Turtle Island Foods v. Thompson
Decision Date | 29 March 2021 |
Docket Number | No. 19-3154,19-3154 |
Citation | 992 F.3d 694 |
Parties | TURTLE ISLAND FOODS, SPC, doing business as The Tofurky Company; The Good Food Institute, Inc., Plaintiffs - Appellants v. Locke THOMPSON, in his official capacity as Cole County Prosecuting Attorney and on behalf of a defendant class of all Missouri Prosecuting Attorneys, Defendant - Appellee State of Missouri, Intervenor - Appellee |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Jessica Almy, Nigel Barrella, Good Food Institute, Washington, DC, Alene Georgia Anello, Amanda Howell, Animal Legal Defense Fund, Cotati, CA, Kayla M. DeLoach, Omri E. Praiss, Anthony E. Rothert, Jessie M. Steffan, American Civil Liberties Union of Missouri, Saint Louis, MO, Gillian R. Wilcox, ACLU of Missouri Foundation, Kansas City, MO, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
Michael G. Berry, Newman & Comley, Jefferson City, MO, for Defendant-Appellee.
Peter A. Houser, Justin D. Smith, Attorney General's Office, Jefferson City, MO, for Intervenor-Appellee.
Before COLLOTON, MELLOY, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiffs, Turtle Island Foods d/b/a The Tofurky Company (Tofurky) and the Good Food Institute (the Institute), brought a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to challenge the constitutionality of Missouri Revised Statutes § 265.494(7) (the Statute), which criminalizes "misrepresenting a product as meat that is not derived from harvested production livestock or poultry." Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction, which the district court1 denied. We affirm.
The Statute went into effect in 2018, adding a new prohibited practice to Missouri's preexisting meat advertising regulations. It prohibits "person[s] advertising, offering for sale or selling all or part of a carcass or food plan2 " from "engag[ing] in any misleading or deceptive practices," Mo. Rev. Stat. § 265.494, which now includes: "misrepresenting a product as meat that is not derived from harvested production livestock or poultry," id. § 265.494(7). The Statute defines "meat" as: "any edible portion of livestock, poultry, or captive cervid carcass or part thereof." Id. § 265.300(7). The term "misrepresent" is defined as "the use of any untrue, misleading or deceptive oral or written statement, advertisement, label, display, picture, illustration or sample." Id. § 265.490(6). Pursuant to the Statute, any person who violates its terms is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. Id. § 265.496. The punishment for a class A misdemeanor is imprisonment for up to one year and a fine up to $1,000. Id. § 558.011.1(6).
The day before the Statute took effect, Plaintiffs filed suit against the Cole County Prosecuting Attorney3 and a putative defendant class of Missouri's prosecuting attorneys. The Cole County Prosecuting Attorney declined to defend the Statute's constitutionality; therefore, the State of Missouri (the State) intervened for that limited purpose, while reserving its sovereign immunity. The Complaint alleges the Missouri legislature passed the Statute in order to protect Missouri's animal agricultural industry against competition from the plant-based-meat and clean-meat-substitutes industries.4 It also alleges the Statute violates Plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights and due process rights and violates the Dormant Commerce Clause. Plaintiffs seek: a preliminary and permanent injunction to prevent enforcement of the Statute; a declaration that the Statute is unconstitutional on its face and as applied to Plaintiffs; and an award of costs and fees.
Two days after the Statute took effect, the Missouri Department of Agriculture issued somewhat unclear guidance on the new Statute. The Department explained that, in its view, the law did not prohibit, and the Department would not refer for prosecution, products in packaging fulfilling two conditions: (1) prominent statements on the front of the package implying the product is "plant-based," "veggie," "lab-grown," "lab-created," or employing a similar qualifier; and (2) a prominent statement anywhere on the package that the product is "made from plants," "grown in a lab," or a comparable disclosure. In the Department's currently-expressed view, products containing these or similar disclosures "do not misrepresent themselves as meat" and therefore do not violate section 265.494(7).
