Turner v. Rusk

• Decision Date: 06 February 1880
• Citation: 53 Md. 65
• Parties: HESTER ANN TURNER, William H. H. Turner and Robert Turner, Trustee, and Others v. THOMAS J. RUSK, Jr., and Others.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

53 Md. 65

HESTER ANN TURNER, William H. H. Turner and Robert Turner, Trustee, and Others v. THOMAS J. RUSK, Jr., and Others.

Court of Appeals of Maryland

February 6, 1880

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Baltimore City.

The case is stated in the opinion of the court.

The cause was argued before BARTOL, C.J., MILLER, ALVEY and IRVING, JJ.

William A. Stewart and R. J. Bouldin, for the appellants.

The appellants contend, that the complainants to sustain their case, must prove that confidential or fiduciary relations existed between William L. Rusk and the defendants at the time of the execution of the deed of December 27th, 1862, or that William L. Rusk was mentally incapacitated on that day from executing said deed. Todd v. Grove, 33 Md. 188.

The rule of evidence, that where insanity is proved or admitted at any particular time it is presumed to continue, does not apply to insanity caused by violent disease. Hix v Whittemore, 4 Met. 545-547; Ray Insanity, 421 422; 1 Beck Med. Jur. 586; Browne Insanity, sec. 518 and note 4; 3 McLean, 55; 18 Ill. 282; 8 Ind. 411; 7 Wait's Actions and Defenses, 151; 2 Abbott (U. S.) 507; 58 Me. 453; Carthwright v. Carthwright, 1 Phillimore, 100 Ewell's Medical Jur.

Absolute soundness of mind is not necessary to enable a person to make a valid contract or conveyance; the true test is, whether the party had the ability to comprehend, in a reasonable manner, the nature of the particular transaction in which he participated. This is the rule in the absence of fraud. 3 Phillipps Ev. 604, 606; Lozier v. Shields, 23 N. J. Eq. 509, 511; Dennett v. Dennett, 44 N.H. 531, 538, 539; Shelf. on Lunacy, 37; Re Morgan, 7 Paige, 237; Speers v. Sewell, 4 Bush. (Ky.) 239, 241; Honey v. Hobson, 55 Maine, 256, 259, 280, 283; Miller v. Craig, 36 Ill. 109, 110; Aiman v. Stout, 42 Pa. St. 115, 123, 124; Browne Insanity, sec. 25; Ripley v. Ginot, 4 Ired. Eq. 413.

Thomas A. Whelan, for the appellees.

The grantor had full power to institute proceedings to have a deed made by him, while of unsound mind, set aside; he having sufficiently recovered to know the character of his act. 1 Collinson on Lunacy, 404; Ray on Insanity, 10; 1 Story's Eq. secs. 225-230; 1 Chitty on Con. 187; Yates v. Boen, 2 Str. 1104; Webster v. Woodford, 3 Day, 90-100; Rice v. Peet, 15 John. 503; Mitchell v. Kingham, 5 Pick. 431; Seaver v. Phelps, 11 Pick. 304; McCreight v. Aiken, 1 Rice, 56; Lang v. Whidden, 2 N.H. 438; Grant v. Thompson, 4 Conn. 208; Fitzgerald v. Reed, 9 Sm. & M. 102; Arnold v. Richmond Iron Works, 1 Gray, 438; Wait v. Maxwell, 5 Pick. 220; Allis v. Billings, 6 Met. 418, 419; Gibson v. Soper, 6 Gray, 280; Owings' Case, 1 Bland, 376, 381, 384; Chew v. Bank, 14 Md. 318; Wampler v. Wolfinger, 13 Md. 337.

If the deed in question was executed in a lucid interval, the defendants must prove the lucid interval by proof as strong as that required to prove the insanity. Brooke v. Townshend, 7 Gill, 32; Higgins v. Carlton, 28 Md. 142; 1 Collinson on Lunacy, 39, 53, 54; Ray on Insanity, 335, 336, 340, 341, 345.

Whenever parties stand in a confidential relation towards each other, and any advantage is taken of that confidence, relief in equity will be administered with as much promptness as upon any other ground. Wilson v. Watts, 9 Md. 386; Billing v. Southee, 10 E. L. & Eq. 39, 40; 1 Story's Eq. secs. 221, 222.

Weakness of intellect taken along with a confidential relation, are all circumstances calculated to impeach a deed as constructively fraudulent. 1 Story's Eq. sec. 237; Brooke v. Berry, 2 Gill, 83, 102; Chew v. Bank, 14 Md. 318; Davis v. Banks, 3 Md. Ch. 139; Long v. Long, 9 Md. 348; Bank v. Copeland, 18 Md. 317; Todd v. Grove, 33 Md. 197; Blackford v. Christian, 1 Knapp, 78; Wilson v. Watts, 9 Md. 440.

