Twilley v. Perkins

• Citation: 77 Md. 252,26 A. 286
• Parties: TWILLEY v. PERKINS et al.
• Decision Date: 15 March 1893
• Court: Court of Appeals of Maryland

26 A. 286

77 Md. 252

TWILLEY

v. PERKINS et al.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

March 15, 1893.

Appeal from circuit court, Kent county.

Action by William S. Twilley against George T. Perkins and Benjamin F. Henly. Defendants had judgment, and plaintiff appeals. Reversed.

Argued before A LVEY, C. J., and BRYAN, McSHERRY, FOWLER, PAGE, ROBERTS, and BRISCOE. JJ.

H. H. Barroll, Thos. S. Hodson, and Clar. Hodson, for appellant.

Marion DeK. Smith, for appellees.

ALVEY, C. J. The plaintiff brought this action against the defendants for an assault and battery and false imprisonment. He alleges—First, that he was illegally arrested and detained; and, second, that he was, without legal or reasonable cause, assaulted by the defendants, and taken into custody by them, and under threats of further detention and imprisonment in jail he was required to pay the sum of $2.50 in order to regain his liberty. The defendants pleaded not guilty.

The material facts of the case, as set forth in the record, are these: The bridge at Chestertown over Chester river, the river dividing Kent and Queen Anne's counties, was originally constructed by the Chester Bridge Company, and was a toll bridge. This bridge, by the authority of the legislature of the state, was purchased by the two counties, Kent and Queen Anne's, with the view and for the purpose of making it a free public bridge and thoroughfare, to be under the joint management and control of the county commissioners of the two counties. This was authorized by the act of 1888, (chapter 376.) The act of 1890 (chapter 65) is supplemental to the original act of 1888, and makes some changes in the manner of accomplishing the purchase, and as to how the bridge shall be managed and controlled by the commissioners of the two counties after the same should be turned over to them. From the time of the consummation of the purchase it is declared by the third section of this latter act of 1890, "that thereafter said bridge shall be taken, held, and perpetuated as a free public bridge between said counties;" and by the fifth section of the same act it is provided that the commissioners of the two counties shall have full power and authority to make reasonable rules and regulations for the use of said bridge by the public, and for the protection of said bridge and other property belonging thereto or therewith and to enforce the observance thereof by imposing upon the party violating the same any reasonable fine not exceeding $10 for any violation thereof, which fines shall be collected as small debts are now collected, and shall be recovered in the name of said commissioners before any justice of the peace of either of said counties in which the party violating such rules and regulations shall be found, and on failure or refusal to pay, and inability to collect by legal process, the party so fined shall he committed to the county jail of the county for a period not exceeding 10 days, in the same manner as commitments are made for fines imposed by the circuit courts of this state on conviction for misdemeanor, etc. In July, 1890, after the sale of the bridge had been effected to the counties, and the bridge turned over to their control, the commissioners of the two counties met and adopted rules and regulations for the use of the bridge by the public, but the only one of which rules that bus been inserted in the record is this: "No. 9. Persons will not be allowed to ride a bicycle, tricycle, or velocipede over the bridge." Notwithstanding this prohibition, the plaintiff, on the 18th of June, 1891, rode a bicycle over the bridge from the Kent county side to the Queen Anne's side, and on his return he was arrested and held in custody by the defendants,—Perkins being the bridge keeper, and Henly a constable of Kent county; and that the arrest was made without the issuance of any warrant. It is conceded that these parties, so acting, supposed that they were acting under and as authorized by the act of 1890, (chapter 85.) and that they used no more force or violence towards the plaintiff than was necessary; that these parties werecharged with the duty of enforcing the rules made by the commissioners of the two counties, and that the defendants did compel the plaintiff to pay the sum of $2.50 as a penalty for the violation of said rule No. 9, under the alternative of going to jail forthwith if he refused to pay, which alternative the defendants were then and there ready to enforce, but, upon being paid the said sum, the defendants allowed the plaintiff to go at liberty. It was further shown that the bridge is built of wood, and has wood railings, and is about one third of a mile long from shore to shore; and that the depth of the water under the bridge is between 8 and 20 feet, the greatest depth being in the channel of the river. It was also shown in proof that some horses, ordinarily gentle, are frightened at bicycles ridden by persons along the public highways, and that some horses never get accustomed to them; and that horses becoming frightened at bicycles ridden by persons on the bridge would endanger the lives of persons driving such horses. The plaintiff offered proof tending to show that, as a general rule, horses, ordinarily gentle, and well broken, do not become frightened at bicycles; that, while the bridge was a toll bridge, persons were accustomed to ride over it on bicycles, and no accidents occurred. The plaintiff objected to all the evidence offered by the defendants in justification, but the objection was overruled, and he then offered, upon the whole evidence, six prayers, the first of which was granted, and all the others were refused; and the defendants offered two prayers, both of which were granted, and by the second of which the court ruled that if the facts as shown in proof on the part of the defendants were found to exist, "then the rule or by-law referred to in the evidence is a reasonable and proper rule or by-law; and the verdict must be for the defendants." Upon the objection to the evidence and the rulings upon the prayers two questions are presented. The first and principal one is whether the county commissioners, under the power given by the fifth ...