Twin Falls Salmon River Land & Water Co. v. Alexander

• Decision Date: 03 January 1919
• Docket Number: 587.
• Citation: 260 F. 270
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Idaho
• Parties: TWIN FALLS SALMON RIVER LAND & WATER CO. v. ALEXANDER et al.

260 F. 270

TWIN FALLS SALMON RIVER LAND & WATER CO. v. ALEXANDER et al.

No. 587.

United States District Court, D. Idaho, Southern Division.

January 3, 1919

Richards & Haga and McKeen F. Morrow, all of Boise, Idaho, for plaintiff.

T. A Walters, Atty. Gen., and A. C. Hindman, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendants.

DIETRICH District Judge.

The plaintiff, a Carey Act corporation, and its assignors promoted, and, under a contract with the state, constructed the Salmon River Carey Act project. The law governing projects of this character is to be found in the United States statutes (Act Aug. 18, 1894, c. 301, Sec. 4, 28 Stat 372, 422 (Comp. St. Sec. 4685); Act June 11, 1896, c. 420, Sec. 4, 29 Stat. 413, 434; Act March 3, 1901, c. 853, Sec. 3, 31 Stat. 1133, 1188 (Comp. St. Sec. 4687); Resolution May 25, 1908, No. 28, 35 Stat. 577 (Comp. St. Sec. 4688); and Act May 27, 1908, c. 200, 35 Stat. 317, 347), and in the laws of Idaho (Const. art. 9, Sec. 7) and the Idaho Revised Codes (sections 149, 150, 1558, and sections 1613 to 1634, inclusive). The defendants are respectively the Governor, the attorney general, the secretary of state, the auditor, and the superintendent of public instruction of the state, who ex officio constitute the state board of land commissioners. As such board they represent the state in all public matters affecting Carey Act projects. With considerable detail the bill charges that, although the plaintiff has substantially completed the project and has performed its contract in so far as is practicable, the defendants arbitrarily neglect to approve the work or accept the system, and, upon the other hand, without reason defer all action in the premises, and harass and injure the plaintiff by threatening litigation and encouraging the settlers to refuse payments under their contracts for water rights.

In a supplemental complaint it is further charged that, in violation of the plaintiff's rights and greatly to its prejudice, the defendants intend to make application for patent for only about 35,000 acres of land included in the project, and threaten to relinquish approximately 20,000 acres for which plaintiff has sold water rights, and upon which it claims liens to secure the payment of the purchase price thereof. The prayer is somewhat voluminous, but in substance it is that it be decreed that the plaintiff has completed the irrigation system in compliance with the plans and specifications, 'in so far as the same are applicable to the conditions now existing under said project, and in so far as' the plaintiff ought under the circumstances to be required to construct the same; further, that, if it be held that the system is unfinished, the deficiencies may be pointed out, to the end that the plaintiff may be able to complete performance; and, further, that it be decreed that the system be turned over to the Salmon River Canal Company, the company organized for the purpose of maintaining and operating the system, and that the plaintiff be relieved from all further liability under its agreement for the construction of the system; and, further, that the defendants be enjoined from bringing any suit to cancel or annul the agreement, and from taking any steps in any way to impair the plaintiff's lien upon the lands embraced in the project, and particularly from relinquishing to the United States any of such lands.

It is unnecessary to detail the numerous issues formally raised by the answers to these pleadings, for the reason that upon final analysis of the record there appear to be but two or three controlling questions, and they can be understood without an elaborate statement of fact. (The project was also involved in Twin Falls Salmon River Land & Water Co. v. Caldwell et al., 242 F. 177, 155 C.C.A. 17; and State v. Twin Falls Salmon River Land & Water Co., 30 Idaho, 63, 166 P. 220, to which resort may be had for additional information.) Admittedly the enterprise was improvident, in that it contemplated the reclamation of an area greatly in excess of any possible water supply. The original proposal of the plaintiff's assignors to the land board was for the reclamation of about 150,000 acres, and the segregation was for approximately that amount. At a comparatively early date, however, the plaintiff seems to have concluded that the area was excessive, and the system was constructed, so the plaintiff alleges, with a capacity sufficient for only 100,000 acres. But even this capacity was in excess of the available water supply, and hence, it is further averred in the complaint, with the consent of all parties concerned, the acreage was reduced from time to time until, when the suit was commenced water contracts were outstanding for a little more than 60,000 acres. The plaintiff does not here expressly affirm that the supply is sufficient for even that acreage, and, upon the other hand, the defendants, apparently with the support of the Land Department of the United States, contend that there is water enough for only about 35,000 acres.

