Turner v. Maschner, 57486

• Decision Date: 20 March 1986
• Docket Number: No. 57486,57486
• Citation: 11 Kan.App.2d 134,715 P.2d 425
• Parties: Samuel TURNER, Appellant, v. Herb MASCHNER, Appellee.
• Court: Kansas Court of Appeals

Page 425

715 P.2d 425

11 Kan.App.2d 134

Samuel TURNER, Appellant, v. Herb MASCHNER, Appellee.

No. 57486.

Court of Appeals of Kansas.

March 20, 1986.

Review Denied May 9, 1986.

Syllabus by the Court

In an appeal from an order denying a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, it is held: Restrictions placed on petitioner's opportunities for education, group religious services, employment services and vocational training and exercise imposed by reason of petitioner's segregated confinement do not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.

David C. Van Parys, of Murray & Tillotson, Chartered, Leavenworth, for appellant.

Larry Cowger, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., and Robert T. Stephan, Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Before REES, P.J., C. FRED LORENTZ, District Judge, Assigned, and JOHN W. BROOKENS, District Judge Retired, Assigned.

REES, Presiding Judge:

Petitioner Samuel Turner appeals the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus (K.S.A. 60-1501), in which he alleged that the conditions surrounding his incarceration constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Specifically, petitioner contends that because of his segregated confinement in the Administrative Treatment and Segregation Unit (A & T), his opportunities for education, group religious services, employment services and vocational training and exercise are impermissibly restricted. We affirm.

The infliction of "cruel and unusual punishment" is constitutionally prohibited by both the United States Constitution and the Kansas Constitution. U.S. Const. amend. VIII; Kansas Const. Bill of Rights, § 9; Levier v. State, 209 Kan. 442, 445, 497 P.2d 265 (1972). This phrase has been interpreted as being punishment which "either inflicts unnecessary or wanton pain or is grossly disproportionate to the severity of crimes warranting imprisonment." Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981). Kansas has defined cruel and unusual punishment as involving a deprivation which is inhumane, barbarous, or shocking to the conscience. State v. Rouse, 229 Kan. 600, 605, 629 P.2d 167 (1981).

Segregated confinement, in itself, does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. See Levier v. State, 209 Kan. 442, 497 P.2d 265; Annot., 51 A.L.R.3d 163. Further, prison officials are vested with wide discretion and before courts will interfere with the administration of prisons, the treatment must be "of such a nature as to clearly infringe upon constitutional rights, be of such character or consequence as to shock general conscience or be intolerable in fundamental fairness." 209 Kan. at 451, 497 P.2d 265; see also Wright v. Raines, 1 Kan.App.2d 494, 499, 571 P.2d 26, rev. denied 222 Kan. 749 (1977), cert. denied 435 U.S. 933, 98 S.Ct. 1508, 55 L.Ed.2d 530 (1978).

Petitioner argues that his confinement in a building without windows constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. It has been held that the rights of an inmate "include entitlement to adequate food, light, clothing, medical care and treatment, sanitary facilities, reasonable opportunity for physical exercise and protection against physical or psychological abuse or unnecessary indignity." (Emphasis added.) Levier v. State, 209 Kan. at 448, 497 P.2d 265. Adequate light is not, however, synonymous with outside light, or windows. The denial of a light bulb in an inmate's cell has been held not to constitute cruel and unusual punishment. State v. Rouse, 229 Kan. at 605, 629 P.2d 167.

We therefore hold that petitioner's confinement in a building which lacks windows is not of the character which would shock the general conscience or be intolerable in fundamental fairness under the standard set out in Levier v. State, 209 Kan. at 451, 497 P.2d 265.

Petitioner next complains that he has been denied group religious services. Relying on LaReau v. MacDougall, 473 F.2d 974, 979 (2d Cir.1972), cert. denied 414 U.S. 878, 94 S.Ct. 49, 38 L.Ed.2d 123 (1973), petitioner argues that substantial justification must be given to prohibit him from participating in group religious services.

In LaReau v. MacDougall, the court held that denying unruly prisoners access to the chapel for Sunday mass was not a violation of their First Amendment rights and that security reasons were substantial justification for denying group religious services. While it appears no Kansas case has addressed the question of whether such a preclusion constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, several other jurisdictions have held generally that it is not improper to preclude an inmate from group religious services. See Otey v. Best, 680 F.2d 1231 (8th Cir.1982); Mawhinney v. Henderson, 542 F.2d 1 (2nd Cir.1976); Sweet v. South Carolina Dept. of Corrections, 529 F.2d 854 (4th Cir.1975). Petitioner has not been denied individual religious activity.

Further, in referring to a prisoner's First Amendment protections while incarcerated, the United States Supreme Court repeated the familiar proposition that " '[l]awful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the considerations underlying our penal system.' " Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822, 94 S.Ct. 2800, 2804, 41 L.Ed.2d 495 (1974), quoting Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285, 68 S.Ct. 1049, 1060, 92 L.Ed. 1356 (1948), and citing Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321, 92 S.Ct. 1079, 1081,...