Tuttle v. Lorillard Tobacco Co.
| Decision Date | 28 September 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. Civ. 99-1550 PAMJGL.,Civ. 99-1550 PAMJGL. |
| Citation | 118 F.Supp.2d 954 |
| Parties | Gloria TUTTLE, as Trustee for the next-of-kin of Bill Tuttle, a.k.a. William R. Tuttle, deceased, Plaintiff, v. LORILLARD TOBACCO COMPANY; National Tobacco Company, L.P.; Worldwide Sports and Entertainment, f.k.a. National Tobacco Management Company; National Tobacco Finance Corporation; The Pinkerton Tobacco Company; and the Smokeless Tobacco Council; Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota |
Martha Koch Wivell, Vincent Joseph Moccio, Robins Kaplan Miller & Ciresi, Minneapolis MN, for plaintiff.
David George Martin, Michael Robert Docherty, Mark Allen Mitchell, Rider Bennett Egan & Arundel, Minneapolis, MN, Jeffrey S Nelson, Nancy Jean Stewig, J. Patrick Sullivan, L. Christopher Wittman, Shook Hardy & Bacon, Kansas City, MO, for Lorillard Tobacco Co., Inc., defendant.
Steven J Kirsch, Murnane Conlin White & Brandt, St Paul, MN, for National Tobacco LP, National Tobacco Finance Corp., defendants.
Steven J Kirsch, Murnane Conlin White & Brandt, St. Paul, MN, David George Martin, Rider Bennett Egan & Arundel, Minneapolis, MN, Nancy Jean Stewig, Shook Hardy & Bacon, Kansas city, MO, for Lehman Brothers/GP, Inc., defendant.
Vincent Joseph Moccio, Robins Kaplan Miller & Ciresi, Minneapolis, MN, Steven J Kirsch, Murnane Conlin White & Brandt, St. Paul, MN, David George Martin, Rider Bennett Egan & Arundel, Minneapolis, MN, Nancy Jean Stewig, Shook Hardy & Bacon, Kansas city, MO, for Worldwide Sports and Entertainment, defendant.
Lawrence R King, Daniel John Trudeau, Shawn M Raiter, Daniel Loren Scott, Larson King, St Paul, MN, for Pinkerton Tobacco Co., defendant.
Geoffrey P Jarpe, Maun & Simon, Minneapolis, MN, for Smokeless Tobacco Council, Inc., defendant.
This matter is before the Court on Defendants Worldwide Sports and Entertainment's and National Tobacco Finance Corporation's Motions to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction; Certain Defendants' Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(6) and 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; and the Smokeless Tobacco Council's Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rules 12(b)(6) and 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the following reasons, the Court summarily dismisses National Tobacco Finance Corporation from this lawsuit, grants Worldwide Sports and Entertainment's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction, grants Certain Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, and grants Defendant Smokeless Tobacco Council's Motion to Dismiss.
Plaintiff Gloria Tuttle's husband, Bill Tuttle ("Tuttle"), died of oropharynx and larynx cancer on July 27, 1998. Having first been introduced to smokeless tobacco in the summer of 1954, Tuttle chewed tobacco regularly throughout his adult life, quitting only upon being diagnosed with cancer in October 1993. Plaintiff believes that Tuttle's death was wrongfully caused by Defendants' negligent, misleading, and fraudulent conduct with respect to the design, manufacturing, marketing, and promotion of smokeless tobacco.
On September 21, 1999, Plaintiff, Trustee for Tuttle's next-of-kin, brought suit in Anoka County District Court alleging negligence, strict liability, breach of warranty, common law fraud, consumer fraud, unlawful trade practices, deceptive trade practices, and false advertising by all named Defendants. Defendants include smokeless tobacco manufacturers Lorillard Tobacco Co. ("Lorillard"), National Tobacco Co. ("National Tobacco"), and The Pinkerton Tobacco Company ("Pinkerton"); National Tobacco's former and current general partners Worldwide Sports and Entertainment ("Worldwide") and National Tobacco Finance Corporation ("NTFC"); and the manufacturers' trade association, the Smokeless Tobacco Council ("STC"). Defendants removed the case to federal court on October 13, 1999. Defendants Worldwide and NTFC now move for dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction. In addition, all Defendants have moved for dismissal under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) and 9(b).
