Tuttle v. Raish
Decision Date | 11 April 1902 |
Parties | E. N. TUTTLE et al., v. JENNIE RAISH et al., Appellants, MARGERY WARDWELL (formerly TUTTLE), Intervener, Appellant |
Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Appeal from Plymouth District Court.--HON. F. R. GAYNOR, Judge.
THIS is an action in equity for the partition of certain real estate left by one Milo R. Tuttle, who died intestate and without issue. Plaintiffs are brothers and sisters of decedent. Jennie Raish was married to Milo R. Tuttle, and on his death was apparently his widow. She has since married one Raish. She claims, however, more than a widow's share of the estate, for she sets up a written instrument which she avers to be a conveyance made by Tuttle to her of the whole of his property. Acting upon her alleged rights under this instrument, she has, since her husband's death, made sales and conveyances of real estate to different persons who are made defendants herein. Margery Wardwell claims to have been married to Milo R. Tuttle many years before he contracted an alliance with the present Jennie Raish. She avers they were never divorced, and by petition of intervention she makes claim to a widow's share, viz one-half of the property. The trial court found against the validity of the alleged conveyance to defendant Jennie Raish but it confirmed her right to a widow's share, and held the purchasers from her respectively entitled to an undivided one-half of the property so conveyed by her to each. The defendants and intervener appeal.--Affirmed.
Decree AFFIRMED.
Zink & Roseberry and Geo. W. Argo for defendants, appellants.
M. J Sweeley for appellees and for intervener appellant.
Naturally, the first question for our consideration is as to the effect of the written instrument through which Jennie Raish claims to have obtained title to all of this property. We set it out in full:
On the tenth day of December, 1896, George Haywood, notary public, made an amended acknowledgment, or certificate of acknowledgment, of said instrument of conveyance, being in words and figures as follows, to wit:
The material matter for us to decide is whether this instrument is a deed or a will. If it is the latter, it is manifestly of no validity, for it is not executed in the form prescribed by statute. Is it a deed? If it operated to convey a present interest, although possession and enjoyment were reserved during life by the grantor, it would be effective as a conveyance. Burlington University v. Barrett, 22 Iowa 60; Craven v. Winter, 38 Iowa 471; Lippold v. Lippold, 112 Iowa 134, 83 N.W. 809. If it passed no present interest, but was to be operative only upon the grantor's death, then it is testamentary in character, and of no effect unless executed with all the formalities of a will. Leaver v. Gauss, 62 Iowa 314, 17 N.W. 522. In Bigley v. Souvey, 45 Mich. 370 (8 N.W. 98), the instrument before the court for construction contained this provision: "The land herein named shall be and continue the property of the first party during his lifetime, and the remainder to said second party immediately at the death of said first party; but, in the event of the death of the second party before the said first party, then the estate herein shall go to said first party. * * *" It was held that title did not pass, the court saying, "The instrument given by defendant was a deed in form, but was testamentary in its nature, and passed no title whatever." In Crocker v. Smith, 94 Ala. 295 (10 So. 258, 16 L. R. A. 576), an instrument quite similar in terms to the one before us was construed by the court. It was properly executed to be either a deed or a will. It was held to be a will, the court saying: "Though an instrument may be in form a deed of gift and designated as such, it is a will if its purpose be testamentary, and it cannot operate during life, but is only consummated by death." But without going into detail as to the language of the cases it is enough to say that the general rule, as we have stated it, has support in the weight of authorities. Barnes v. Stephens, 107 Ga. 436 (33 S.E. 399); Pinkham v. Pinkham, 55 Neb. 729 (76 N.W. 411); Turner v. Scott, 51 Pa. 126; Hazleton v. Reed, 46 Kan. 73 (26 P. 450, 26 Am. St. Rep. 86); Conrad v. Douglas, 59 Minn. 498 (61 N.W. 673); Roth v. Michalis, 125 Ill. 325 (17 N.E. 809). Devlin, Deeds, section 309. The cases cited by appellants do not antagonize the general doctrine stated. In some of them extrinsic facts were resorted to for interpreting the language of the instrument, and in all of them it was found that a present interest passed. It may well be that the instrument should be given some effect if consistent with well-established legal principles; but a man may intend to dispose of his property by will, and this intention be...
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