It is not necessary to show actual fraud, where confidence is reposed. If the situation is such that the parties must have had the influence over him, the courts will relieve. Wilson v. Watts, 9 Md. 428; Davis v. Cooper, 5 Myl. & Cr. 277; Purcell v. McNamara, 14 Ves. 91, 107, 115; Huguenen v. Basely, 14 Ves. 284; 1 Story's Eq. sec. 329 a; Allore v. Jewell, 4 Otto, 506.

Whenever a fiduciary relation exists, legal or actual, whereby trust and confidence are reposed on the one side, and influence and control are exercised on the other, courts of equity, independent of the ingredients of positive fraud, through public policy, as a protection against overweening confidence will interpose to prevent a man from stripping himself of his property. 1 Story's Eq. secs. 303-322; Highberger v. Stiffler, 21 Md. 352; Hatch v. Hatch, 9 Ves. 221; Todd v. Grove, 33 Md. 197; Rhodes v. Bate, 1 Ch. App. 256; Griffiths v. Robins, 3 Madd. 191; Welles v. Middleton, 1 Cox Ch. 112; Gibson v. Russell, 2 Y. & C. 104; Rhodes v. Bate, 1 Ch. App. 252.

The principles stated are independent, both of actual fraud in the donee, and of any weakness of mind in donor, although the presence of either one of these ingredients would of course make the case so much the worse; and if actual fraud is charged in the bill and not proved, yet the averment is sufficient for obtaining relief. Bridgsman v. Green, Wilmot, 70; Brice v. Brice, 5 Barb. 533; Whelan v. Whelan, 3 Cowen, 537; McCormick v. Malin, 5 Blackf. 523, 525, 531; 1 Story's Eq. secs. 309, 323; Highberger v. Stiffler, 21 Md. 352; Harding v. Handy, 11 Wheat. 125; Allore v. Jewell, 4 Otto, 511; Owings' Case, 1 Bland, 397.

Miller J., delivered the opinion of the court.

A person of full age, who has been insane, may, after he has sufficiently recovered his reason to understand the character of his act, file a bill in equity to annul a deed or contract to his prejudice, made by him when he was of unsound mind and incapable of contracting. This proposition was conceded in argument, and the contrary doctrine has long since been repudiated by every American court, and denounced as having no foundation in reason or justice, and as dishonoring the jurisprudence of a civilized people. The bill in this case is one of that character. The deed sought to be vacated was executed by the complainant, William L. Rusk, on the 27th of December, 1862. It is a lengthy document and was carefully and skillfully prepared by an attorney of ability and experience. By it the grantor, "for divers good causes and valuable consideration, and also in consideration of the sum of ten dollars lawful money," conveys certain real estate situated on York avenue in the City of Baltimore, worth, as the proof shows, more than $10,000, to Robert Turner and his heirs, in trust for Barbara Rusk, the mother of the grantor, during her life, and after her death in trust for his sister, Hester Ann Turner, wife of Wm. H. H. Turner, with power to the said Hester to dispose of the property absolutely by deed or will, and if she died without making such disposition, then in trust for her children, but if she died without leaving children or descendants of children living at the time of her death, or should such children or descendants all die under age and without issue, then in trust for such persons as would by the then existing laws of Maryland, be the heirs of the said Hester to take an estate in fee in land by descent from her. These are its most important and main provisions.

When this deed was executed the complainant was about forty-eight years of age, and had never married. His mother was then, according to the testimony of Mrs. Turner, about seventy-five years of age, and she died in the early part of 1875. Mrs. Turner was his only sister, and he was very much attached to her, but he also had four brothers towards whom there is nothing to show he entertained other than kindly and fraternal feelings. At that time he was also possessed of other property, which however was subsequently sold, and it seems the proceeds of it were not more than sufficient to pay the debts he owed at the date of the deed. He therefore in fact by this voluntary deed, conveyed away absolutely, and without any pecuniary consideration, all the property he had save what was sufficient to pay his creditors.

He filed his bill to vacate that deed, on the 23rd of February, 1877, and in it he avers, in substance, that at the time of the execution thereof, and for some time previous, and for several years thereafter he was mentally incapacitated from making a valid deed or contract; that he remembers being told at the time that it was done to save his property for him, and that is all he knew or recollects being told in relation to it; and he charges that he was fraudulently deceived and imposed upon by the trustee named in the deed, or by some of the cestuis que trust therein as to the character of the transaction. The parties defendants are the trustee and the cestuis que trust under the deed. There has been no alienation of the property by Mrs. Turner, under the power contained in the instrument. These defendants in their answers, deny all the allegations of the bill, and especially the fraud and deception imputed to them, and aver that the complainant at the time, and for a long time before was capable and mentally qualified, and in nowise incapacitated from making a valid deed or contract, and that he well knew when he signed it, the import and meaning of this instrument and the reasons why he made and executed it. In the progress of the case, and after a large part of the testimony, including his own, had been taken, the complainant died, and the appellees, his heirs-at-law, other than Mrs. Turner, were admitted as complainants to prosecute the suit in his stead.

The issue thus made by the bill and answers, is purely one of fact to be determined by the evidence in the cause. That evidence, consisting mainly and almost exclusively of the oral testimony of a large...