In view of the plaintiff's admission that the water supply is grossly inadequate for the enterprise as originally projected, and its failure to tender an issue as to the amount of water actually available, and the further obvious, if not admitted, fact that the acts and omissions of the state board, of which it here complains, are in the main referable to the contention consistently made by it of the inadequacy of the water supply, we must assume for the purposes of the case that there is sufficient water for only about 35,000 acres, or at least that the defendants reasonably and in good faith so believe. With water right contracts, all apparently of equal dignity, out for 60,000 acres, and with a water supply for only 35,000 acres, with the system incomplete, according to the original plans, and wasteful of water and unnecessarily expensive to maintain by reason of the oversize of the principal conduits for a tract of 35,000 acres, or even 60,000 acres, what was the plain duty of the land board? The plaintiff says: Approve of and accept the system so constructed, authorize its transfer to the settlers, thus relieving it from further responsibility, and apply for a patent for the entire 60,000 acres. The board, upon the other hand, has maintained that the excess of outstanding water contracts is a matter in respect to which both it and the plaintiff have some obligation, and has apparently been seeking a basis of equitable adjustment.

At the threshold we are confronted with the question whether or not the case should be deemed to be a suit against the state, and for that reason withdrawn from our jurisdiction by the Eleventh Amendment to the federal Constitution. The precise question was submitted upon a motion to dismiss the bill, but the view was then taken that, while our jurisdiction is so restricted by this constitutional provision that at most we could grant but a fitted relief, some of the averments of misconduct are so unqualified and sweeping as necessarily to imply arbitrary, if not wanton, inaction on the part of the defendants, and, if true, would warrant a small measure of relief. Akin to this question of the jurisdiction of federal courts is the broader question of the jurisdiction of any court of equity to grant the relief prayed for; indeed, so closely related are the two questions that no attempt is made in the discussion which follows to distinguish or state separately the considerations which apply to one and not to the other. By reason of the peculiar nature of a Carey Act project and the anomalous relation thereto of the state land board, the federal question is not free from great difficulty, and upon it the decided cases defining the scope of the constitutional provision throw no very certain light. A measure of assistance may be gathered from the following cases: State v. Twin Falls Salmon R.L. & W. Co., 30 Idaho, 41, 166 P. 220, opinion on rehearing, page 232; Davis v. Gray, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 203, 21 L.Ed. 447; Board v. McComb, 92 U.S. 531, 23 L.Ed. 623; Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U.S. 711, 2 Sup.Ct. 128, 27 L.Ed. 448; Hagood v. Southern, 117 U.S. 52, 6 Sup.Ct. 608, 29 L.Ed. 805; Rolston v. Crittenden, 120 U.S. 390, 7 Sup.Ct. 599, 30 L.Ed. 721; In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 8 Sup.Ct. 164, 31 L.Ed. 216; Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 Sup.Ct. 504, 33 L.Ed. 842; Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, 140 U.S. 1, 10 Sup.Ct. 699, 35 L.Ed. 363; Reagan v. Farmers' L. & T. Co., 154 U.S. 362, 14 Sup.Ct. 1047, 38 L.Ed. 1014; Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 Sup.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714, 13 L.R.A. (N.S.) 932, 14 Ann.Cas. 764; Scully v. Bird, 209 U.S. 481, 28 Sup.Ct. 597, 52 L.Ed. 899; Lankford v. Platte Iron Works, 235 U.S. 461, 35 Sup.Ct. 173, 59 L.Ed. 316; Tanner v. Little, 240 U.S. 369, 36 Sup.Ct. 379, 60 L.Ed. 691; Carolina Glass Co. v. Murray, 240 U.S. 305, 36 Sup.Ct. 293, 60 L.Ed. 658; Johnson v. Lankford, 245 U.S. 541, 38 Sup.Ct. 203, 62 L.Ed. 460; Martin v. Lankford, 245 U.S. 547, 38 Sup.Ct. 205, 62 L.Ed. 464; Morenci Copper Co. v. Freer (C.C.) 127 F. 199; Magruder v. Belle Fourche, etc., 219 F. 72, 135 C.C.A. 524; Weiland v. Pioneer Irr. Co., 238 F. 519, 151 C.C.A. 455.

Now, bearing in mind the constitutional provision and the general principle that the jurisdiction of courts of equity cannot be invoked to interfere with administrative officers, while exercising a discretion with which they are clothed by law, we pass to consider the specific contention made by the plaintiff.

First the supplemental bill: It appears that in the fall of 1917, after a joint investigation by the defendants and a representative of the General Land Office, the Commissioner of the General Land Office, having found that there was water available for only 35,000 acres, recommended to the land board...