Turpin v. State
Decision Date | 27 April 2021 |
Docket Number | WD 83707 |
Citation | 628 S.W.3d 416 |
Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Parties | In the Matter of the Care and Treatment of: Wade TURPIN, Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent. |
Amy E. Lowe, Assistant Public Defender, St. Louis, MO, Attorney for Appellant.
Eric S. Schmitt, Attorney General, and Kristen S. Johnson, Assistant Attorney General, Jefferson City, MO, Attorneys for Respondent.
Before Division Two: Mark D. Pfeiffer, Presiding Judge, and Alok Ahuja and Karen King Mitchell, Judges
Wade Turpin was involuntarily committed to the custody of the Missouri Department of Mental Health (DMH) as a sexually violent predator in 2004. In 2016, he petitioned for conditional release under § 632.498.3.1 Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied Turpin's petition because he failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he "no longer suffer[ed] from a mental abnormality that makes [him] likely to engage in acts of sexual violence if released." In his sole point on appeal, Turpin argues that the trial court erred in denying his petition because the court did not consider the conditions of release set out in § 632.505, as required by our decision in In re Care and Treatment of King , 571 S.W.3d 169 (Mo. App. W.D. 2019). Finding no error, we affirm.
In 1985, Turpin pled guilty to two counts of sodomy and two counts of abuse of a child; he was sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment. Before Turpin was scheduled to be released, the State petitioned to have him involuntarily committed as a sexually violent predator. On February 26, 2004, Turpin was tried by jury and found to meet the requirements for civil commitment as a sexually violent predator under §§ 632.480 - 632.525. We affirmed Turpin's involuntary commitment in In re Care and Treatment of Turpin , 173 S.W.3d 659 (Mo. App. W.D. 2005).
On September 26, 2016, Turpin filed a petition for conditional release without authorization of the DMH Director. Turpin's petition alleged that he no longer suffers from a mental abnormality that makes him likely to commit an act of sexual violence if conditionally released.
Turpin appeals.
"Our review of the denial of a petition for conditional release from the custody of [DMH] is governed by Murphy v. Carron , 536 S.W.2d 30 (Mo. banc 1976)." In re Care and Treatment of Smith , 592 S.W.3d 829, 832 (Mo. App. W.D. 2020) (quoting State v. Carter , 551 S.W.3d 573, 575 (Mo. App. W.D. 2018) ). "We will reverse the trial court's decision only if there is no substantial evidence to support it, ... it erroneously declares or applies the law, or ... it is against the weight of evidence." Id. (quoting Carter , 551 S.W.3d at 575 ).
In his sole point on appeal, Turpin asserts that the trial court clearly erred in denying his petition because the court "did not sufficiently abide by" King and Turpin's continued detention violates due process.
Although we find Turpin's point relied on to be vague,3 there are only two potential ways the judgment "does not sufficiently abide" by King ; either (1) the trial court failed to make findings ostensibly required by King or (2) the court failed to consider the conditional release factors in rendering its judgment (i.e. , the court misapplied the law). Either way, Turpin's argument fails.
To the extent Turpin argues that the trial court erred because it failed to make findings ostensibly required by King —findings concerning the conditions of release set out in § 632.505—Turpin failed to preserve that issue for appellate review. To preserve allegations of error relating to "the form or language of the judgment, including the failure to make statutorily required findings," such allegations must first be raised in a motion to amend the judgment, which Turpin did not file. Rule 78.07(c).4 Thus, to the extent King requires specific findings and Turpin's complaint is about their absence in the judgment, he waived that claim by failing to file a motion to amend under Rule 78.07(c).
To the extent Turpin argues that the trial court erred because it failed to consider the § 632.505 conditions in rendering its judgment, that argument also fails. The record shows that the trial court did consider the § 632.505 conditions in denying Turpin's petition for conditional release.
King , 571 S.W.3d at 173 (quoting § 632.480(5) ). To satisfy due process concerns, "the ‘mental abnormality’ and ‘dangerousness’ must be inextricably intertwined, such that ‘involuntary civil confinement is limited to those who suffer from a volitional impairment rendering them dangerous beyond their control.’ " Id. ( ). "Due process requires that a person be both mentally ill and dangerous in order to be civilly committed; the absence of either characteristic renders involuntary civil confinement unconstitutional." Id. (quoting Murrell , 215 S.W.3d at 104 ).
"The constitutional requirement that an offender both suffer from a mental illness, and present a substantial risk of reoffending, continues beyond the offender's initial commitment." Id. "The individual must not only be dangerous at the time of, but also during, commitment, for ‘if his involuntary confinement was initially permissible, it could not constitutionally continue after a basis no longer existed.’ " Id. (quoting Murrell , 215 S.W.3d at 104 ). The Missouri Supreme Court has emphasized that Id. (quoting Murrell , 215 S.W.3d at 105 ).
"Section 632.498 ensures that an offender's continued involuntary commitment remains constitutionally justifiable." Id. "Section 632.498.1 requires the Director of [DMH], on an annual basis, to conduct an examination of the mental health of every involuntarily committed sexually violent predator who has not been conditionally released." Id. "If the Director determines in that annual review ‘that the person's mental abnormality has so changed that the person is not likely to commit acts of sexual violence if released, the director shall authorize the person to petition the court for release.’ " Id. (quoting § 632.501 ). "If, on the other hand, the Director determines that release of the offender is not warranted, the offender may nevertheless petition the court...
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