Tyler v. United States
| Decision Date | 01 November 2022 |
| Docket Number | 4:17-cr-40011-SLD-2 |
| Parties | LEDELL SEANTREL TYLER, Petitioner/Defendant, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent/Plaintiff. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Central District of Illinois |
Before the Court are Petitioner Ledell Seantrel Tyler's Motion Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody (“§ 2255 Motion”), ECF No. 122; Respondent United States of America's (the “government”) Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 125; Tyler's Motion in Relation Back to Original 2255 Petition (“Motion to Amend”), ECF No. 154; and Tyler's Motion to Grant 2255 Motion to Vacate and Vacate Conviction and Sentence as to Count Two (“Motion to Grant”), ECF No. 156. For the following reasons, the § 2255 Motion is GRANTED, the Motion to Dismiss is DENIED, the Motion to Amend is DENIED and the Motion to Grant is GRANTED IN PART.
On February 22, 2017, Tyler, along with his co-defendants Deaunta Sentrel Tyler and Dalvent Jera Jackson, was indicted by a grand jury for attempted Hobbs Act robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (Count One),[1] possession of firearms in furtherance of a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C § 924(c) (Count Two), and possession of firearms by a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (Count Four). Indictment 1-3 ECF No. 1. The case went to trial, and on November 15, 2017, a jury convicted Tyler on all three counts. Jury Verdict 4-6, ECF No. 48. He was sentenced to 60 months on Counts One and Four to run concurrently and 120 months on Count Two to run consecutively to Counts One and Four. Judgment 2, ECF No. 103. Tyler filed a notice of appeal on July 13, 2018. Not. Appeal, ECF No. 105. His appeal was eventually dismissed by the Seventh Circuit. USCA Mandate, ECF No. 116.
In March 2020, Tyler filed his § 2255 Motion, making the sole argument that Hobbs Act robbery and attempted Hobbs Act robbery do not categorically qualify as crimes of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Mem. Supp. § 2255 Motion 1, ECF No. 123. In response, the government filed its Motion to Dismiss, arguing that Tyler's claim was procedurally barred because he raised the same issue on direct appeal and that his motion should be denied on the merits. Mot. Dismiss 1. Pursuant to Tyler's request, Mot. Stay 1, ECF No. 152, the case was stayed on February 18, 2022 pending the Supreme Court's decision on the appeal of United States v. Taylor, 979 F.3d 203 (4th Cir. 2020), which would resolve the issue raised in his § 2255 Motion, Feb. 18, 2022 Text Order. In April 2022, Tyler filed his Motion to Amend, seeking to add two new grounds to the § 2255 Motion. Mot. Amend 4-10. And in June 2022, Tyler filed his Motion to Grant, advising the Court that the Supreme Court had issued its ruling in the Taylor appeal and that the outcome invalidated his Count Two conviction and sentence. Mot. Grant 1-2. The government concedes that Tyler's Count Two conviction should be vacated due to Taylor, Suppl. Resp. 2, ECF No. 159, but argues that the Motion to Amend should be denied, see id. at 3.
Tyler wishes to amend his § 2255 Motion to add two new grounds for relief: first, that “Count Two of his Indictment is fatally defective and fails to state a federal offense” because it does not adequately allege that he knowingly possessed a firearm in furtherance of Hobbs Act robbery, Mot. Amend 4-8, and second, that pursuant to Rehaif v. United States, 139 S.Ct. 2191 (2019), his indictment as to Count Four is fatally defective in that it does not adequately allege that he knew that he had been previously convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year at the time of the instant offense, see id. at 8-10. Because the government concedes that Tyler's Count Two conviction must be vacated, it takes no position on Tyler's argument that his Count Two indictment was fatally defective, Suppl. Resp. 2, but it contends that his Rehaif claim is untimely, procedurally defaulted, and lacking merit, id. at 3.
