United States v. Maez

• Citation: 960 F.3d 949
• Decision Date: 01 June 2020
• Docket Number: No. 19-1287, No. 19-2049, No. 19-1768,19-1287
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Carlos MAEZ, Defendant-Appellant. United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Matthew R. Jones, Defendant-Appellant. United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Cameron Battiste, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

960 F.3d 949

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Carlos MAEZ, Defendant-Appellant.

United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Matthew R. Jones, Defendant-Appellant.

United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Cameron Battiste, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 19-1287

No. 19-1768

No. 19-2049

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Submitted March 31, 2020^*

Argued March 31, 2020

Decided June 1, 2020

David E. Hollar, Attorney, Office of the United States Attorney, Hammond, IN, for Plaintiff-Appellee (Case no. 19-1287)

Thomas W. Patton, Attorney, Office of the Federal Public Defender, Peoria, IL, Colleen McNichols Ramais, Attorney, Office of the Federal Public Defender, Urbana, IL, for Defendant-Appellant

Katherine Virginia Boyle, Attorney, Office of the United States Attorney, Urbana Division, Urbana, IL, for Plaintiff-Appellee (Case no. 19-1768)

Johanes Maliza, Attorney, Office of the Federal Public Defender, Springfield, IL, for Defendant-Appellant

Saurish Appleby-Bhattacharjee, Attorney, Office of the United States Attorney, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff-Appellee (Case no. 19-2049)

Daniel J. Hillis, Attorney, Office of the Federal Public Defender, Springfield, IL, Thomas W. Patton, Attorney, Office of the Federal Public Defender, Peoria, IL, for Defendant-Appellant

Before Wood, Chief Judge, and Kanne and Hamilton, Circuit Judges.

Hamilton, Circuit Judge.

In separate cases, juries found appellants Carlos Maez, Matthew Jones, and Cameron Battiste guilty of violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), which prohibits convicted felons and several other classes of people from possessing firearms or ammunition. In their appeals, the three defendants raise overlapping issues relying on Rehaif v. United States , ––– U.S. ––––, 139 S. Ct. 2191, 204 L.Ed.2d 594 (2019), to challenge their convictions in trials held before Rehaif was decided. Before Rehaif , the federal courts of appeals had all held that § 922(g) required the government to prove a defendant knowingly possessed a firearm or ammunition, but not that the defendant knew he or she be-longed to one of the prohibited classes. United States v. Williams , 946 F.3d 968, 970 (7th Cir. 2020). In Rehaif , the Supreme Court reached a different conclusion, holding that the statute requires the government to "show that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and also that he knew he had the relevant status when he possessed it." 139 S. Ct. at 2194.

Courts across the nation are grappling with how Rehaif affects cases pending on direct appeal when it came down. This court has already affirmed several pre- Rehaif convictions based on guilty pleas, but this is our first precedential decision concerning convictions upon jury verdicts. See United States v. Ballard , 950 F.3d 434, 436 n.1 (7th Cir. 2020) ; United States v. Dowthard , 948 F.3d 814, 818 (7th Cir. 2020) ; Williams , 946 F.3d at 975. The three appellants assert types of error that we have not yet addressed in light of Rehaif : a missing element in their indictments and jury instructions and—in Jones’s case—a denied motion for a judgment of acquittal. Applying plain-error review, we conclude that the asserted errors do not require reversing any of the convictions. We vacate Jones’s sentence, however. As the government acknowledges, the district court made what is known as a Tapia error, imposing a longer prison term for purposes of rehabilitation through prison programs. See Tapia v. United States , 564 U.S. 319, 334, 131 S.Ct. 2382, 180 L.Ed.2d 357 (2011).

