Turner v. Mitchell Pontiac, Inc., Civ. No. H-90-484 (AHN).

• Decision Date: 10 September 1991
• Docket Number: Civ. No. H-90-484 (AHN).
• Parties: Beatrice TURNER v. MITCHELL PONTIAC, INC.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut

771 F. Supp. 530

Beatrice TURNER v. MITCHELL PONTIAC, INC.

Civ. No. H-90-484 (AHN).

United States District Court, D. Connecticut.

September 3, 1991.

As Amended September 10, 1991.

Michael E. Satti, Schatz & Schatz, Hartford, Conn., for plaintiff.

David B. Beizer and Jay B. Weintraub, Beizer & Weintraub, West Hartford, Conn., for defendant.

RULING ON PENDING MOTIONS

NEVAS, District Judge.

In this case, the plaintiff, Beatrice Turner ("Turner"), a former employee of Mitchell Pontiac, Inc. ("Mitchell"), brought suit under Tile VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2, et seq., and under the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act., Conn.Gen.Stat. § 46a-60(a)(1), alleging employment discrimination based on sex and religion. The plaintiff seeks lost wages and benefits as well as injunctive and declaratory relief. Now pending is the defendant's motion to strike the plaintiff's request for a jury trial (filing 14) as well as the plaintiff's motion for reconsideration of its motion for leave to file an amended complaint (filing 32). For the reasons that follow, both motions are granted. However, upon review of the record and the case law, the court's May 17, 1991 denial of the plaintiff's motion for leave to amend the complaint (filing 19) is affirmed.

I. BACKGROUND

On December 26, 1990, the plaintiff filed a request for a trial by jury, six months after the complaint was filed. Plaintiff's counsel explained that when he filed the complaint on June 15, 1990, he was aware that there was clear precedent against jury trials in Title VII cases. Nevertheless, he had claimed the matter for jury trial in the appropriate place on the civil cover sheet, which was served on the defendant, "disagreeing with existing precedent and hoping that time, logic and reason would yield precedent allowing Title VII claims to be tried to a jury." Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Strike Jury Demand (filing 18), at 1-2. The plaintiff's subsequent request for a jury trial was prompted by recent cases indicating a possibly emerging trend to the contrary in Title VII cases.

On January 7, 1991, Mitchell moved to strike the plaintiff's request for a jury trial on two grounds: 1) that Turner's request was not timely filed, pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 38(b); and 2) that plaintiffs in Title VII cases are not entitled to a trial by jury. In response, Turner argued that her request on the civil cover sheet constitutes a timely request entitling her to a jury trial, citing Favors v. Coughlin, 877 F.2d 219, 229 (2d Cir.1989) and Winant v. Carefree Pools, 118 F.R.D. 28, 29 (E.D.N.Y.1988); and that the court should exercise its discretion, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 39(b), and grant the request even if it was not timely served. In addition, on February 11, 1991, eight months after the complaint was filed, with discovery virtually complete, the plaintiff filed a motion to amend the complaint by adding four state law claims.

The court held oral argument on May 17, 1991 on the defendant's motion to strike and the plaintiff's motion for leave to file an amended complaint. The court reserved on the issue of the right to a jury trial in Title VII cases, inviting the parties to submit further briefs. Following the hearing, the court denied the plaintiff's motion to amend its complaint. Thereafter, on May 28, 1991, the plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration of its motion for leave to file an amended complaint.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Defendant's Motion to Strike the Jury Demand

1. The Language of the Statute

While Title VII itself makes no mention of any right to a jury trial, the language of the statute indicates that Congress intended to provide for equitable remedies administered by the courts.¹ The statute empowers a court, not a jury, to enjoin any unlawful employment practice, reinstate the employee with or without back pay, or provide for "any other equitable relief."² This inclusion by Congress in Title VII of specific, well-defined equitable remedies weighs strongly against implying any additional scheme. Sherman v. Burke Contracting Inc., 891 F.2d 1527, 1540 (11th Cir.1990) (Tjoflat, C.J., concurring); see Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 15, 101 S.Ct. 2615, 2623-24, 69 L.Ed.2d 435 (1981) ("In the absence of strong indicia of a contrary congressional intent, we are compelled to conclude that Congress provided precisely the remedies it considered appropriate."). The wording of the statute thus indicates that the legislative intent was to empower courts with the discretion to administer equitable remedies in response to Title VII violations.

