Twala H. v. Saul
| Decision Date | 23 March 2020 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. CBD-18-4015 |
| Parties | TWALA H. Plaintiff, v. ANDREW SAUL, Commissioner, Social Security Administration Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
Twala H. ("Plaintiff") brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) seeking judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration ("Commissioner"). The Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") denied Plaintiff's claim for Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB") under Title II of the Social Security Administration ("SSA"). The ALJ also denied Plaintiff's claim for a period of Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") under Title XVI of the SSA. Before the Court are Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Plaintiff's Motion"), ECF No. 13, Plaintiff's Alternative Motion for Remand ("Plaintiff's Alternative Motion"), ECF No. 13, and Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Commissioner's Motion"), ECF No. 16. The Court has reviewed the motions, related memoranda, and the applicable law. No hearing is deemed necessary. See Loc. R. 105.6 (D.Md.). For the reasons presented below, the Court hereby DENIES Plaintiff's Motion, DENIES Commissioner's Motion, GRANTS Plaintiff's Alternative Motion, and REMANDS the ALJ's decision pursuant to the fourth sentence of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. A separate order will issue.
On February 19, 2016, Plaintiff filed for DIB under Title II of the SSA alleging disability beginning December 3, 2015. R. 10. On February 23, 2016, Plaintiff also filed for SSI under Title XVI of the SSA alleging disability beginning December 3, 2015. R. 10. Plaintiff alleged disability due to multiple impairments, including: Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease ("COPD"), diabetes, depression, anxiety, panic attacks, high blood pressure, high cholesterol, and reduced vision in his left eye. R. 58-59. Plaintiff's claims were initially denied on July 12, 2016 and upon reconsideration on September 27, 2016. R. 10. An administrative hearing was held on August 30, 2017. R. 10. On December 5, 2017, Plaintiff's claims for DIB and SSI were denied. R. 20. Plaintiff sought review by the Appeals Council, ("AC") which concluded on October 30, 2018, that there was no basis for granting the request for review. R. 1. Plaintiff subsequently filed an appeal with this Court. ECF No. 1.
On appeal, the Court has the power to affirm, modify, or reverse the decision of the ALJ "with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2019). The Court must affirm the ALJ's decision if it is supported by substantial evidence and the ALJ applied the correct law. Id. (); see also Russell v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 440 F. App'x 163, 164 (4th Cir. 2011) (citing Hays v. Sullivan, 907F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990)). "In other words, if the ALJ has done his or her job correctly and supported the decision reached with substantial evidence, this Court cannot overturn the decision, even if it would have reached a contrary result on the same evidence." Schoofield v. Barnhart, 220 F. Supp. 2d 512, 515 (D. Md. 2002). Substantial evidence is "more than a mere scintilla." Russell, 440 F. App'x at 164. "It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Id. (citing Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)); see also Hays, 907 F.2d at 1456 (quoting Laws v. Celebrezze, 368 F.2d 640, 642 (4th Cir. 1966)) (internal quotation marks omitted) ( ).
The Court does not review the evidence presented below de novo, nor does the Court "determine the weight of the evidence" or "substitute its judgment for that of the Secretary if his decision is supported by substantial evidence." Hays, 907 F.2d at 1456 (citations omitted); see also Blalock v. Richardson, 483 F.2d 773, 775 (4th Cir. 1972) (). The ALJ, not the Court, has the responsibility to make findings of fact and resolve evidentiary conflicts. Hays, 907 F.2d at 1456 (citations omitted). If the ALJ's factual finding, however, "was reached by means of an improper standard or misapplication of the law," then that finding is not binding on the Court. Coffman v. Bowen, 829 F.2d 514, 517 (4th Cir. 1987) (citations omitted).
The Commissioner shall find a person legally disabled under Titles II and XVI if he is unable "to do any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1505(a), 416.905(a) (2012). The Code of Federal Regulations outlines a five-step process that the Commissioner must follow to determine if a claimant meets this definition:
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4) (2012). Plaintiff has the burden to prove that she is disabled at steps one through four, and Commissioner has the burden to prove that Plaintiff is not disabled at step five. Hunter v. Sullivan, 993 F.2d 31, 35 (4th Cir. 1992).
The ALJ evaluated Plaintiff's claim using the five-step sequential evaluation process. R. 12-20. At step one, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since December 3, 2015, the alleged onset date of Plaintiff's disability. R. 12. At step two, under 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c) the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: Schizophrenia and COPD. R. 12. The ALJ found that Plaintiff's "hypertension, hyperlipidemia, alcohol use disorder, obesity, and visual acuity loss is not severe." R. 12. At step three, the ALJ determined Plaintiff "does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926)." R. 19. Before turning to step four, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had the RFC to:
[L]ift, carry, push, and pull up to 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently. She can stand and walk six hours in an 8 hour workday and sit without restriction. She can occasionally climb ramps and stairs, but never use ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. She can frequently stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. She cannot have exposure to pulmonary irritants or temperature extremes beyond a level found in a climate controlled indoor work environment. She is limited to simple, routine tasks and no more than occasional changes in the work settings. She can make simple work related decisions.
R. 14. At step four, the ALJ determined Plaintiff can perform her past relevant work as a housekeeping cleaner because "[the] work does not require the performance of work-related activities precluded by [Plaintiff's] residual functional capacity." R. 18. At step five, with the benefit of a Vocational Expert ("VE"), the ALJ found that there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff can perform, including: office helper, gate attendant, and ticket seller. R. 19-20. The ALJ found that "Plaintiff has not been under adisability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from December 3, 2015, through the date of this decision." R. 20.
On appeal, Plaintiff argues that the Court should reverse the final decision of the ALJ or in the alternative, remand the case to the Commissioner for further proceedings, alleging that2:
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