Tuttle v. Sudenga Industries, Inc.

Decision Date25 January 1994
Docket NumberI-,D,No. 20320,20320
Citation125 Idaho 145,868 P.2d 473
Parties, Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 13,778 Daryl TUTTLE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SUDENGA INDUSTRIES, INC. an Iowa corporation, Defendant-Respondent, and Wayment Farms, Inc., an Idaho corporation; Wes's, Inc., an Idaho corporation; Individual John Does and Corporate Doesefendants. Twin Falls, November 1993 Term
CourtIdaho Supreme Court

Hall, Farley, Oberrecht & Blanton, Boise, for respondent. Donald J. Farley argued.

BISTLINE, Justice.

BACKGROUND AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS

In 1984, Wes's Welding & Iron Works of Burley, Idaho ("Wes's") installed a U-trough grain auger which was manufactured by Sudenga Industries, Inc., of George, Iowa, ("Sudenga") into a grain storage facility located on Wayment Farms, a dairy farm near Burley. This auger consisted of eight ten-foot sections and was to run the length of the grain bin, with the final sections of the auger being gradually raised from ground level to the point of discharge into Wayment Farms' milling machinery.

The covers for the auger which were provided by Sudenga and installed by Wes's are at the center of this dispute. As sold by Sudenga, these covers were each ten feet in length and of a snap-on design. To attach to the auger in this case, the top ridge (or "peak") of these covers "must be struck very hard." The covers then attach to the auger so firmly that a crowbar or other tool is required to remove them. If the covers are shortened, removal from the auger is easier, but a tool is still required. Jed Wayment, vice-president of Wayment Farms, Kendall Karlson, vice-president of Wes's, and Daryl Tuttle, the injured employee, each testified that the snap-on covers often are pushed off the auger during normal operation by grain that becomes lodged in the flighting (the rotating component). If the covers were permanently fastened to the auger, Karlson testified that these clogs would cause other problems, such as pushing out various bearings or burning up the auger motor.

Sudenga also sells hoppers and other intake devices to be utilized in loading grain into their augers. The Wayment Farms operation did not purchase a hopper, planning to load grain into the auger by gravity feed.

At some point after installation of the auger, either Wayment Farms or Wes's cut the ten-foot sections of covers into two-foot sections and flattened them, so that the covers merely rested on top of the auger rather than snapping into place. The reason for the alteration was to facilitate Wayment Farms' method of feeding grain directly into the auger by controlling its flow. Wayment Farms also replaced the auger's belt and pulley system, which was provided by Sudenga and on which there was a warning decal, with its own belt and pulley system. It is unclear from the record whether or not the warning provided by Sudenga remained in place after the changes made by Wayment Farms.

On May 9, 1991, Daryl Tuttle ("Tuttle") was operating the auger. Despite Sudenga's warning not to remove the covers, and Wayment Farms' warning not to remove all of the flattened covers at once, Tuttle removed all covers. 1 Without turning the auger off, Tuttle attempted to move a second auger about the grain bin and inadvertently stepped into the first auger, severely injuring both feet.

Tuttle filed suit on the theories of negligence and strict liability, naming Wayment Farms, Wes's, and Sudenga as defendants. The district court denied Wes's motion for summary judgment on June 26, 1992, because of material issues of fact on whether Wes's altered the auger covers. The district court then granted Sudenga's motion for summary judgment on October 21, 1992, entered a Rule 54 certification to finalize the judgment, and vacated the jury trial that was set to hear the case against the remaining defendants. Tuttle appeals to this Court, arguing that (1) there exist genuine issues of material fact as to whether the grain auger was defective in design and unreasonably dangerous and as to the adequacy of the warning, and (2) his injuries were proximately caused by the alleged defects in the auger and warning, rather than the changes made to the auger covers subsequent to Sudenga's sale of the auger to Wayment Farms.

ANALYSIS
I. Standard of Review

In reviewing the granting of Sudenga's motion for summary judgment, we review the record to ascertain that there is no genuine triable issue of material fact, construing the record most favorably to Tuttle, the party against whom Sudenga's motion was directed. Corbridge v. Clark Equip. Co., 112 Idaho 85, 86, 730 P.2d 1005, 1006 (1986) (citations omitted).