2. Legislative History

The legislative history reveals that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was modeled on the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1982). See 110 Cong.Rec. 6549 (remarks by Senator Humphrey in introducing the Civil Rights Bill for debate in the Senate on March 30, 1964), 7214 (remarks of Senators Clark and Case). At the time, Congress was aware that the Supreme Court had interpreted the NLRA provision as not allowing punitive or compensatory damages. See United Auto Workers v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634, 645-46, 78 S.Ct. 932, 939-40, 2 L.Ed.2d 1030 (1958). "Although not conclusive, the similarity of the statutes and the fact that Congress was aware that neither punitive nor compensatory damages were allowed under the National Labor Relations Act leads to the firm belief that Congress did not intend that any money damages ... would be granted under ... Title VII." Harrington v. Vandalia-Butler Bd. of Educ., 585 F.2d 192, 197 (6th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 932, 99 S.Ct. 2053, 60 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979) (quoting Van Hoomissen v. Xerox Corp., 368 F.Supp. 829, 836-38 (N.D.Cal. 1973)). According to the House report on the Bill, "the purpose of this title is to eliminate, through the utilization of formal and informal remedial procedures, discrimination in employment." House Report No. 914, 1964 U.S.Code Cong. and Admin.News 1964, pp. 2355, 2401. The Commission, the agency which was to carry out the purpose of the statute, "would confine its activities to correcting abuse, not promoting equality with mathematical certainty." Id. at 2516. Thus, the agency would work in a corrective, not a punitive, manner. 368 F.Supp. at 836-38.

3. Back Pay as an Equitable Remedy

Nevertheless, two recent cases authored by Judge Acker in district court in Alabama have questioned whether there should be a right to a jury trial in Title VII cases since back pay is a monetary remedy and monetary remedies have traditionally been viewed as legal. In Walton v. Cowin Equip. Co., Inc., 733 F.Supp. 327 (N.D.Ala. 1990), reversed and vacated, 930 F.2d 924 (11th Cir.1991), the court questioned the logic of classifying back pay as an equitable remedy under Title VII but as a legal compensatory remedy under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.³ As noted by Judge Acker, "unless Congress is empowered to make `black' into `white' by the simple device of renaming the two to suit some salutary purpose, a `legal remedy' cannot be converted into `equitable relief' by calling it `equitable.'" Walton v. Cowin, 733 F.Supp. at 331. See also Walker v. Anderson Electrical Connectors, 736 F.Supp. 253 (N.D.Ala.1990) (Acker, J.), later proceeding, 742 F.Supp. 591, 593 (1991) ("It would be an impermissible anomaly for `back pay' to be a legal remedy under the ADEA but an equitable remedy under Title VII. If `back pay' is a legal remedy, the Seventh Amendment clearly controls who shall make the factual determinations.");⁴Selbst v. Touche Ross & Co. 587 F.Supp. 1015, 1017 (S.D.N.Y.1984) ("It may seem odd that Congress should preclude punitive damages and the right to a jury trial in Title VII cases, and then permit the recognition of such rights and claims in such actions through the device of pendent jurisdiction. That is, however, an oddity for Congress to correct.") However, Judge Acker's opinion in Walton v. Cowin was reversed, vacated, and remanded by the eleventh circuit, 930 F.2d 924 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding that Title VII actions are proceedings in equity; hence, Title VII litigants are not entitled to a trial by jury).⁵ Thus, the primary case that the plaintiff relies on to support its request for a jury demand is not good law. Absent the Alabama case, however, there is virtually no authority for jury trials in Title VII cases.

4. The Prevailing View

Despite the Supreme Court's recent pronouncement, on which Judge Acker relied, in Lytle v. Household Mfg., Inc., 494 U.S. 545, 110 S.Ct. 1331, 1335 n. 1, 108 L.Ed.2d 504 (1990) that the Court has "not yet ruled on the question of whether a plaintiff seeking relief under Title VII had a right to a jury trial" and in Teamsters Local 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 110 S.Ct. 1339, 1348, 108 L.Ed.2d 519 (1990) (Court assumed without deciding that plaintiffs in Title VII cases have no right to a jury trial), the Supreme Court has held that not every "award of monetary relief must necessarily be `legal' relief." Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 196-97, 94 S.Ct. 1005, 1009-10, 39 L.Ed.2d 260 (1974) (describing back pay under Title VII as `restitutionary' as distinguished from `legal' damages). In Terry, the Court found that "Congress specifically characterized back pay under Title VII as a form of `equitable relief.'" 110 S.Ct. at 1348. See also Great American Loan Association v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 375, 99 S.Ct. 2345, 2350, 60 L.Ed.2d 957 (1979) ("Because (Title VII) expressly authorizes only equitable relief, the courts have consistently held that neither party has right to a jury trial."); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 415-421, 95 S.Ct. 2362, 2370-2373, 45 L.Ed.2d 280 (1975) (reinstatement and back pay are discretionary, equitable remedies). Thus, in numerous cases, the Court has found back pay to be an equitable remedy in the Title VII context. As explained by the...