Walker v. Anderson Elec. Connectors

• Decision Date: 02 May 1990
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 89-AR-1482-M.
• Citation: 736 F. Supp. 253
• Parties: Ann WALKER, Plaintiff, v. ANDERSON ELECTRICAL CONNECTORS, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama

736 F. Supp. 253

Ann WALKER, Plaintiff, v. ANDERSON ELECTRICAL CONNECTORS, et al., Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 89-AR-1482-M.

United States District Court, N.D. Alabama, M.D.

April 27, 1990.

As Amended May 2, 1990.

C. Michael Quinn and Ann K. Norton, Gordon Silberman Wiggins & Childs, Birmingham, Ala., for plaintiff.

William F. Gardner, William K. Thomas and Richard Taylor Abbot, Jr., Cabaniss, Johnston, Gardner, Dumas & O'Neal, and John C. Falkenberry, Birmingham, Ala., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

ACKER, District Judge.

The court has for consideration motions by each of two defendants to strike a plaintiff's jury demand in a Title VII case. Ann Walker sues both her employer, Anderson Electrical Connectors, and her union, Local Lodge 2601, International Association of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, AFLCIO, invoking Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and claiming that both Anderson Electrical and Local 2601 knowingly tolerated Walker's sexual harassment by male employees and condoned vulgarities which caused Walker's working conditions to be intolerable. She also presents pendent tort claims against Anderson Electrical Connectors, under the law of Alabama for alleged invasion of privacy and outrage. She seeks damages in the form of lost wages and benefits as well as compensation for her physical pain and mental suffering. Lastly, she seeks punitive damages. Her original complaint contained the following clear demand:

The plaintiff demands a trial by struck jury on her assault and battery claims, outrage claim and invasion of privacy claim.¹

After the publication of this court's opinions in Beesley v. The Hartford Fire Insurance Company, 717 F.Supp. 781 (N.D. Ala.1989), reconsidered at 723 F.Supp. 635 (N.D.Ala.1989), Walker filed a supplemental demand for trial by jury of her Title VII claims, whereupon defendants moved to strike her demand. Defendants' grounds were, first, that this court is incorrect in its Beesley decision and, second, that Walker's jury demand is not timely under Rule 38(b), F.R.Civ.P. Anticipating opinions by the Supreme Court of the United States in Teamsters, Local No. 391 v. Terry, ___ U.S. ___, 110 S.Ct. 1339, 108 L.Ed.2d 519 (1990), and Lytle v. Household Manufacturing, Inc., ___ U.S. ___, 110 S.Ct. 1331, 108 L.Ed.2d 504 (1990), which the court thought likely to provide guidance, this court withheld ruling on Walker's right to a jury trial of her Title VII claims until the Supreme Court spoke in these two cases. Not only have Local 391 and Lytle now been handed down by the Supreme Court, but this court has written Walton v. Cowin Equipment Company, Inc., 733 F.Supp. 327 (N.D.Ala.1990), which explains in some detail the significance this court sees in Local 391 and Lytle. This court need not repeat here what it has said already in Beesley and in Walton, and from which it does not retreat.

The Significances of Yellow Freight Systems v. Donnelly: Or Manna from Constitution Avenue

After Walton was decided, the Supreme Court decided Yellow Freight System, Inc. v. Donnelly, ___ U.S. ___, 110 S.Ct. 1566, 108 L.Ed.2d 834 (1990). What the unanimous Supreme Court said in Yellow Freight proves to the satisfaction of this court that it did not misread Local 391 and Lytle. If this court lacked any confidence in the correctness of its opinions in Beesley and Walton, this court can call Yellow Freight unanimous "Manna from Constitution Avenue."

Yellow Freight was a case in which a female plaintiff had presented her Title VII sex discrimination claim to an Illinois state court. Her reasons for filing in the state court are, in this court's opinion, not relevant here. There are several things about Yellow Freight which are, however, awesomely relevant to a decision on Anderson Electrical's and Local 2601's motions to strike Walker's jury demand. The central holding, announced by the Supreme Court for the first time since Title VII was enacted in 1964, is that the state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over actions brought under Title VII. The reasoning which led to this ultimate conclusion throws considerable light on the separate but interconnected Title VII jury trial issue.

