Tyberg v. City of N.Y.

• Decision Date: 26 June 2019
• Docket Number: 2016–03171,Index No. 5086/11
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division
• Parties: Boruch TYBERG, etc., et al., Appellants, v. CITY OF NEW YORK, et al., Respondents.

173 A.D.3d 1239

104 N.Y.S.3d 703

Boruch TYBERG, etc., et al., Appellants,

v.CITY OF NEW YORK, et al., Respondents.

2016–03171

Index No. 5086/11

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

Argued February 4, 2019

June 26, 2019

Lipsig Shapey Manus & Moverman, P.C. (Pollack, Pollack, Isaac & De Cicco, LLP, New York, N.Y. [Brian J. Isaac and Michael H. Zhu ], of counsel), for appellants.

Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel, New York, N.Y. (Susan P. Greenberg, Qian Julie Wang, and Jason Anton of counsel), for respondent City of New York.

Litchfield Cavo LLP, New York, N.Y. (Robert Macchia of counsel), for respondent Paul C. Jules.

RUTH C. BALKIN, J.P., SHERI S. ROMAN, VALERIE BRATHWAITE NELSON, LINDA CHRISTOPHER, JJ.

DECISION & ORDER

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Dawn Jimenez–Salta, J.), dated February 24, 2016. The order, insofar as appealed from, granted those branches of the separate motions of the defendants City of New York and Paul C. Jules which were for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against each of them.

ORDERED that the order is modified, on the law, by deleting the provision thereof granting that branch of the motion of the defendant City of New York which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it, and substituting therefor a provision denying that branch of the motion; as so modified the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from; and it is further,

ORDERED that one bill of costs is awarded to the plaintiffs payable by the defendant City of New York, and one bill of costs is awarded to the defendant Paul C. Jules payable by the plaintiffs.

On the morning of May 7, 2010, the infant plaintiff, then eight years old, was walking in Brooklyn with his mother and brother towards the intersection of Avenue J and East 32nd Street. Although there was no formal bus stop at that location, a number of private schools routinely utilized the location to pick up children. At the time, Avenue J was a two-way street with no traffic control device at the subject intersection. East 32nd Street was a one-way street with a stop sign at its intersection with Avenue J. There was no crosswalk across Avenue J at that intersection. The infant plaintiff was intending to board a bus and go to school. His mother prepared to cross Avenue J with the children behind a bus that was stopped in traffic. Focused on the traffic, she extended her hand for the infant plaintiff to hold. When she did not feel his hand, she turned her head in his direction and saw him running across Avenue J. Upon passing behind the bus and crossing the center line of Avenue J, the infant plaintiff collided with a vehicle being driven by the defendant Paul C. Jules. The infant plaintiff sustained severe injuries as a result of the accident.

The infant plaintiff, by his father, and his father suing derivatively, commenced this action against Jules and the City of New York, alleging, inter alia, that the City was negligent in failing to install an appropriate traffic control device for Avenue J at the intersection. Jules and the City separately moved, inter alia, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against each of them. In the order appealed from, the Supreme Court granted both motions. The plaintiffs appeal.

We agree with the Supreme Court's determination that Jules established that he was not negligent as a matter of law. Jules submitted evidence that the infant plaintiff darted out from behind a bus, not within a crosswalk, directly into the path of Jules' moving vehicle. Jules' view of the infant plaintiff was obstructed by the bus such that he was unable to avoid contact with the infant plaintiff (see Pixtun–Suret v. Gevinski, 165 A.D.3d 715, 716, 84 N.Y.S.3d 260 ; Balliet v. North Amityville Fire Dept., 133 A.D.3d 559, 560, 19 N.Y.S.3d 77 ; Galo v. Cunningham, 106 A.D.3d 865, 866, 965 N.Y.S.2d 571 ; Rosa v. Scheiber, 89 A.D.3d 827, 828, 932 N.Y.S.2d 349 ). In opposition, the plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether Jules operated the vehicle in a negligent manner (see Pixtun–Suret v. Gevinski, 165 A.D.3d at 716, 84 N.Y.S.3d 260 ; Galo v. Cunningham, 106 A.D.3d at 866, 965 N.Y.S.2d 571 ; Rosa v. Scheiber, 89 A.D.3d at 828, 932 N.Y.S.2d 349 ).

We disagree, however, that the City established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. A municipality has a duty to keep its streets in a reasonably safe condition (see Friedman v. State of New York, 67 N.Y.2d 271, 283, 502 N.Y.S.2d 669, 493 N.E.2d 893 ; Weiss v. Fote, 7 N.Y.2d 579, 584, 200 N.Y.S.2d 409, 167 N.E.2d 63 ; Warren v. Evans, 144 A.D.3d 901, 42 N.Y.S.3d 37 ). "While this duty is nondelegable, it is measured by the courts with consideration given to the proper limits on intrusion into the municipality's planning and decision-making functions. Thus, in the field of traffic design engineering, the [governmental body] is accorded a qualified immunity from liability arising out of a highway planning decision" ( Friedman v. State of New York, 67 N.Y.2d at 283, 502 N.Y.S.2d 669, 493 N.E.2d 893 ; see Warren v. Evans, 144 A.D.3d at 901–902, 42 N.Y.S.3d 37 ; Poveromo v. Town of Cortlandt, 127 A.D.3d 835, 837, 6 N.Y.S.3d 617 ). Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, a governmental body may not be held liable for a highway safety planning decision unless its study of the traffic condition is plainly inadequate or there is no reasonable basis for its traffic...