mass. 701, 704 (1984). "When the language is less clear, we must interpret the statute 'according to the intent of the Legislature ascertained from all its words construed by the ordinary and approved usage of the language, considered in connection with the cause of its enactment, the mischief or imperfection to be remedied and the main object to be accomplished, to the end that the purpose of its framers may be effectuated.'" Adoption of Derrick, supra at 444, quoting Telesetsky v. Wight, 395 Mass. 868, 872 (1985). See Champagne v. Champagne, 429 Mass. 324, 326 (1999). We have also held that "a statute should be read as a whole to produce an internal consistency." Telesetsky v. Wight, supra at 873.

In interpreting the term "related by blood," we recognize that "[a] general term in a statute . . . takes meaning from the setting in which it is employed." Mahoney v. Baldwin, 27 Mass. App. Ct. 778, 780 (1989). We also bear in mind the importance of "giv[ing] broad meaning to the words 'related by blood,'" and considering "whether the relationship puts the parties into contact with one another, even though they might not otherwise seek or wish for such contact." Commentary to § 3:02 of the Guidelines for Judicial Practice: Abuse Prevention Proceedings (Dec. 2000).

Here we conclude that the parties are "related by blood." The paternal grandmother, through her son, is "related by blood" to the child. Likewise, the child and her mother are "related by blood." Thus, the child is "related by blood" to both parties, making the mother and grandmother "related by blood" through that child.

Interpreting the term "related by blood" to include the relationship between the grandmother and the mother would be consistent with the Legislature's purpose in enacting c. 209A. We note first that, in light of the grandmother's custody of the child and the mother's visitation rights with the child, there will likely be significant, albeit unwanted, contact between the mother and the grandmother, a fact particularly evidenced by the events that precipitated this appeal. See id. The "main object to be accomplished" by c. 209A, Champagne v. Champagne, supra at 326, was the prevention of violence in the family setting. Violence brought on by, or exacerbated by, familial relationships was the "mischief or imperfection to be remedied" by c. 209A. Adoption of Derrick, supra at 444, quoting Telesetsky v. Wight, supra at 872. Moreover, c. 209A has always reflected "[a] significant decision by the legislature . . . to broaden the definition of persons eligible to seek protection from abuse and domestic violence beyond the 'family' and to also include other persons having some 'family-like' connection." C.P. Kindregan, Jr., & M.L. Inker, Family Law and Practice, supra at § 57.5.

Our conclusion is supported by sound public policy. We take judicial notice of the social reality that the concept of "family" is varied and evolving and that, as a result, different types of "family" members will be forced into potentially unwanted contact with one another. The recent increases in both single parent and grandparent headed households are two examples of this trend.

With respect to the increase in single parent headed households, "[c]hildren under age [eighteen] are considerably more likely to be living with only one parent today than two decades ago." Marital Status and Living Arrangements: March 1994, Bureau of the Census, United States Department of Commerce (Feb. 1996). See Marital Status and Living Arrangements: March 1998 (Update) Bureau of the Census (Dec. 1998) (between 1970 and 1998, proportion of children under age of eighteen years living with single parent grew from twelve per cent to 27.7 per cent). "High levels of divorce and postponement of first marriage are among the changes that have reshaped the living arrangements of children and adults since the 1970's." Id. In the majority of these cases, women are the head of the household. Id. (eighty-four per cent of children who lived with single parent in 1998 lived with mother). The often contentious nature of custody arrangements necessitates the protection of these single parents through legislation like G. L. c. 209A.

Likewise, as the amicus brief adverts, there has been a growing phenomenon of grandparents raising their grandchildren in the past thirty years:

"Between 1992 and 1997, the greatest growth has occurred among grandchildren living with grandparents with no parents present. The increase in grandchildren in these 'skipped generation' living arrangements has been attributed to the growth in drug use among parents, teen pregnancy, divorce, the rapid rise of single-parent households, mental and physical illness, AIDS, crime, child abuse and neglect, and incarceration of parents." Coresident Grandparents and Grandchildren, Current Population Reports 1, Bureau of the Census, United States Department of Commerce (May, 1999) (75% increase in number of children residing in households headed by grandparents from 1970-1997).

See M. Minkler, Intergenerational...

To continue reading

Request your trial
20 cases
  • Oliveira v. Commerce Ins. Co., 17-P-757
    • United States
    • Appeals Court of Massachusetts
    • October 23, 2018
    ... (contract should be interpreted not to render any provision superfluous).We are, nonetheless, given some pause by Turner v. Lewis, 434 Mass. 331, 749 N.E.2d 122 (2001). In Turner , the Supreme Judicial Court faced a complaint for an abuse prevention order sought by the paternal grandmothe......
  • Charron v. Amaral, SJC-09942
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • July 10, 2008
    ...speak of average American family; test for significant preexisting relationship between grandparent and child); Turner v. Lewis, 434 Mass. 331, 334-336, 749 N.E.2d 122 (2001) (civil protective order statute must be applicable to reality of diverse family relationships); E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 42......
  • Mitchell v. Mitchell, No. 03-P-222 (MA 1/19/2005), No. 03-P-222.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • January 19, 2005
    ...intended to protect victims of abuse, as defined by the statute,8 through the issuance of abuse prevention orders.9 See Turner v. Lewis, 434 Mass. 331, 334 (2001) ("[v]iolence brought on by, or exacerbated by, familial relationships was the `mischief or imperfection to be remedied' by c. 20......
  • Smith v. Jones
    • United States
    • Appeals Court of Massachusetts
    • August 17, 2006
    ...on by, or exacerbated by, familial relationships was the `mischief or imperfection to be remedied' by c. 209A." Turner v. Lewis, 434 Mass. 331, 334, 749 N.E.2d 122 (2001). The statute is not a general catch-all for the regulation of all human relationships that run into difficulty, no matte......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT