Tuttle v. Lang

• Decision Date: 31 March 1905
• Parties: TUTTLE v. LANG, Sheriff.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

60 A. 892

100 Me. 123

TUTTLE

v. LANG, Sheriff.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

March 31, 1905.

Exceptions from Supreme Judicial Court, Somerset County.

Petition for habeas corpus by Warren Tuttle against Alfred H. Lang, as sheriff, to procure petitioner's discharge from custody. Exceptions sustained and petitioner discharged.

Argued before WISWELL, C. J., and WHITEHOUSE, STROUT, SAVAGE, and POWERS, JJ.

E. N. Merrill, for petitioner. Geo. W. Gower, Co. Atty., for defendant.

STROUT, J. The justice who heard the cause in the first instance found the following facts:

November 20, 1902, the petitioner was arrested and brought before the Skowhegan municipal court, charged with the offense of the unlawful sale of intoxicating liquors. Before pleading to the complaint the petitioner, the prosecuting complainant, and the judge came to an agreement by which the petitioner should plead guilty, and be sentenced to fine, costs, and imprisonment, but that no mittimus in execution of the sentence should issue until the petitioner should again be guilty of unlawfully selling intoxicating liquors. The petitioner thereupon pleaded guilty, sentence of fine, costs, and imprisonment was imposed, a memorandum of the agreement was noted on the judge's docket, and the petitioner was released from arrest, and allowed to go without day, without payment of fine and costs, and without imprisonment. No mittimus or other precept in execution of the sentence was issued or even prepared.

In October, 1904, nearly two years afterwards, the judge, being of the opinion that the petitioner was again unlawfully selling intoxicating liquors, but without giving him any hearing on the question, made out a mittimus on the old sentence of November 20, 1902, and delivered it to the sheriff, who took the petitioner into custody and committed him to jail in execution of that sentence. The petitioner thereupon sued out this writ of habeas corpus, and asks for his discharge from that imprisonment.

For the purpose of bringing the cause before the law court, the sitting justice ruled, as matter of law, that the petitioner was not entitled to be discharged. The case is here upon exception to that ruling.

A discharge will not be granted for technical or unimportant errors in the process or proceedings, but it will be granted where the detention is under process issued by a court or magistrate without authority or in excess of its Jurisdiction. Fisher v. McGirr, 1 Gray, 45, 61 Am. Dec. 381.

The municipal court of Skowhegan has regular terms for civil business, but none for criminal. Chapter 485, p. 812, Sp. Laws 1901. In the class of offenses charged against the petitioner, that court has the same jurisdiction as trial justices, and no more. In criminal cases it is always open. Upon a criminal charge within its jurisdiction, if upon trial the respondent is found guilty, or if he plead guilty, it becomes the duty of the judge at that session to impose sentence. When that is done, the cause is determined, the judge's judicial duty is at an end, and nothing remains but to carry the judgment into effect. If to do this a commitment is necessary, he should issue a mittimus at or before the end of the session at which the conviction was had, to convey the prisoner then present in custody to jail. The issuance of a mittimus is a ministerial, and not judicial, act—a sequence of the sentence, necessarily following it—and not subject to control by a magistrate, except in case of appeal, as hereinafter stated. In courts of general jurisdiction it is issued by the clerk without action or direction by the court, but a magistrate having no clerk must do it personally. Fisher v. Deans, 107 Mass. 118; Doggett v. Cook, 11 Cush. 262.

There is no doubt that a permanent court of general jurisdiction, having stated terms for the trial of criminal cases, may, for good cause, place an indictment on file, or continue the case to a subsequent term for sentence. In such case jurisdiction of the person and cause is retained. But after sentence and the adjournment of the term, or the end of the session, if before a magistrate, all jurisdiction of the cause and the person has ceased. Com. v. Dowdican's Bail, 115 Mass. 136; People v. Court of Sessions, 141 N. Y. 288, 36 N. E. 386, 23 L. R. A. 856.

We are not called upon to decide whether the Skowhegan municipal court or a trial justice has authority after conviction to continue for sentence. It is very doubtful if such authority exists. The statute in force when Tuttle was convicted provided that, "if the offense is within the jurisdiction of the magistrate, he shall try it and award sentence thereon." A continuance for sentence cannot be for an indefinite time, but should be to a subsequent term. The municipal court has no stated terms for criminal causes. As to these it is a temporary court for each case, exercising limited jurisdiction by prescribed methods. It has no jurisdiction to suspend and revive at its will a case before it. Com. v. Maloney, 145 Mass....