Tuscaloosa County v. Shamblin

• Decision Date: 25 June 1936
• Docket Number: 6 Div. 989
• Citation: 169 So. 234,233 Ala. 6
• Parties: TUSCALOOSA COUNTY v. SHAMBLIN.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

169 So. 234

233 Ala. 6

TUSCALOOSA COUNTY v. SHAMBLIN.

6 Div. 989

Supreme Court of Alabama

June 25, 1936

Appeal from Circuit Court, Tuscaloosa County; Henry B. Foster Judge.

Bill in equity by Festus Shamblin, individually and as sheriff of Tuscaloosa county, against Tuscaloosa county. From a decree for complainant, respondent appeals.

Affirmed.

Foster Rice & Foster and J.G. Madison, all of Tuscaloosa, for appellant.

McQueen McQueen & McQueen, of Tuscaloosa, for appellee.

FOSTER Justice.

This is a suit in equity under the Declaratory Judgment Act of September 7, 1935, Gen.Acts 1935, p. 777.

The purpose is primarily to have declaration as to the validity of an act of the Legislature to regulate the office of the sheriff of Tuscaloosa county (Local Acts 1936, p. 53), approved April 7, 1936, by which, among other things, the salary of the sheriff is fixed at $4,000 per annum, payable monthly, prescribing the details as to his office expenses, by authority of a constitutional amendment. See, Gen.Acts 1935, p. 1170.

It is also alleged that for the month of May, 1936, there is now due petitioner the sum of $333.33, the amount provided by the act, and certain items of expense due to be paid him by the same authority, but that the board of revenue of the county have refused to allow and pay the claim, or cause a warrant to be issued so that it may be paid, claiming that the act is invalid, and confers no authority upon them to pay petitioner, wherefore there exists an actual controversy as to the validity of the act between petitioner and the board of revenue acting for Tuscaloosa county.

The Declaratory Judgments Act confers upon courts of record power to make declaration of such controversies, which we have held is sufficient to do so, when there is subsisting an actual controversy, on which substantial personal or property rights are dependent, and the parties to it are brought into court and heard so that the matter thereby becomes res judicata. Jefferson County v. Johnson (Ala.Sup.) 168 So. 450.

There may sometimes arise a question as to the proper court, whether law or equity, in which to proceed since the act does not specify, or whether it is available when there exists a common-law remedy, by which the same result may be reached.

This suit illustrates a situation which might give rise to such a controversy, and we wish to emphasize the fact that there is no claim here made that it was begun in equity rather than at law, or that it is not available because of the existence of other remedy. The chancery court is ordinarily the court to which application would be made for declaratory proceedings, such as to quiet title, and settle boundary disputes. Created by authority of section 145 of the Constitution, it may have such jurisdiction as is conferred by law, not exclusively conferred upon some other tribunal, and so long as other constitutional rights are protected. The broad language of the act in question would be appropriate to give courts of law and equity concurrent jurisdiction. Section 9 (page 778) provides for a jury trial, pursuant to the practice and proceedings in such court in which the cause is heard. In chancery, except when a trial by jury is given by law, such a trial is not authoritative and binding on the court, but is largely advisory. Hill v. Lindsey, 223 Ala. 550, 137 So. 395; section 6631, Code.

In some states, in which the chancery court is separate from that at law, some difficulty has arisen in determining when a proceeding under such an act should be in equity and when at law. Borchard on Declaratory Judgments, page 137. But in Alabama we have only one court in which such a proceeding should originate, the circuit court. But in it, the law and equity jurisdiction and procedure are kept separate and distinct.

We cannot see that it is material whether the proceeding is begun on one docket or the other, so long as constitutional rights are preserved, including that of trial by jury. Such right does not include matters within the original jurisdiction of a court of equity, such as declaring disputed boundary lines. Yauger v. Taylor, 218 Ala. 235, 118 So. 271.

The act here in question does not limit the jurisdiction to the equity court, but confers it upon a court of record. The effect, as we have said, is to give the courts of law and equity concurrent jurisdiction, so long as other constitutional rights are preserved.

A case may arise under the act in which an action in common-law form is available against a defendant on account of an existing default, and in which defendant would be entitled to a jury trial. If proceeding for a declaratory judgment is begun in equity, and defendant wishes and demands a jury trial, pursuant to his right under the law or Constitution, the court could either transfer the cause to the law docket under section 6486, Code, or have a jury trial in equity under section 6631, Code, when the verdict would be as authoritative as at law, since it was a matter of right. Brintle v. Wood, 223 Ala. 472, 136 So. 803; Karter v. East, 220 Ala. 511, 125 So. 655; Hill v. Lindsey, supra.

A proceeding for a declaratory judgment under such circumstances is not within the original jurisdiction of the chancery court, and cannot be used to deprive one of a jury trial secured by the Constitution. Miller v. Gaston, 212 Ala. 519, 103 So. 541.

This remedy is intended to be alternative, and not dependent upon an absence of other ordinary remedies, Borchard on Declaratory Judgments, pages 147, 148, provided in it constitutional rights are preserved.

We have treated the subject as above, because in this case there has been an alleged breach or failure which entitles petitioner to enforce his claim by mandamus, or some other proceeding in which defendant may claim a right to trial by jury, Weakley v. Henry, 204 Ala. 463, 86 So. 46,

but has not done so, nor questioned the power of the court to pass on the merits of the controversy.

The first attack made on the act is that it violates section 45, Constitution, in that it contains more than one subject, more specifically that some matters are included which are not germane to the main subject. It is conceded that the main purpose of the act is to place the sheriff on a salary basis.

We have carefully considered all of its features, and think that all the provisions are incidental to that one subject. When the sheriff is taken off of a fee system of compensation, in which he must pay all the expenses of his administration of the office, other provision for such payment must reasonably follow.

It is useless to discuss separately each and every provision of the act to show that it is properly a part of such altered system. We think it is so.

It is next insisted that section 10 of the act is invalid, and that, therefore, the whole act is so. It is claimed that it is impossible to give the language of this section a precise and intelligible application, principally because the amount is left blank. It directs the payment to the sheriff of "$_______" annually to be used for the purchase and maintenance of automobiles necessary in the performance of his duties, and for other expenses not otherwise provided for, and that the amount remaining unused of...