Tuttle v. Town of Clear Lake

Decision Date17 January 1905
Citation102 N.W. 136
PartiesTUTTLE v. TOWN OF CLEAR LAKE.
CourtIowa Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Appeal from District Court, Cerro Gordo County; Clifford P. Smith, Judge.

Judgment for damages, from which the defendant appeals. Reversed.D. W. Hurn and Cliffitt, Rule & Keeler, for appellant.

J. J. Clark and D. W. Telford, for appellee.

LADD, J.

Along the north side of State street, in Clear Lake, next to block 21 in Elon Tuttle's Addition, is a cement sidewalk. An alley intersects the block, and, instead of cement, the crossing over it was of flagstone. Between the walk and the stone was a space of about 2 1/2 feet on each side of the alley. This space had been covered with boards, but these had been removed when the cement walk was constructed, about 11 months previous, and had not been replaced. This left a depression from the cement walk, on the west side, of 3 or 4 inches, and of about 2 inches next to the flagstone. That on the east side was practically the same. The plaintiff was returning home from an entertainment in the evening of May 3, 1902, and passed the depression at the west safely. When she reached that on the east side of the alley, she stepped into it, as usual, but, as she undertook to step up on the cement walk, stubbed her toe against the edge of it and fell. That defendant had notice of the condition of the walk long before the accident, and that plaintiff suffered injury, were put beyond dispute by the evidence. The main contention is that plaintiff should have been held, as a matter of law, guilty of contributory negligence. She lived on the same street, and, in going downtown, had passed over this sidewalk twice or three times a week for 11 months. She had done so that evening in going to the Relief Corps Hall, and was in the habit of stepping into the depression, and then upon the walk, precisely as when injured. It was shortly before 9 o'clock in the evening that she fell. It was dark and stormy, but the frequent lightning flashes afforded sufficient light, so that she knew precisely where she was. After describing how she crossed the first depression, she testified: “Q. Immediately after this first depression, did you then have in mind the other crossing? A. I was trying to get over it as careful as I could. Yes, sir. Q. You passed along over the stone flagging, did you? A. Yes, sir. Q. This stone crossing in the alley? A. Yes, sir. Q. Did you attempt to step over the stone flagging onto the crossing at the Vincent side of the alley? A. No, sir; I stepped down in. Q. You stepped off the stone flagging down into this depression? A. Yes, sir. Q. Did you know then where you were? A. I did. Q. Realized where you was, did you? Did you have your mind on the place then? A. Just as much as anybody would, because I was trying to get over it all right. Q. You knew that you had your foot down in that depression, did you? A. I said I did. Q. You had it in mind at the time? A. Yes, sir. Q. What was you thinking of there? A. Thinking of getting home. Q. Were you thinking at all of that sidewalk just beyond you? A. Why, yes; I was thinking about getting up onto it. Q. Well, when you took the next step after you stepped in to the depression, did you have in mind then stepping on the stone sidewalk? A. Yes, sir; I tried to step up. I expect I did. Q. You knew at that time that the sidewalk--that there was a rise of four or five inches? Were you trying to step up upon it? A. Yes, sir. Q. And at that time you fell? A. At that time I caught my foot as I went to step up. Didn't get it high enough, I expect. Q. At the time you stepped off of the stone flagging into this depression, you realized then there was danger of falling if you struck against the cement walk, didn't you? A. Yes, sir.”

The evidence was such that plaintiff ought not to be declared negligent, as a matter of law, in undertaking to pass over the walk. She had been over it frequently, and, though knowing of the defect, she did not regard it as dangerous. Moreover, it was the only convenient...

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5 cases
  • Moeller v. City of Rugby, a Municipal Corporation
    • United States
    • North Dakota Supreme Court
    • April 28, 1915
    ...107 Wis. 436, 83 N.W. 695; Cooper v. Waterloo, 98 Wis. 424, 74 N.W. 115; Barce v. Shenandoah, 106 Iowa 426, 76 N.W. 747; Tuttle v. Clear Lake, Iowa , 102 N.W. 136; v. Manistee, 107 Mich. 60, 64 N.W. 868; De Pere v. Hibbard, 104 Wis. 666, 80 N.W. 933; Parkhill v. Brighton, 61 Iowa 103, 15 N.......
  • Pyke v. City of Jamestown
    • United States
    • North Dakota Supreme Court
    • February 15, 1906
    ... ... 311; Collins v. City of ... Janesville, 87 N.W. 241; Bender v. Town of ... Minden, 100 N.W. 352; Tuttle v. Town of Clear ... Lake, 102 ... ...
  • Straight Creek Fuel Company v. Mullins
    • United States
    • Kentucky Court of Appeals
    • November 26, 1920
    ...cannot be held responsible for the consequences of his failure to pass safely beneath the beams of the truck." Tuttle v. Town of Clear Lake (Iowa), 102 N. W. 136, involved injuries resulting from a depression beside a city walk. In the course of the opinion the court "But she was also requi......
  • Straight Creek Fuel Co. v. Mullins
    • United States
    • Kentucky Court of Appeals
    • November 26, 1920
    ...cannot be held responsible for the consequences of his failure to pass safely beneath the beams of the truck." Tuttle v. Town of Clear Lake (Iowa) 102 N.W. 136, involved injuries resulting from a depression beside a walk. In the course of the opinion the court said: "But she was also requir......
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