Turner v. Miller

Decision Date04 February 2021
Docket NumberCase No. 4:20-cv-00152-TWP-DML
PartiesTHOMAS A. TURNER, Plaintiff, v. BRENT MILLER Washington County Sheriff, JOSEPH KELTNER Washington County Sheriff Deputy in his official and individual capacities, MATTHEW HEIN Washington County Sheriff Deputy in his official and individual capacities, TROY HILDRETH Washington County Sheriff Deputy in his official and individual capacities, CHERYL BAKER, and ANDREAS BAKER, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana
ENTRY ON DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS

This matter is before the Court on the defendants Motions to Dismiss. Defendants Washington County Sheriff Brent Miller ("Sheriff Miller"), Washington County Sheriff Deputies Joseph Keltner ("Captain Keltner"), Matthew Hein ("Deputy Hein"), and Tory1 Hildreth ("Deputy Hildreth") (collectively, the "County Defendants"), (Filing No. 16) seek dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Defendants Andreas Baker ("Andy") and Cheryl Baker ("Cheryl") (collectively, the "Bakers") also filed a Motion to Dismiss (Filing No. 14), however, their Motion is resolved pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.2 Plaintiff Thomas A. Turner ("Turner") initiated this action against the County Defendants alleging violations of his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law claims against the Bakers for defamation andlibel, malicious prosecution, and intentional infliction of emotional distress (see Filing No. 1 at 14-16). For the following reasons, the Court grants the County Defendants' Motion (Filing No. 16) and denies the Bakers' Motion (Filing No. 14).

I. BACKGROUND

On July 27, 2018, Turner was in the backyard of his residence test firing firearms that he had recently purchased. (Filing No. 1 at 4-5.) During a two-and-a-half-hour span—from roughly 2:30 p.m. to approximately 5:00 p.m.—he fired his firearms ten times while pointing the weapons down, and a couple feet away from the front of his body, and firing single rounds periodically into the ground. Id. at 5. While Turner was firing his firearms, his neighbor Cheryl, arrived home from work and went to retrieve her mail. Id. at 6. As she neared her mailbox, she heard four or five gunshots coming from Turner's property, and, as she walked back to her house, she heard two or three more gunshots. Id. After entering her home, Cheryl observed Turner in his backyard. Id. At approximately 4:20 p.m., Cheryl's husband Andy, arrived home from work, hearing one gunshot as he turned his truck into his driveway and another as he drove toward his residence. Id. at 7. The Bakers, however, never saw Turner shoot the weapons and never found any damage on their property. Id. Approximately ten minutes after Andy arrived home, Cheryl contacted the Washington County Sheriff's Department ("Sheriff's Department") to report "that Turner was shooting a handgun into the air in the direction of other residences." Id.

Deputy Hein was immediately dispatched to the scene, where Cheryl—under penalty of perjury—stated that she saw "Turner aim a firearm in her direction" two or three times and "discharge a firearm in a trajectory over her head" another two or three times. Id. at 8. Andy—also under penalty of perjury—affirmed to Deputy Hein that on that day he saw "Turner aim a firearm in his direction while he was in his truck attempting to turn into his driveway," "dischargea firearm in a trajectory over the truck he was driving," "aim a firearm in his direction a second time while his truck had entered onto the driveway," "discharge a firearm a second time in a trajectory over the truck he was driving," and also that he saw Turner "aim a firearm in his direction" and "discharge a firearm in a trajectory over his person" on three prior occasions. Id. at 8-9.

Deputy Hein concluded his interviews with the Bakers, and Deputy Hildreth arrived on the scene. After being apprised of the situation, the two deputies headed to Turner's home. Id. at 9. Turner denied the accusations, explaining "that he had been test firing firearms he had recently purchased on his residential property toward the north and back of his home," each time aiming "the firearm down before discharging it directly into the ground in close proximity of his person." Id. After showing the deputies "the location on his property where he had been test firing his firearms," Turner stated that he neither pointed nor discharged a firearm "up and into the sky" or toward the Bakers' or any neighbor's residence. Id. at 9-10. All of Turner's test firings were captured on video by his come security system. Id. at 5. Although Turner offered to show the deputies security footage from "his security camera surveillance system [that] would substantiate his statements to them," the deputies "elected not to view and/or obtain a copy" of the recording. Id. at 10. The deputies "did not place Turner under arrest" and left the scene. Id. at 11.

Following the interview at his home, Turner "reported to the Washington County Sheriff's Department to better understand what he had done to warrant his investigation for test firing his firearms on his property on July 27, 2018." Id. Upon arrival, "Turner met with Deputy Hildreth and Captain Keltner to discuss why Deputy Hein had accused him of engaging in criminal recklessness," again informing them that "that he did not point, aim and/or discharge his firearm in the direction of a person and/or a residential property" and "that he had security surveillancefootage that" could back him up. Id. Deputy Hein then "entered the conversation," informing Captain Keltner that the Bakers had accused Turner of pointing, aiming, and discharging "a firearm in their direction on numerous occasions" that day. Id. at 11-12. At that time, Deputy Hein asserted "that Turner's arrest for criminal recklessness was warranted based upon the statements he received from Cheryl and Andy." Id. at 12. Then, "with Captain Keltner's consent and authorization," Deputy Hein arrested Turner. Id. A few days later, the Bakers submitted a Victim Impact Statement to the Washington County Prosecutor's Office, stating, among other things, that Turner frequently shot guns over their heads. Id. at 12-13. Turner was prosecuted wrongfully for the events of July 27, 2018. Id. at 13.

On July 1, 2020, Turner filed a Complaint in this Court alleging that the County Defendants violated his rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see id. at 14-15, and that the Bakers were liable for defamation and libel per se, malicious prosecution, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, see id. at 15-16.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows a defendant to move to dismiss a complaint that has failed to "state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). When deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court accepts as true all factual allegations in the complaint and draws all inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Bielanski, 550 F.3d at 633. However, courts "are not obliged to accept as true legal conclusions or unsupported conclusions of fact." Hickey v. O'Bannon, 287 F.3d 656, 658 (7th Cir. 2002).

The complaint must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, the United States Supreme Court explained that the complaint must allege facts that are "enough to raise aright to relief above the speculative level." 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Although "detailed factual allegations" are not required, mere "labels," "conclusions," or "formulaic recitation[s] of the elements of a cause of action" are insufficient. Id.; see also Bissessur v. Ind. Univ. Bd. of Trs., 581 F.3d 599, 603 (7th Cir. 2009) ("it is not enough to give a threadbare recitation of the elements of a claim without factual support"). The allegations must "give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Stated differently, the complaint must include "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Hecker v. Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575, 580 (7th Cir. 2009) (citation and quotation marks omitted). To be facially plausible, the complaint must allow "the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

Moreover, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(d) provides that

[i]f, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c), matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56. All parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the motion.

The Seventh Circuit has explained that,

[i]n response to an ordinary 12(b)(6) motion, a court simply examines the allegations in the complaint to determine whether they pass muster. If a district court considers matters outside the pleadings, our procedural rules require that the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment under [Rule] 56. Under this converted motion, all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. The consideration of outside matter without converting the motion may result in reversible error.

GE Capital Corp. v. Lease Resolution Corp., 128 F.3d 1074, 1080 (7th Cir. 1997) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

With that in mind, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that summary judgment is appropriate if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Hemsworth v. Quotesmith.Com, Inc., 476 F.3d 487,...

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