Once a defendant has challenged a federal court's in personam jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden of presenting a prima facie case that such jurisdiction exists. See Aero Sys. Eng'g, Inc. v. Opron, Inc., 21 F.Supp.2d 990, 995 (D.Minn.1998). Where, as here, personal jurisdiction is challenged at the pretrial stage, all evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and all factual disputes must be resolved in the plaintiff's favor. See id. Doubts as to whether a court has personal jurisdiction over an individual or entity should be resolved in favor of retaining jurisdiction. See Hardrives, Inc. v. City of LaCrosse, 307 Minn. 290, 240 N.W.2d 814, 816 (1976); Hunter-Keith, Inc. v. General Elec. Credit Corp., Civ. No. 4-84-804, 1987 WL 8592, at * 4 (D.Minn.1987).
The general test for deciding whether a federal court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a civil defendant is well-known. First, the court must determine whether the forum state's long-arm statute subjects the defendant to jurisdiction. Second, the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with the due process requirements of the Fifth Amendment. Where the relevant state long-arm statute extends as far as due process allows, as does Minnesota's, the two inquiries are codeterminate. See Minn.Stat. § 543.19; Domtar, Inc. v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 533 N.W.2d 25, 29 (Minn.1995) (). In order to satisfy due process, a defendant must have "minimum contacts [with the forum state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend `traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463, 61 S.Ct. 339, 85 L.Ed. 278 (1940)). The defendant's "contacts" with the forum state generally must not arise due to mere fortuity, but must arise because of the defendant's "purposeful availment" of the privilege of conducting activities in the state. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958); see also Digi-Tel Holdings, Inc. v. Proteq Telecomm, Ltd., 89 F.3d 519, 522 (8th Cir.1996). Where the defendant has purposely directed activities at residents of the forum and the litigation results from "alleged injuries that `arise out of or relate to' those activities," a finding of specific jurisdiction is appropriate.1 Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472-73, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985) (citing Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 80 L.Ed.2d 404 (1984)).
Worldwide, formerly known as National Tobacco Management Company, is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Los Angeles, California. Worldwide was the general partner of National Tobacco from April 1992 until May 17, 1996. (See Compl. ¶ 10.) NTFC, formed on October 25, 1995, became the general partner of National Tobacco on May 17, 1996. (See id. ¶ 11.) NTFC, also a Delaware corporation, has its principal place of business in New York, New York.
NTFC argues that it should be immediately dismissed from this lawsuit because it was not formed until two years after Tuttle stopped using smokeless tobacco, and therefore could not have contributed to Tuttle's injury. The allegations in Plaintiff's Complaint provide no insight into this obvious barrier to liability. Plaintiff ultimately addresses the issue in her memorandum in response to NTFC's motion to dismiss, in which she argues — without providing any legal support whatsoever — that NTFC is a proper defendant in this lawsuit as the mere continuation of the corporate structure that controlled National Tobacco when Tuttle used smokeless tobacco.
When considering a motion to dismiss, the Court looks only to the factual allegations in the complaint. Any allegations made in subsequent legal memoranda cannot correct inadequacies within a complaint. See Morgan Distrib. Co., Inc. v. Unidynamic Corp., 868 F.2d 992, 995 (8th Cir.1989) . "To hold otherwise would mean that a party could unilaterally amend a complaint at will, even without filing an amendment, and simply by raising a point in a brief." Id. (internal citations omitted). Because the face of Plaintiff's Complaint provides no basis for linking NTFC to this case, NTFC is summarily dismissed from this lawsuit with prejudice. The Court declines to grant Plaintiff leave to amend given the resounding inadequacy of the Complaint in this regard and given Plaintiff's failure to provide any legal support for her later presented theory that NTFC was in essence the corporate structure that controlled National Tobacco at times relevant to this lawsuit. The Court now turns to consider whether it may assert personal jurisdiction over Worldwide.
Worldwide denies that it has sufficient contacts with the State of Minnesota to be haled into court within its boundaries. Plaintiff acknowledges that Worldwide lacks direct physical contacts with Minnesota, but argues that jurisdiction is proper because "as National's general partner, Worldwide ... engaged in, among other things, the design, manufacture, marketing, distribution and promotion of smokeless tobacco, which it sold throughout the United States, including the states of Minnesota, Michigan and Missouri." (Compl. ¶ 25.) In particular, Plaintiff maintains that this Court has jurisdiction over Worldwide under the stream of commerce theory and the Calder effects test.
Under the stream of commerce theory, due process is satisfied...
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