“Because the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings . . . do not deal with amendments to motions for collateral review,” district courts rely on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 to determine whether to grant a motion to amend. Johnson v. United States, 196 F.3d 802, 805 (7th Cir. 1999). Pursuant to Rule 15(a)(2), “[t]he court should freely give leave” to parties to amend their pleadings “when justice so requires.” But the court can deny leave to amend when an amendment would be futile. Bausch v. Stryker Corp., 630 F.3d 546, 562 (7th Cir. 2010). Here, both proposed amendments would be futile. As discussed below, see infra Section II(b), Tyler's conviction and sentence as to Count Two must be vacated because of the Supreme Court's recent ruling that attempted Hobbs Act robbery does not categorically qualify as a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), so any alleged defect in the indictment as to Count Two is irrelevant. And, while the indictment as to Count Four does not allege the knowledge element now required under Rehaif, Tyler cannot seek redress for this error through a motion brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
In Rehaif, the Supreme Court held that, in a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), “the [g]overnment must prove both that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and that he knew he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm.” 139 S.Ct. at 2200; see United States v. Maez, 960 F.3d 949, 954-55 (7th Cir. 2020) (). The Seventh Circuit has acknowledged that, under Rehaif, indictments must include the knowledge of status element. See Maez, 960 F.3d at 966 ().[2] Tyler's indictment as to Count Four reads:
On or about January 7, 2017, . . . the defendant, Ledell Seantrel Tyler, having been previously convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, knowingly possessed firearms and ammunition, . . . said firearms and ammunition having previously traveled in interstate and foreign commerce.
Indictment 3 (capitalization omitted). This language is similar to the language of the § 922(g) indictment the Seventh Circuit assumed was defective in Maez, as the term “knowingly” falls after the clause about Tyler's previous conviction and therefore would not typically be interpreted to apply to that clause. See Maez, 960 F.3d at 966. As such, the Court cannot say that Tyler's Count Four indictment satisfies Rehaif. It will therefore address whether Tyler could bring a Rehaif claim in his § 2255 Motion.
The Court finds that Tyler's Rehaif claim is untimely. “A district court may properly deny a motion to amend as futile if the proposed amendment would be barred by the statute of limitations.” Rodriguez v. United States, 286 F.3d 972, 980 (7th Cir. 2002). New claims in a proposed amended § 2255 motion must either “independently meet the statute of limitations” or relate back to the filing date of the original motion. Riney v. United States, No. 15-3783, 2017 WL3426473, at *1 (7th Cir. Feb. 10, 2017) (citing Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644 (2005)). The proposed claim does neither.
As relevant here, to fall within the statute of limitations, a § 2255 motion must be filed within one year of the date on which the judgment of conviction became final or one year of the “date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.” 28 U.S.C. §§ 2255(f)(1), (3). Tyler's conviction became final on January 13, 2020, see Tyler v. United States, 140 S.Ct. 819 (2020) (mem.) (denying petition for writ of certiorari), and Rehaif, which established the right under which Tyler now seeks redress, was decided on June 21, 2019, see 139 S.Ct. 2191. As such, the Rehaif claim, filed in April 2022, does not independently meet the statute of limitations.
Nor does it relate back to Tyler's initial § 2255 motion. “In order for an untimely claim to relate back, it must have arisen from the same set of facts as the timely filed claim, not from separate conduct or a separate occurrence in both time and type.” Rodriguez, 286 F.3d at 981 (quotation marks omitted). Courts have uniformly denied amendments “that would add a new claim or theory of relief.” Id. (collecting cases). Tyler's initial § 2255 motion argues only that his Count Two conviction must be vacated because Hobbs Act robbery and attempted Hobbs Act robbery are not categorically crimes of violence for purposes of § 924(c), Mem. Supp. § 2255 Motion 1; he does not mention his Count Four conviction at all. Thus, Tyler's motion to amend his § 2255 Motion to add a Rehaif claim is futile due to untimeliness.[3] Because both of the proposed amendments in the Motion to Amend would be futile, the Court denies the motion.
A prisoner in federal custody may move the court that imposed his sentence to vacate, set aside, or correct it. 28 U.S.C § 2255(a). “[R]elief under § 2255 is an extraordinary remedy because it asks the district court essentially to reopen the criminal process to a person who already has had an opportunity for full process.” Almonacid v. United States, 476 F.3d 518, 521 (7th Cir. 2007). Accordingly, such relief “is available only when the ‘sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of...
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