Tye v. State

Decision Date19 January 2016
Docket NumberNo. S15A1522.,S15A1522.
Citation298 Ga. 474,782 S.E.2d 10
Parties TYE v. The STATE.
CourtGeorgia Supreme Court

Roger C. Wilson, The Roger C. Wilson Law Firm, P.C., Atlanta, for appellant.

Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Paula Khristian Smith, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Matthew Blackwell Crowder, Asst. Atty. Gen., Department of Law, Paul L. Howard Jr., Dist. Atty., Fulton County District Attorney's Office, Paige Reese Whitaker, Fulton County District Attorney's Office, Atlanta, for appellee.

HINES

, Presiding Justice.

In 2008, Cortez Tye was convicted of and sentenced for felony murder and related crimes stemming from a carjacking.1 Tye now appeals his convictions and sentences and the superior court's 2014 denial of his motion for new trial, as amended, in which the remaining stated issue was Tye's assertion that the judge who conducted his trial erred in declining to hold a hearing on the issue of Tye's competency to stand trial pursuant to OCGA § 17–7–1302

even though Tye filed a special pre-trial plea of incompetency. Prior to the denial of the request for a new trial, the superior court conducted a post-conviction hearing on the issue of competency pursuant to Baker v. State, 250 Ga. 187, 297 S.E.2d 9 (1982)

, and determined that Tye was competent at the time of his trial. In this appeal, Tye makes no challenge regarding the merits of his convictions and sentences; the appeal focuses solely on the issue of competency to stand trial. For the reasons which follow, we affirm in part, and as discussed in Division 3, we vacate in part and remand the case for resentencing.

1. As noted, Tye has not enumerated as error that the evidence at his criminal trial was insufficient to sustain his convictions; nevertheless, this Court will review the evidence. Such evidence, construed in favor of the verdicts, included, inter alia, that on the date in question Tye and an accomplice approached the victim Rouse while he was in the parking lot of a gas station on Campbellton Road in Fulton County and physically attacked him; in the struggle to gain control of the keys to Rouse's vehicle, Tye hit Rouse with an unknown object, knocking him to the ground and causing impact to the back of his head; Rouse was unable to move; Tye and his accomplice then stole Rouse's vehicle and drove away; several days later, police spotted the stolen vehicle being driven by Tye; after seeing the police, Tye accelerated, turned onto a side street, and then into the parking lot of an apartment complex; once the vehicle stopped, all the occupants ran away; and a police officer chased after the driver, Tye, and eventually found him hiding in a closet of a vacant apartment. Tye admitted in a statement to police that he, along with an accomplice, "came up on" Rouse in an effort to get the keys to his vehicle; that at some point he fell on Rouse; that Rouse was on the ground and never stood up again; and that Rouse asked for help but that Tye and the accomplice drove away in Rouse's vehicle. Rouse was hospitalized and later died of complications from the injuries

he sustained in the attack.

The evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find Tye guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes for which he was convicted. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)

.

2. A more detailed procedural history is useful for understanding the present posture of the case and Tye's challenge to his competency. Six days before Tye's trial on the charges, his counsel, Scott Dawkins ("Dawkins"), filed a special plea of incompetency to stand trial and a motion for an evaluation of Tye's competency pursuant to OCGA § 17–7–130

. The trial court denied the motion after the State argued that it was a delay tactic and that neither of the two previous attorneys representing Tye had raised any concern about his competency; the case proceeded to trial.

More than four years after Tye's convictions and sentencing, his present counsel moved for a new trial based on the alleged erroneous denial of the requested pre-trial competency hearing and arranged for a mental competency examination of Tye by forensic and clinical psychologist Dr. Adriana Flores ("Dr. Flores"). The State offered that the two-prong test in Baker provided the method for determining whether the grant of a motion for new trial was warranted. The superior court held a hearing at which it was agreed by the parties to proceed pursuant to Baker; both parties conceded the first prong of the test, which was to determine if there was sufficient evidence that a retroactive determination could be made of Tye's competency at the time of his trial in 2008. See Baker at 193(1), 297 S.E.2d 9

.

