Turner v. Strawgate
| Decision Date | 28 January 1975 |
| Docket Number | No. 74--504,74--504 |
| Parties | Dorothea Chase TURNER, Appellant, v. Edward M. STRAWGATE and Gerald M. Higier, Appellees. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Richard M. Gale, Philip F. Ludovici, Miami, for appellant.
Helliwell, Melrose & DeWolf and Douglas S. Lyons, Miami, for appellees.
Before PEARSON, HENDRY and HAVERFIELD, JJ.
The appellant seeks review of an adverse judgment in the trial court awarding to the appellees, Edward Strawgate and Gerald Higier, money held in the registry of the court as well as costs and attorney's fees.
This action commenced with the filing of a complaint for interpleader by the law firm of Meyer, Weiss, Rose & Arkin, acting as escrow agent in the land transaction involved in this case.
The appellant and the appellees are adverse claimants to the proceeds which were placed in escrow and subsequently placed in the registry of the court pursuant to the interpleader action. For the sake of clarity, the appellant is the seller of the property located on Windley Key. The appellees are the purchasers.
The appellees, Strawgate and Higier, are experienced real estate developers, specializing in the development of shopping centers.
In early 1972, the two men were exploring the possibility of developing a shopping center in the Florida Keys, and more particularly in the area of Islamorada and Windley Key.
Through an engineer whom they employed, the appellees came in contact with Wayne Sipe a realtor in the Keys who had the listing on the Turner property. And, through Sipe the appellees entered into negotiations with the Turners which resulted in a written option agreement dated June 6, 1972.
The terms of the option provided that it would extend for a period of 120 days and that the property would sell for a purchase price of $125,000, all cash at the time of closing.
The consideration for the option was the time, effort and expense expended by the appellees in an effort to promote interest in the prospective shopping center as well as the preparation of preliminary site plans.
Most important to the issues presented in this appeal is the legal description which the parties used in the option agreement and subsequently in the purchase and sale agreement.
This description read as follows:
(Emphasis supplied.)
At trial, which was held before the court sitting without a jury, Higier testified that the legal description was written into the option and sales agreements By the appellees because neither the Turners nor Sipe had a survey of the property.
Higier also testified that some time during the option period or during an extension on the option which the appellees were given, a surveyor employed by the Turners, Robert Graham, contacted him with regard to conducting a survey of the land.
Higier indicated that he declined to authorize Graham to do a survey because at the time the appellees were letting the option expire without exercising it. He said this was some time in November, 1972.
The appellees in fact permitted the option to expire, however, their interest in the property was almost immediately rekindled as an investment with a view to developing the site as a shopping center in the near future.
In January, 1973, Strawgate flew down to Windley Key and met with Sipe to look at the property physically. The record is replete with testimony that up until this point the appellees had been under the impression that the property in question was adjacent to the Pavement of U.S. Highway No. 1. By insertion of the word 'frontage' in the contract, the appellees maintained they meant that the property abutted and was adjacent to the paved portion of the highway.
Strawgate's viewing of the property, which was a crucial feature of the appellees' case, did nothing to change this impression. He testified that when Sipe showed him the land, he fortified this impression.
For instance, Strawgate testified that Sipe said to him at one point,
In addition, appellees maintained that there were physical features of the property which lead them to believe that the property abutted the paved portion of the highway (such as billboards, telephone wires and the location of the Ocean View Motel itself which was adjacent to the highway).
In fact, the actual frontage of the property did not lie adjacent to the pavement, but was set back approximately 175 feet and 'fronted' the state right-of-way.
In his testimony, Sipe insisted that he had not been given the exact legal description and that he was unaware that the property was set back 175 feet. Sipe said he 'assumed' the property was closer to the pavement than it was.
However, he staunchly denied representing to...
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Strawgate v. Turner
...cause is before us on petition for writ of certiorari to review the decision of the District Court of Appeal, Third District, reported at 307 So.2d 902, which reversed the judgment of the Circuit Court, Eleventh Judicial Circuit in and for Dade County. We have jurisdiction because of confli......
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Turner v. Strawgate
...HENDRY, C.J., and PEARSON and HAVERFIELD, JJ. ORDER ON MANDATE PER CURIAM. WHEREAS, the judgment of this court was entered on January 28, 1975 (307 So.2d 902) reversing the judgment of the Circuit Court of Dade County, Florida, in the above styled cause; WHEREAS, on review of this court's j......