Turner v. Teller
| Decision Date | 12 June 1925 |
| Docket Number | (No. 7412.) |
| Citation | 275 S.W. 115 |
| Parties | TURNER v. TELLER. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Appeal from District Court, Willacy County; W. B. Hopkins, Judge.
Election contest by Joe Turner against R. H. Teller. Judgment declaring defendant's election, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.
B. D. Tarlton, of Corpus Christi, J. P. Cogdell, of Raymondville, and Bill Sutherland, of Corpus Christi, for appellant.
D. E. Decker, of Raymondville, and Graham, Jones, Williams & Ransome, of Brownsville, for appellee.
Appellant, Joe Turner, and appellee, R. H. Teller, were candidates for sheriff of Willacy county at the general election in 1924. The commissioners' court canvassed the returns, found that Turner had received 257 and Teller 296 votes, and declared the latter's election. Turner filed a contest in the district court, which rendered judgment declaring Teller's election. Turner has appealed.
It is provided in our election statutes (article 3001) that, when a voter presents himself at the polls to vote, and the election judges are satisfied as to his right to vote, the judge shall "deliver to him one official ballot on the blank side of which the presiding judge shall have previously written his signature," whereupon the voter may prepare the ballot for voting it.
It is then provided (article 3005) that, when the voter has thus prepared his ballot, "he shall fold the same so as to conceal the printing thereon, and so as to expose the signature of the presiding judge on the blank side, which shall always be indorsed by the judge before the ballot is delivered," and the voter shall then cast the ballot.
So it will be seen from the three articles, considered together, that in order to be counted each ballot voted shall bear the "signature" of the presiding judge before it is issued to the voter for marking, and that, if not so indorsed, it shall not be counted. The statutes quoted do not require, as appellant contends, that the presiding judge's "name" shall be indorsed on the ballot. The requirement in article 3011, upon which appellant bases this contention, that the election officers shall familiarize themselves with the signature of the judge "who writes his name" on the ballots is deemed but descriptive of that official, and not as a mandatory definition of that official's duty. It is not used for the purpose of modifying or legislatively construing the meaning of the word "signature" used in the three articles in defining the nature of the official act, but is used for the purpose of identifying the official upon whom rests the duty of performing that act. This is made obvious by the context of the three provisions, which must be construed together.
Thus the simple requirement of the statute is that the presiding judge shall write his "signature" upon the ballot. The requirement is not merely directory, but is mandatory, as appellee concedes.
In this case a large majority of the ballots were indorsed merely with the three initials, and not by the full names, of the presiding judges. For instance, F. A. Whitbeck was the presiding judge in a given precinct. He did not indorse any of the ballots cast in that box with the full name, "F. A. Whitbeck"; he indorsed all of them with his initials only, "F. A. W." The ballots were nevertheless counted by the precinct officials, the commissioners' court, and the district court. If they had been disregarded and not counted, then appellant would have gotten a majority of the votes counted. So the controlling question in the case is, Should those ballots, indorsed with the initials only, and not with the full name, of the presiding judge, have been given effect as legal ballots? The question is here presented for the first time in this state.
This and similar requirements in our statutes were enacted in order to prevent fraud. It is...
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Brown v. Grzeskowiak
...is not exclusive of any other method legally sufficient to accomplish the same result.' The question involved in Turner v. Teller, Tex.Civ.App., 1925, 275 S.W. 115, although not concerned with absent voters' ballots, was identical to the one now before us, except that there the Texas statut......
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State v. Hager
... ... 272; Miller v. Schallern, 8 N. D. 395, 79 ... N.W. 865; People ex rel. Nichols v. Board, 129 N.Y ... 395, 29 N.E. 327, 14 L.R.A. 624; Turner v. Teller ... (Tex.Civ.App.) 275 S.W. 115; Slaymaker v ... Phillips, 5 Wyo. 453, 40 P. 971, 42 P. 1049, 47 L.R.A ... 842; McKay v. Minner, 154 ... ...
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Walker v. Thetford, 11480
...defeat a fair expression of the popular will. Where they do not, the courts have been liberal in sustaining the result. Turner v. Teller (Tex.Civ.App.) 275 S.W. 115. Where such derelictions of the election officials have interfered with or prevented such a fair expression, or where there is......
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Thomas v. Groebl
...Wilhelm, Tex.Civ.App., 52 S.W.2d 757, application for writ of error refused; Moore v. Plott, Tex.Civ.App., 206 S.W. 958; Turner v. Teller, Tex.Civ.App., 275 S.W. 115; State ex rel. Paggi v. Fletcher, Tex.Civ.App., 50 S.W.2d 450; Neil v. Pile, Tex.Civ.App., 75 S.W.2d 899: Stratton v. Hall, T......