II. The Role of the Idaho Products Liability Act

Tuttle predicated his product liability action against Sudenga on the theories of strict liability and negligent design, manufacture, and sale of the auger. We note that an action based on strict liability focuses on the condition of the product after manufacturing and the consumer's expectation, and that an action based on negligence is concerned with the conduct and behavior of the manufacturer. Toner v. Lederle Laboratories, 112 Idaho 328, 334 n. 5, 732 P.2d 297, 303 n. 5 (1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 942, 108 S.Ct. 1122, 99 L.Ed.2d 282 (1988) (quoting David v. Globe Machine Manufacturing Co., Inc., 102 Wash.2d 68, 684 P.2d 692, 696 (1984)).

The district court granted Sudenga's motion for summary judgment on both negligence and strict liability, ruling as a matter of law that the auger, when it left Sudenga, was not defective. Presuming that strict product liability does not attach if the product is substantially altered because such alteration breaks the chain of causation, the district court ruled that the alteration of the auger covers was substantial and therefore constituted the proximate cause of Tuttle's injury. Because the district court ruled that no defect existed when the auger left Sudenga's control, the court apparently, but not expressly, concluded that Sudenga's motion for summary judgment as to Tuttle's negligence claim should likewise be granted.

We first find that the analysis conducted by the district court and its summary disposition of this case was incorrect in light of our cases which have decided that the Idaho Products Liability Act, I.C. §§ 6-1401 through 6-1410, indicates the legislature's intent to apply principles of comparative negligence not only in the field of negligence law, but also in the field of products liability law, which had previously operated under principles of strict liability. Salinas v. Vierstra, 107 Idaho 984, 989 n. 14, 695 P.2d 369, 374 n. 14 (1985). In relying on other jurisdictions and ruling that an alteration of the auger constitutes an absolute defense for Sudenga, the district court failed to apply I.C. § 6-1405(4) in its entirety. The Act defines product alteration and modification as follows:

I.C. 6-1405. Conduct affecting comparative responsibility.

....

(4) Alteration or modification of a product.

(a) "Alteration or modification" occurs when a person or entity other than the product seller changes the design, construction, or formula of the product, or changes or removes warnings or instructions that accompanied or were displayed on the product. "Alteration or modification" of a product includes the failure to observe routine care and maintenance, but does not include ordinary wear and tear.

(b) When a product seller proves, by a preponderance of the evidence, that an alteration or modification of the product by the claimant, or by a party other than the claimant or the product seller has proximately caused the claimant's harm, the claimant's damages shall be subject to reduction or apportionment to the extent that the alteration or modification was a proximate cause of the harm.

This subsection shall not be applicable if: ...

3. The alteration or modification was reasonably anticipated conduct, and the product was defective because of the product seller's failure to provide adequate warnings or instructions with respect to the alteration or modification.

Furthermore, we have made it clear that this statute must be considered in light of the presumption in Idaho that the language defining product misuse in I.C. § 6-1405(3)(a) creates a jury question, unless the undisputed facts lead to only one reasonable conclusion, in which case the court may rule as a matter of law. Corbridge v. Clark Equip. Co., 112 Idaho at 86-87, 730 P.2d at 1006-07 (finding misuse as a matter of law and affirming summary judgment when a claimant, who failed to fasten the operable seat belt of the forklift in which he rode, was thrown from the forklift as it was towed over rough terrain and through heavy snow). The language in I.C. § 6-1405(4)(a) similarly creates a jury question, unless the court is able to rule as a matter of law that the facts are undisputed and lead to but one reasonable conclusion. Sudenga's argument that our reading of the above sections of the Products Liability Act prevents the application of summary judgment, therefore, is clearly unfounded. See also I.C. § 6-1401 ("The previous existing applicable law of this state on product liability is modified only to the extent set forth in this act.").

The provision of the Act that is quoted above contemplates that an alteration or modification of a product which proximately causes the claimant's injury shall reduce the claimant's damages. The alteration or modification made by the claimant or by a party other than the claimant or product seller shall not be considered in a comparative negligence analysis, however, if the alteration or modification was reasonably anticipated and if the product was defective for a lack of warnings about alteration of the product. I.C. § 6-1405(4)(b)(3). We find nothing in the district court's opinion to indicate that any of this analysis occurred. Clearly, however, genuine issues of material fact exist as to...

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