Turnquist v. Hannon

• Decision Date: 31 December 1914
• Citation: 219 Mass. 560,107 N.E. 443
• Parties: TURNQUIST v. HANNON.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

219 Mass. 560

107 N.E. 443

TURNQUIST v. HANNON.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

December 31, 1914

COUNSEL

Frank W. Knowlton and Chas. O. Pengra, both of Boston, for plaintiff.

Albin L. Richards, of Boston, for defendant.

OPINION

RUGG C.J.

An employé, in the course of his employment by a subscriber under the Workmen's Compensation Act, received mortal injuries through the negligence of an agent of the defendant acting within the scope of his duty. Thereafter, the widow of the employé, who was appointed administratrix of his estate made an agreement, both individually and as administratrix with the insurance company through which the employer was insured, as to the compensation due her for its liability under the act, which was approved by the Industrial Accident Board. St. 1911, c. 751, pt. 3, § 4, as amended by St. 1912 c. 571, § 9. Substantial sums of money have been paid to her in accordance therewith. This action is brought in her name by the insurance company for its benefit under section 15 of part 3 of the Act, which is in these words:

'Sec. 15. Where the injury for which compensation is payable under this act was caused under circumstances creating a legal liability in some person other than the subscriber to pay damages in respect thereof, the employé may at his option proceed either at law against that person to recover damages or against the association for compensation under this act, but not against both, and if compensation be paid under this act, the association may enforce in the name of the employé, or in its own name and for its own benefit, the liability of such other person.'

The insurance company, in the name of the administratrix as plaintiff, is seeking under the authority of that section to enforce the liability established by R. L. c. 171, § 2, as amended by St. 1907, c. 375, which enables the administratrix of a deceased person who has lost his life through the negligence of another, to recover against such other person damages in a sum not less than $500, and not more than $10,000, to be assessed with reference to the degree of culpability of the person causing the death.

The sum so recoverable is a penalty to punish the wrongdoer. It is in substance a fine imposed by the commonwealth for the offense of causing the loss of a human life through negligence, which, instead of being turned into the treasury of the commonwealth, is paid, one-half to the widow and one-half to the minor children; if there are no minor children, the whole to the widow; if there is no widow, the whole to the next of kin. Boott Mills v. Boston & Maine Railroad, 218 Mass. 582, 106 N.E. 680. The money which may be recovered under that death statute is not assets in the hands of the administrator, but is required to be paid directly to the widow and children, to the widow, or to the next of kin, as the case may be. Brennan v. Standard Oil Co., 187 Mass. 376, 73 N.E. 472. The same provision in effect is made by part 2, § 13, of the act, except that in the event that there is no personal representative the compensation shall be paid directly to the dependents, or, if there are none, then to the creditor for the expenses of the last sickness and death. Under each of these statutes the executor or administrator of the deceased acts as trustee for the persons designated as beneficiaries and not for all interested in the estate of the deceased, as in ordinary cases.

If the injury in the case at bar had not resulted in his death, two alternatives would have been open to the employé under the terms of part 3,§ 15, of the act: (1) To bring an action at law against the defendant for the injury done him, or (2) to proceed for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act. But he could not have pursued both remedies. He would have been bound to elect between the two.

It is provided by part 5, § 2, of the act that:

'Any reference to an employé who has been injured shall, when the employé is dead, also include his legal representatives, dependents and other persons to whom compensation may be payable.'

These words are comprehensive and inclusive. They occur under the subdivision of the act which, among other miscellaneous provisions, undertakes to define the meaning of numerous words used repeatedly in the several sections. There seems to be no sufficient reason for giving to this definition any other than its natural meaning. The Legislature in enacting this act were dealing in a new way with an old subject which affects vast numbers of plain people. It undertook to codify the law as to the relations between employer and employé in most industrial affairs. An administrative board was created for its execution, no one of whom was required by its terms to be learned in the law. The initial inquiry as to the facts and the application of the act is to be made by the Committee of Arbitration, which often may be composed entirely of laymen. These considerations make necessary the conclusion that this act ought to be interpreted according to the obvious sense of its words and that exceptions are not to be read into its general provisions unless required by strong reasons. It follows that 'employé,' in part 3, § 15 has the meaning ascribed to it...