Turney v. Barr

Decision Date09 June 1888
Citation38 N.W. 550,75 Iowa 758
PartiesTURNEY v. BARR.
CourtIowa Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Appeal from district court, Jones county; JAMES D. GRIFFIN, Judge.

Habeas corpus. The plaintiff was remanded to the custody of the defendant, and he appeals.

REED, J., dissenting.

C. C. Cole and A. H. Denman, for appellant.

A. J. Baker, Atty. Gen., for appellee.

SEEVERS, C. J.

The petition stated that the defendant is warden of the penitentiary at Anamosa, and, as such, has custody of the plaintiff, who is restrained of his liberty, and that the cause and pretense of such restraint is certain judgments, rendered by the district court of Jackson county in certain criminal actions wherein the state of Iowa was plaintiff and the appellant was defendant, copies of which said judgments are made a part of the petition. The following is a copy of the proceedings of the court, and of one of said judgments, as the same appears of record:

State of Iowa, Jackson County: Be it remembered that heretofore, to-wit, at a term of the district court of the state of Iowa begun and held * * * in and for said county, * * * present, the Hon. Walter I. Hayes, sole presiding district judge of the Seventh judicicial district, * * * the following entitled cause coming on to be heard, * * * the following, among other, proceedings were had therein, to-wit:

State of Iowa v. Chester Turney. (Larceny.)

Now, on this 10th day of December, A. D. 1885, this cause came on for trial, the plaintiff appearing by M. V. Gannon, district attorney, and, the defendant being without means with which to employ counsel, the court appointed A. D. Wynkoop, Esq., attorney to defend him. The defendant, being arraigned, says he is indicted by his right name, and pleads not guilty; and thereupon came a jury of twelve men, who were duly sworn to well and truly try said cause, and a true verdict render therein; and the said jury having heard the evidence, and received the charge of the court, returned their verdict in words and figures following, to-wit: We, the jury, find the defendant guilty, and find the property stolen to be of the value of $45,000. R. C. WESTBROOK, Foreman.’ And on the same day, to-wit, December 10, 1885, the court sustained the verdict, and sentenced the defendant (he waiving time) to imprisonment in the penitentiary at Anamosa, at hard labor, for the term of six months. It is therefore ordered by the court that the defendant, Chester Turney, be taken by the sheriff, and conveyed to the penitentiary at Anamosa, Iowa, and confined at hard labor for the term of six months, and that D. A. Wynkoop be allowed ten dollars for defending, and that judgment be entered against defendant for costs.”

The other judgments were substantially the same as the foregoing. The petition further states that the plaintiff is illegally restrained of his liberty on the following grounds: (1) He was restrained of his liberty by the sheriff of said county, and was not present before said court when the jury was impaneled or sworn in any of said actions. (2) He was restrained of his liberty by said sheriff, and was not present in or before said court during any portion of the trial of each and all of said actions. (3) He was restrained of his liberty by said sheriff, and was not allowed to be and was not present in or before said court when the judgment of the court aforesaid was rendered in any of said actions. (4) The jury in each of said causes did not deliberate upon nor determine the question of this petitioner's guilt or innocence, but, in obedience to the direction of said court with the district attorney, one of their number, to-wit, R. C. Westbrook, as foreman, did sign and return to said court a written verdict, prepared and handed to him for that purpose by an officer of the court, which verdicts, so signed and returned, were the only verdicts rendered in said actions; and said jury did not, from the time of being sworn and taking their seats in the jury-box in the first of the aforesaid actions, leave the same, nor any member thereof, nor was said jury, nor any member thereof, first impaneled as aforesaid, discharged from the jury-box by the court until after the verdicts had been signd by the said R. C. Westbrook, in manner aforesaid, in each of the twelve different actions above mentioned; nor was said jury, nor any member thereof, in any of said causes aforesaid, allowed to express or take any part whatever, in determining the question of the guilt or innocence of the defendant in said actions, except the said R. C. Westbrook in the manner aforesaid. (5) There was in fact no trial by either court or jury of the question of the guilt or innocence of the defendant in any of said actions, inasmuch as there was no testimony or evidence offered or introduced, either on the part of the state or said defendant, in any of said actions, nor any pretense thereof, except reading of the minutes of evidence taken by the clerk of the grand jury, and returned with the several indictments.”

In the return to the writ the defendant admitted that he held the plaintiff under the several judgments referred to in the petition, but did not controvert in any respect the allegations in the petition. There was a stipulation of the parties that the evidence might be taken in the form of affidavits, and the plaintiff obtained the affidavits of certain persons who had acted as jurors. The defendant filed a motion to strike the same from the record on several grounds, and the motion was sustained, but the affidavits are set out at length in the record before us. The defendant also demurred to the fourth and fifth paragraphs of the petition upon several stated grounds. The demurrer was sustained. The foregoing is a full statement of the record and rulings of the court, except that the contents of the affidavits have not been stated.

1. This case has been elaborately argued by counsel, and many authorities cited, but the legal questions involved are few, and can and must be solved by reference to well-settled legal principles, as to the existence of which there cannot, we think, be any serious doubt. For instance, we regard it as undoubted that an attack, by habeas corpus, upon the validity of a judgment, is of a collateral character, and that, unless...

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