Tofurky is a vegan food brand whose products are marketed and sold in Missouri. The Institute is a food advocacy organization that partners with vegan food producers whose products are marketed and sold in Missouri. Plaintiffs believe their current marketing and labeling practices are only able to be accurate and effective because they describe products through "comparison to the conventional meat products they are designed to replace." For example, Tofurky labels its plant-based products using references to traditional meat products, such as "slow-roasted chick'n," "DIY chorizo style sausage," "original sausage kielbasa," and "vegetarian ham roast." The Institute works with companies that also market their products using meat-related terminology, such as "vegan jerky," "smart bacon: veggie bacon strips," and "the ultimate beefless burger."
Although Plaintiffs use meat-related terminology, Tofurky, as well as the plant-based meat companies that the Institute supports, use labels and marketing that clearly indicate their products are made of plants, meatless, vegetarian, or vegan. The Complaint includes seven labels for certain Tofurky products, all of which include modifiers like "vegetarian," "veggie," and "all vegan" or otherwise indicate they are made with "pasture raised plants" or "plant-based" ingredients, not meat harvested from poultry or livestock.
After filing the Complaint, Plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction and a motion to certify the defendant class. Plaintiffs argued a preliminary injunction of the Statute, as applied to them, was warranted based on the likelihood of success of their First Amendment claim. Plaintiffs argued that, under the Statute, their use of meat-related terminology in their marketing and labeling could be viewed as "misrepresenting" their products as meat because the statute defines "misrepresent" as not only "the use of any untrue" statements but also statements that are "misleading or deceptive." In response, the State argued the labels, like those Tofurky submitted to the district court, which describe plant-based meat as plant-based, are not misleading and are therefore not prohibited by the Statute. Without holding a hearing, the district court certified the class and denied the motion for a preliminary injunction. The court concluded Plaintiffs had not shown a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of their First Amendment claim because the Statute does not prohibit their commercial speech. Although Plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction was denied, the district court's analytical path rendered its decision a seemingly positive outcome for Plaintiffs—that is, the district court found preliminarily that the Statute did not apply to Plaintiffs’ speech. Plaintiffs appealed nonetheless and now argue the district court erred in its interpretation of the Statute. Plaintiffs contend the Statute is a content-based restriction on their commercial speech and ask that this court remand with instructions to enter a preliminary injunction.
We generally review the denial of a preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion and reverse "where the district court rests its conclusion on clearly erroneous factual finding or erroneous legal conclusions." Minn. Citizens Concerned for Life, Inc. v. Swanson, 692 F.3d 864, 870 (8th Cir. 2012) (en banc). We review the district court's legal conclusions de novo. Johnson v. Minneapolis Park & Recreation Bd., 729 F.3d 1094, 1098 (8th Cir. 2013).
"A district court considering injunctive relief evaluates the movant's likelihood of success on the merits, the threat of irreparable harm to the movant, the balance of the equities between the parties, and whether an injunction is in the public interest." Powell v. Ryan, 855 F.3d 899, 902 (8th Cir. 2017) (citing Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. C L Sys., Inc., 640 F.2d 109, 114 (8th Cir. 1981) (en banc)). "A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy, and the burden of establishing the propriety of an injunction is on the movant." Watkins Inc. v. Lewis, 346 F.3d 841, 844 (8th Cir. 2003) (internal citation omitted). "No single factor is dispositive, as the district court must balance all factors to determine whether the injunction should issue." Lankford v. Sherman, 451 F.3d 496, 503 (8th Cir. 2006). However, "[i]n deciding whether to grant a preliminary injunction, likelihood of success on the merits is most significant." Laclede Gas Co. v. St. Charles Cnty., 713 F.3d 413, 419–20 (8th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). Because Plaintiffs challenge a state statute "based on presumptively reasoned democratic processes," they must show they are "likely to prevail on the merits." Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 732–33 & n. 4 (8th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
As an initial matter, we briefly address the State's argument that Plaintiffs lack standing and have brought this action before it is ripe for review. The district court did not directly address these questions below. However, we "must address questions of standing before addressing the merits of a case where standing is called into question." Brown v. Medtronic, Inc., 628 F.3d 451, 455 (8th Cir. 2010). "Th[e] irreducible constitutional minimum of standing requires a showing of injury in fact to the plaintiff that is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and likely to be redressed by a favorable decision." Braden v. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 591 (8th Cir. 2009) (cleaned up). The State argues Plaintiffs lack standing because they cannot show injury in fact,...
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