Tuscaloosa County v. Jim Thomas Forestry Consultants, Inc.
| Decision Date | 31 December 1992 |
| Citation | 613 So.2d 322 |
| Parties | TUSCALOOSA COUNTY v. JIM THOMAS FORESTRY CONSULTANTS, INC. JIM THOMAS FORESTRY CONSULTANTS, INC. v. TUSCALOOSA COUNTY. 1910403, 1910574. |
| Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Barry L. Mullins and Robert M. Spence of deGraffenried & Mullins, Tuscaloosa, for appellant/cross-appellee.
John F. McDaniel and W.J. McDaniel of McDaniel, Hall, Conerly & Lusk, P.C., Birmingham, for appellee/cross-appellant.
Tuscaloosa County ("the County") and Jim Thomas Forestry Consultants, Inc. ("JTFC"), appeal and cross-appeal, respectively, from a judgment entered on a jury verdict in favor of Tuscaloosa County in its action against JTFC for damages to compensate for the destruction of a bridge. We affirm.
On May 12, 1989, the "Whittson bridge," a 100-year-old structure spanning the North River in northern Tuscaloosa County, collapsed when a truck owned by JTFC attempted to cross. The truck weighed approximately 40 tons--four times the bridge's posted carrying capacity.
On November 7, 1989, the County sued JTFC, alleging that JTFC had negligently or wantonly caused the destruction of its bridge. Following a jury's verdict awarding the County $100,000 in compensatory damages, both parties moved for a new trial on the grounds, inter alia, that the verdict was contrary to the law and the facts and was against the weight of the evidence. Both parties appealed the judgment entered following the denial of their post-trial motions.
Although the parties attack the judgment on various procedural grounds, the issue on which both the appeal and the cross-appeal turn is the proper method of calculating damages for the destruction of the bridge. Specifically, the County contends that the trial court erred in (1) instructing the jury that it was to calculate damages based on the "difference between the reasonable, market value[s] of the property" before and after the accident; (2) allowing JTFC to argue to the jury for a deduction from damages based on a "straight-line" depreciation formula; and (3) excluding evidence of a "cost-benefit" analysis, which purported to show the use and benefit of the bridge to the residents of the community it served. Similarly, JTFC contends in its cross-appeal that the trial court erred in (1) admitting evidence of the cost of replacing the bridge, particularly in allowing the jury to consider the cost of replacing it with one of larger dimensions; and (2) excluding a pre-accident "appraisal report," which purported to show the bridge's condition, projected expenditures for repair, and recommended schedules for the bridge's repair or rehabilitation. For procedural reasons, we deem it expedient to address first the issues raised in the cross-appeal.
Damages for the destruction of a public bridge are expressly authorized by Ala.Code 1975, § 32-5-9, which provides in pertinent part:
"(a) Any person driving any vehicle, object or contrivance upon any highway or highway structure shall be liable for all damage which said highway or structure may sustain as a result of any illegal or careless operation, driving or moving of such vehicle, object or contrivance or as a result of operating, driving or moving any vehicle, object or contrivance weighing in excess of the maximum weight prescribed by law...."
This section was originally enacted as Act No. 516, § 41, 1949 Ala.Acts 740, and, as far as we have been able to determine, has never been interpreted by an appellate court. Thus, the measure of damages recoverable under this section appears to be a question of first impression.
As authority for its theory of damages calculation, JTFC cites Chambers County Commissioners v. Walker, 459 So.2d 861 (Ala.1984), and Smith v. Springsteen, 385 So.2d 56 (Ala.Civ.App.1980), thus contending, as we understand it, that the proper measure of damages is the value of the bridge before it collapsed, minus its value after the accident. The "value" measure, that is, "the difference in the value of [the] property immediately before and immediately after the injury to it," is one method used to calculate the damages recoverable for damage to structures attached to the land. Dan Dobbs, Handbook of the Law of Remedies § 5.1 (1975). Characteristically, however, it is linked to the concept of market value, Dobbs supra, at 315-18, which is the amount that "a willing buyer ... would pay to a willing seller." United States v. Certain Property in the Borough of Manhattan, 403 F.2d 800, 802 (2d Cir.1968). At least two courts considering a similar issue have concluded that damages for the destruction of a public structure such as a bridge cannot be determined by a reference to market value. See Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Dep't of Transp. v. Estate of Crea, 92 Pa.Commw. 242, 250, 483 A.2d 996, 1001 (1977); Town of Fifield v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 119 Wis.2d 220, 226-227, 349 N.W.2d 684, 687 (1984) ().
We agree with these characterizations of bridges and similar structures. In our view, a consideration of damages for the destruction of an inherently unmarketable structure in the context of market value represents a contradiction in terms. Damages for the destruction of the Whittson bridge cannot, therefore, be computed on the basis of market value.
In the absence of a market on which to value a bridge, Town of Fifield adopted a damages formula based on the intrinsic value of the destroyed bridge to its owner--a formula requiring a consideration of an expanded roster of factors, including "opinion evidence, cost, use, cost of restoration, ease or likelihood of repair, continued usefulness, age of the property, and its condition." 119 Wis.2d at 227, 349 N.W.2d at 687. 1 The court quoted with approval the following remarks:
Town of Fifield, 119 Wis.2d at 228, 349 N.W.2d at 688, quoting Johnson v. Board of County Commissioners, 138 Colo. 392, 395, 336 P.2d 300 (1959) () (emphasis in Town of Fifield ). Interestingly, this rule as currently expressed in 25A C.J.S. Damages, § 157, at 57-58 (1966), specifically prohibits the admission of "evidence purporting to show the market value of such property."
The applicability of Town of Fifield's multi-factor valuation formula to structures within the scope of § 32-5-9, however, appears tenuous at best. Just how such structures can be said to have a realistically calculable value to their owners, which are generally government entities, is not readily apparent. Instructive in this connection is the following colloquy that transpired during the County's attempt to introduce evidence of its cost-benefit analysis:
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