Tuttle v. Buck

• Citation: 119 N.W. 946,107 Minn. 145
• Parties: TUTTLE v. BUCK.
• Decision Date: 19 February 1909
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

107 Minn. 145

119 N.W. 946

TUTTLE

v.BUCK.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Feb. 19, 1909.

Appeal from District Court, Rice County; Thomas S. Buckham, Judge.

Action by Edward C. Tuttle against Cassius M. Buck. Verdict for plaintiff. From an order denying a new trial, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Syllabus by the Court

A complaint which states, in substance, that the defendant, a banker and man of wealth and influence in the community, maliciously established a barber shop, employed a barber to carry on the business, and used his personal influence to attract customers from the plaintiff's barber shop, not for the purpose of serving any legitimate purpose of his own, but for the sole purpose of maliciously injuring the plaintiff, whereby the plaintiff's business was ruined, states a cause of action. Hall & Kolliner, for appellant.

F. E. Latham, for respondent.

This appeal was from an order overruling a general demurrer to a complaint in which the plaintiff alleged: That for more than 10 years last past he has been and still is a barber by trade, and engaged in business as such in the village of Howard Lake, Minn., in said county, where he resides, owning and operating a shop for the purpose of his said trade. That until the injury hereinafter complained of his said business was prosperous, and plaintiff was enabled thereby to comfortably maintain himself and family out of the income and profits thereof, and also to save a considerable sum per annum, to wit, about $800. That the defendant, during the period of about 12 months last past, has wrongfully, unlawfully, and maliciously endeavored to destroy plaintiff's said business and compel plaintiff to abandon the same. That to that end he has persistently and systematically sought, by false and malicious reports and accusations of and concerning the plaintiff, by personally soliciting and urging plaintiff's patrons no longer to employ plaintiff, by threats of his personal displeasure, and by various other unlawful means and devices, to induce, and has thereby induced, many of said patrons to withhold from plaintiff the employment by them formerly given. That defendant is possessed of large means, and is engaged in the business of a banker in said village of Howard Lake, at Dassel, Minn., and at divers other places, and is nowise interested in the occupation of a barber; yet in the pursuance of the wicked, malicious, and unlawful purpose aforesaid, and for the sole and only purpose of injuring the trade of the plaintiff, and of accomplishing his purpose and threats of ruining the plaintiff's said business and driving him out of said village, the defendant fitted up and furnished a barber shop in said village for conducting the trade of barbering. That failing to induce any barber to occupy said shop on his own account, though offered at nominal rental, said defendant, with the wrongful and malicious purpose aforesaid, and not otherwise, has during the time herein stated hired two barbers in succession for a stated salary, paid by him, to occupy said shop, and to serve so many of plaintiff's patrons as said defendant has been or may be able by the means aforesaid to direct from plaintiff's shop. That at the present time a barber so employed and paid by the defendant is occupying and nominally conducting the shop thus fitted and furnished by the defendant, without paying any rent therefor, and under an agreement with defendant whereby the income of said shop is required to be paid to defendant, and is so paid in partial return for his wages. That all of said things were and are done by defendant with the sole design of injuring the plaintiff, and of destroying his said business, and not for the purpose of serving any legitimate interest of his own. That by reason of the great wealth and prominence of the defendant, and the personal and financial influence consequent thereon, he has by the means aforesaid, and through other unlawful means and devices by him employed, materially injured the business of the plaintiff, has largely reduced the income and profits thereof, and intends and threatens to destroy the same altogether, to plaintiff's damage in the sum of $10,000.ELLIOTT, J. (after stating the facts as above).

It has been said that the law deals only with externals, and that a lawful act cannot be made the foundation of an action because it was done with an evil motive. In Allen v. Flood, [1898] A. C. 151, Lord Watson said that, except with regard to crimes, the law does not take into account motives as constituting an element of civil wrong. In Mayor v. Pickles, [1895] A. C. 587, Lord Halsbury stated that if the act was lawful, ‘however ill the motive might be, he had a right to do it.’ In Raycroft v. Tayntor, 68 Vt. 219, 35 Atl. 53,33 L. R. A. 225, 54 Am. St. Rep. 882, the court said that, ‘where one exercises a legal right only, the motive which actuates him is immaterial.’ In Jenkens v. Fowler, 24 Pa. 308, Mr. Justice Black said that ‘mischievous motives make a bad case worse, but they cannot make that wrong which in its own essence is lawful.’ This language was quoted in Bohn Mfg. Co. v. Hollis, 54 Minn. 233,55 N. W. 1119,21 L. R. A. 337, 40 Am. St. Rep. 319, and in substance in Ertz v. Produce Exchange, 79 Minn. 143,81 N. W. 737,48 L. R. A. 90, 79 Am. St. Rep. 433. See, also, Cooley, Torts (3d Ed.) p. 1505; Auburn & Co. v. Douglass, 9 N. Y. 444. Such generalizations are of little value in determining concrete cases. They may state the truth, but not the whole truth. Each word and phrase used therein may require definition and limitation. Thus, before we can apply Judge Black's language to a particular case, we must determine what act is ‘in its own essence lawful.’ What did Lord Halsbury mean by the words ‘lawful act’? What is meant by ‘exercising a legal right’? It is not at all correct to say that the motive with which an act is done is always immaterial, providing the act itself is not unlawful. Numerous illustrations of the contrary will be found in the civil as well as the criminal law.

We do not intend to enter upon an elaborate discussion of the subject, or become entangled in the subtleties connected with the words ‘malice’ and ‘malicious.’ We are not able to accept without limitations the doctrine above referred to, but at this time content ourselves with a brief reference to some general principles. It must be remembered that the common law is the result of growth, and that its development has been determined by the social needs of the community which it governs. It is the resultant of conflicting social forces, and those forces which are for...