The second prong of Baker required a determination of whether Tye was competent at the time of his criminal trial; Tye had the burden to show his incompetency by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. Dr. Flores made her conclusions in a written report and gave expert testimony at the competency hearing; in summary, she opined that Tye was then incompetent and would have been less competent at the time of trial, but that his competency could be "restored" for a new trial through certain State-administered programs. Dawkins also testified on behalf of Tye. The State's rebuttal expert, Dr. Stacey Marks ("Dr. Marks"), a general and forensic psychiatrist, conducted a retrospective and current competency assessment of Tye and reviewed Dr. Flores's report, the trial transcript, and a Fulton County Jail incident report. Dr. Marks concluded and gave expert testimony that Tye was then competent and would have been competent at the time of his trial in 2008. David Quinn ("Detective Quinn"), the lead detective in the criminal case, also testified on behalf of the State.

Following the competency hearing, the superior court ruled: that the defense had not met its burden under the preponderance-of-evidence standard; that Tye was competent at the time of trial; and that there was no error warranting a new trial based on the trial court's failure to hold the requested pretrial competency hearing. In pursuing the motion for new trial, Tye's counsel conceded that any other claims for a new trial had to be presented prior to an appeal or they would be waived, and asserted that Tye would be pursuing a new trial only on the issue of competency and the State's procedures for remedying the failure to grant the pre-trial hearing. The superior court thereafter entered the present "Order Denying Motion for New Trial," incorporating its earlier ruling as to the competency claims and clarifying that it found Tye to be competent both at the time of his criminal trial and presently, and that there was no error warranting a new trial from the trial court's failure to hold the requested pre-trial competency proceeding.

a). Tye contends that the superior court erred "by crediting and accepting the testimony of Dr. Marks over that of Dr. Flores, notwithstanding the manifest, dramatic, determinative differences in [their] relative backgrounds and expertise" and "notwithstanding the dramatic and manifest differences between the quality and quantity of investigative steps performed by the two persons." He argues that this Court must reverse the superior court's determination that the defense failed to show, even by a preponderance of the evidence, that he was not competent at the time of trial. But, such argument is unavailing.

As noted, in a competency proceeding, it is the defendant's burden to prove incompetency by a preponderance of the evidence. Adams v. State, 275 Ga. 867, 867–868(3), 572 S.E.2d 545 (2002)

. And, there is the rebuttable presumption that a person is mentally competent to stand trial. OCGA § 16–2–3.3 ; Sims v. State, 279 Ga. 389, 390(1), 614 S.E.2d 73 (2005). A criminal defendant is deemed to be competent for the purpose of standing trial if the defendant is capable of understanding the nature and object of the criminal proceedings against him and of assisting his attorney with his defense.

Velazquez v. State, 282 Ga. 871, 873(1), 655 S.E.2d 806 (2008)

. After the judgment has been made that a defendant is competent to be tried, and there is an appeal of that decision, this Court is to review the evidence in a light most favorable to the State and then to determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found that the defendant failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was incompetent to stand trial. Id.

As a threshold matter, Tye's contention of error places emphasis on the relative backgrounds, expertise, and approaches of Dr. Flores and Dr. Marks, seemingly to professionally disparage Dr. Marks, but at the hearing Tye made no objection whatsoever to Dr. Marks being deemed an expert in forensic psychiatry and specifically the issue of competence. Moreover, it was for the superior court, as fact finder, to judge the credibility of the opposing expert witnesses. Crowe v. State, 277 Ga. 513, 514, 591 S.E.2d 829 (2004)

.

As to the substance of Tye's contention of error, Tye relies principally upon the oral testimony and written report of Dr. Flores in support of his claim of incompetency. Dr. Flores testified: in 2012, a year before the competency hearing, she met with Tye for approximately five hours and ten minutes during which time she conducted a clinical interview and some psychological testing; Tye stated that he was "a really good reader," but that when his reading ability was tested, "it wasn't all that great"; Tye had a "full scale IQ of 77" with "perceptional reasoning" at 86 and a "verbal comprehension index of 74," making his verbal abilities similar to that of someone with mild mental retardation

; he had a "working memory" score of 77; the full scale score put Tye at the "borderline level of intelligence"; and the results of his achievement test were consistent with his IQ scores. However, Dr. Flores also testified: she was able to test Tye for malingering "because his level of IQ was fine";...

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