Twomey v. Clausohm
| Decision Date | 22 April 1970 |
| Docket Number | No. 39030,39030 |
| Citation | 234 So.2d 338 |
| Parties | John J. TWOMEY, Petitioner, v. Lucille R. CLAUSOHM, Respondent. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
John J. Twomey, in pro. per.
John A. Williamson, Tampa, of Barrs, Melendi & Williamson, for respondent.
John Arthur Jones, Tampa, as amicus curiae.
By petition for certiorari we have for review a decision of the Court of Appeal, Second District, because of an alleged conflict on the same point of law with prior decisions of this Court and a decision of another District Court of Appeal. Fla.Const. art. V, § 4, F.S.A.; Clausohm v. Twomey, 226 So.2d 226 (2nd Dist.Ct.App.Fla.1969).
We must decide whether an administratrix, by her final accounting, is entitled to credit for payment of claim for a tombstone and other claims which were presented to the administratrix but never filed in the probate court pursuant to Fla.Stat. § 733.16 (1965), F.S.A.
Mrs. Dolores A. Culpepper died intestate. Lucille R. Clausohm was appointed administratrix. The sole heir was the eight month old infant daughter of Mrs. Culpepper. The first notice to creditors was published March 4, 1967, under the applicable statute, § 733.16, Supra. During the six month period certain creditors presented claims to the administratrix but did not file the same in the probate court. The time for filing claims expired September 4, 1967. During the six month period the administratrix paid the funeral bill and, in addition, small bills for utilities, telephone and earned insurance premiums. None of these claims were filed in the probate court. Subsequent to the expiration of the six month period and on November 29, 1967, the administratrix paid for a bronze marker for the grave site of the decedent. Eventually, the administratrix filed her petition for the approval of her final accounting by which she took credit for the payments above described. The county judge appointed John J. Twomey administrator ad litem to represent the interest of the infant heir. On Mr. Twomey's objections County Judge Brooker disapproved the payments described above. On appeal the Court of Appeal, Second District, held to the contrary and reversed the disapproving order of the probate judge. By petition for certiorari we are requested to quash the decision of the District Court and reinstate the order of the probate judge. The petition is based on the constitutional ground that the decision tendered for review conflicts with certain stated prior decisions of this Court and another District Court of Appeal.
We have issued the writ and have heard oral argument. On the face of the decision under review and the decisions cited for conflict, it, does appear there is a jurisdictional conflict because of divergent statements of the rule of law applicable to situations such as the one at hand.
By the decision under review the District Court held, '* * * it would not accord with reason and logic to construe the nonclaim statute in such a way as to require the personal representative, in every instance, to insist upon the filing of a formal written claim in order to pay such claims * * *'
In Simpson v. Simpson, 143 So.2d 707 (1st D.C.A.Fla.App.1962) the Court of Appeal, First District, held: 'Pursuant to the above provisions any claims for which written claims were not filed in the estate within the mentioned six month period are void * * *.' The probate judge had approved payment of certain bills for which no formal claim had been filed in the estate. The Court of Appeal, First District, reversed this action with the statement of law above quoted.
Similarly, although admittedly in a different factual posture, this Court In re: Williamson's Estate, 95 So.2d 244 (Fla.1956) stated: 'The personal representative, whether he be an administrator or executor, has no power to waive the requirements of the statute with reference to the filing of the claim.'
We, therefore, detect a conflict and potential confusion in the law generated by the quoted statement from the decision under review and the statements quoted from the other decisions. Nielsen v. Sarasota, 117 So.2d 731 (Fla.1960). It is to eliminate this apparent confusion that we have taken jurisdiction. Even if the statement from one of the earlier cases can be regarded as obiter dictum the conflict still establishes our jurisdiction. Sunad, Inc. v. Sarasota, 122 So.2d 611 (Fla.1960).
The subject of the necessity for filing claims against an estate has, on numerous occasions, challenged the attention of the Legislature since 1838. In practically every amendment adopted over the years the Legislature has 'tightened' the requirements for the presentation of claims against an estate as a condition to their validity. For example, under the early statute, best illustrated by the Revised General Statutes, 1920, § 3732, the Legislature required publication of notice to creditors for eight weeks and allowed them two years to present their claims To the personal representative. In the initial legislation on the subject there was no requirement that a sworn claim be filed in the court.
Subsequently, the Legislature required that the claims be filed in the office of the county judge and allowed twelve months for doing so. These statutes, however, did not preclude the possibility of a waiver of the filing requirement arising out of action by a personal representative. Fla.Laws 1925, ch. 10119, and Fla.Laws 1927, ch. 11994.
Finally, by Fla.Laws 1961, ch. 61--394, the Legislature inserted into the statute that an unfiled claim shall be void 'even though the personal representative has recognized such claim or demand by paying a portion thereof or interest thereon or otherwise; * * *.' This statute governs the action of the administratrix...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Advisory Opinion to the Governor, In re
...wisdom of the act, upon which we will not second guess the legislature. E.g., Holley v. Adams, 238 So.2d 401 (Fla.1970); Twomey v. Clausohm, 234 So.2d 338 (Fla.1970). We find the taxation of advertising revenues rationally related to the goal of raising revenue and our analysis must end upo......
-
Estate of Carlton, In re
...the merits, I would adopt the reasoning of the Court in Hewett, when the Court said: the Court from taking jurisdiction. Twomey v. Clausohm, 234 So.2d 338 (Fla.1970). We might well say that what the legislature mainly had in mind in drafting this section was the extent and quality of an ado......
-
Baillargeon v. Sewell
...province of the legislature to prescribe statutes providing for the orderly administration of decedent's estates. See Twomey v. Clausohm, 234 So.2d 338, 340 (Fla.1970); see also Mudarri v. Gillespie, 226 So.2d 808, 812 (Fla.1969) (“It is apodictic that the administration of estates of deced......
-
Adshead v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue (In re Estate of Hagmann)
...to the debts were filed in accordance with such stature, the debts became void and unenforceable under Florida law. Twomey v. Clausohm, 234 So.2d 338 (Fla. 1970). Moreover, such debts have not been and will not be paid by the estate. In these circumstances, no deduction can be allowed for s......