First Point in Yellow Freight

Not necessarily in order of the importance of the various points made by the unanimous Supreme Court in Yellow Freight, the first relevant point is that for the 26 years since the enactment of Title VII the general assumption has been that the federal courts constitute the exclusive forum for Title VII cases. The Court in Yellow Freight mentions the fact that in 1980 the EEOC filed an amicus curiae brief contending "that federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over Title VII actions." This court is reminded of the fact that the same EEOC filed an amicus curiae brief with this court in Beesley, contending that Title VII cases cannot be tried to a jury. This proves, of course, that governmental agencies, even those charged with specialized responsibilities, do not necessarily have superior knowledge of the principles of law which supposedly direct their actions.

Second Point in Yellow Freight

A second important point in Yellow Freight is the unanimous Supreme Court's reliance on the absence of any language in Title VII placing jurisdiction over Title VII actions exclusively in the federal courts, despite the admitted fact "that most legislators, judges, and administrators who have been involved in the enactment, amendment, enforcement, and interpretation of Title VII expected that such litigation would be processed exclusively in the federal courts." 110 S.Ct. at 1567. In other words, conventional wisdom does not always equate with proper statutory construction and with correct constitutional interpretation.

Third Point in Yellow Freight

The third concept prominently featured in this most recent reasoning by the Supreme Court, working in conjunction with the absence of express statutory language providing exclusivity of jurisdiction in the federal courts, is the eye which the Court cast upon the Constitution for guidance. The unanimous Court recognized the cruciality of the dual court system provided by the Constitution and held that state courts have jurisdiction over federal causes of action unless Congress "in an exercise of its powers under the Supremacy Clause, affirmatively divests state courts of their presumptively concurrent jurisdiction." 110 S.Ct. at 1568. It goes without saying that the Constitution not only contains the Supremacy Clause mentioned in Yellow Freight, but the Seventh Amendment featured in Local 391 and Lytle. Title VII is just as silent about who is to be the trier-of-fact as it is about which courts are to have jurisdiction. Looking to the Constitution to fill the void leads any reader directly to the Seventh Amendment.

Fourth Point in Yellow Freight

Yellow Freight contains another idea which parallels and elucidates the question of whether or not juries can try Title VII cases upon appropriate demand. Since 1964, one of the chief arguments in favor of bench trials in Title VII cases is the alleged expertise of federal judges on these allegedly technically difficult issues, particularly issues which arguably should be insulated from regional prejudices by limiting their consideration to federal judges, who everyone recognizes to be both brilliant and absolutely impartial. This argument made no impression whatsoever on the Supreme Court in Yellow Freight. The court said in response to such an argument:

It may be assumed that federal judges will have more experience in Title VII litigation than state judges. That, however, is merely a factor that the plaintiff may weigh when deciding where to file suit, or that may motivate a defendant to remove a case to federal court. We have no reason to question the presumption that state courts are just as able as federal courts to adjudicate Title VII claims. Cf. Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp., 456 U.S. 461 102 S.Ct. 1883, 72 L.Ed.2d 262 (1982) (state court decisions may have preclusive effect in Title VII cases before federal courts).

110 S.Ct. at 1570.

If a popularly elected Alabama judge can be trusted to try a Title VII case, why cannot a federal jury, picked from a randomly-selected pool of venirepersons, not subject to any unexplainable preemptory challenge, be likewise trusted? This was the central point made by this court in its first Beesley opinion.

Fifth Point in Yellow Freight

Inasmuch as state court decisions may have preclusive effect in Title VII cases in federal courts, as pointed out in Kremer, cited in Yellow Freight, that same preclusive effect can surely be created by a state court's jury verdict. A month before the Supreme Court first held that Title VII cases can be filed in state courts, a district court decided that the Seventh Amendment mandates a jury trial of a statutory cause of action created by the legislature of the State of New Jersey if tried in federal court. In Reiner v. State of New Jersey, 732 F.Supp. 530 (D.N.J.1990), the district court, without access to Yellow Freight or to Local 391 or to Lytle, found that a plaintiff who had invoked the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, together with Title VII, was entitled to a jury trial of her New Jersey claims (which were "legal," although virtually identical to the remedies available in Title VII) because of the Seventh Amendment. This was despite the fact that the Supreme Court of New Jersey had earlier held that a cause under the said Act does not "entail the right to trial by jury." 732 F.Supp. at 530. The district court there relied basically upon the same authorities which this court used in Beesley and Walton, and the same reasoning that the Supreme Court used in Local 391 and Lytle, saying, inter alia:

So long as a legal cause of action is implicated and legal relief is authorized, the fundamental promise in the federal system is that a timely demand for a jury will be preserved.

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