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Carlos Maez robbed a bank at gunpoint in South Bend, Indiana, on October 16, 2015. Police found firearms and ammunition in Matthew Jones’s bedroom when executing a search warrant for his home in Kankakee, Illinois, on July 15, 2018. And when federal agents arrested Cameron Battiste and his girlfriend outside their apartment complex in Willowbrook, Illinois, on April 7, 2017, his girlfriend was carrying a laundry bag that contained two firearms. Each defendant stipulated at his trial that prior to the charged possession of a firearm, he had been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. Juries found each defendant guilty on one count of violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and each was sentenced under § 924(a)(2).¹

On appeal, the defendants argue that Rehaif v. United States , ––– U.S. ––––, 139 S. Ct. 2191, 204 L.Ed.2d 594, requires reversal of their § 922(g) convictions. All three defendants argue that their indictments were defective because they failed to allege that they knew of their felon status. All three argue that the jury instructions erroneously omitted this same element of knowledge. None of the defendants objected to the indictment or jury instructions in the district courts, on any grounds. Jones did, however, move for a judgment of acquittal at the close of evidence. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(a). He gave no specific grounds to support his oral motion, and the district court denied it without asking for elaboration. Jones argues that this denial was also a Rehaif error because the trial evidence was insufficient to show that he knew he was a felon.²

II. Legal Framework

We first address the common legal issues raised by these jury verdicts before Rehaif was decided. Current law governs our review on direct appeal, including any issues reviewed for plain error. See Henderson v. United States , 568 U.S. 266, 276–77, 133 S.Ct. 1121, 185 L.Ed.2d 85 (2013). This principle applies with full force where an intervening decision has effectively added an element to a crime. See Johnson v. United States , 520 U.S. 461, 467–68, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997) (giving retroactive effect to United States v. Gaudin , 515 U.S. 506, 115 S.Ct. 2310, 132 L.Ed.2d 444 (1995), which required the jury to find materiality in perjury prosecutions); United States v. Ross , 77 F.3d 1525, 1539 (7th Cir. 1996) (same). Several questions arise concerning our review of jury verdicts rendered before Rehaif was issued.

A. Scope of Knowledge Required by Rehaif

Jones and Battiste raise a threshold question concerning the scope of the Supreme Court’s holding in Rehaif . The Court held that "in a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and § 924(a)(2), the Government must prove both that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and that he knew he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm." 139 S. Ct. at 2200. Does this language require only that defendants know their status —in these cases, having a felony conviction? Or, construing the decision more broadly, must defendants know that it was a crime to possess a firearm as a result of their prohibited status? Jones and Battiste press the broader interpretation. In effect, they argue that § 922(g), as interpreted in Rehaif , prohibits only criminally willful possession of firearms and ammunition—possession with knowledge that the law makes the possession a crime. See Bryan v. United States , 524 U.S. 184, 191–92, 118 S.Ct. 1939, 141 L.Ed.2d 197 (1998) ("As a general matter, when used in the criminal context, ... in order to establish a ‘willful’ violation of a statute, ‘the Government must prove that the defendant acted with knowledge that his conduct was unlawful.’ "), quoting Ratzlaf v. United States , 510 U.S. 135, 137, 114 S.Ct. 655, 126 L.Ed.2d 615 (1994).

We do not read Rehaif as imposing a willfulness requirement on § 922(g) prosecutions. First, the difference between requiring knowledge of status and knowledge of the criminal prohibition is so important in the practical workings of federal courts that the Supreme Court would not have adopted the broader reading without saying so with unmistakable clarity. More fundamental, the logic of the Court’s opinion supports only the narrower requirement of knowledge of status. The textual analysis centered on Congress’s use of the word "knowingly" in § 924(a)(2), which spells out the punishment for violations of § 922(g). 139 S. Ct. at 2195. This fact alone casts serious doubt on Jones and Battiste’s reading because, in criminal law, "knowing" connotes a lower level of scienter than does "willful." In Bryan , the Court collected cases holding that defendants could be convicted of "knowing" crimes without proof that they knew their deliberate actions violated the law. 524 U.S. at 192–93, 118 S.Ct. 1939. Rehaif fits easily into that line of cases interpreting "knowing" requirements.

Rehaif changed governing law in holding that "knowingly" in § 924(a)(2) applies not only to the "possession element" of § 922(g) but also to its "status element." 139 S. Ct. at 2195–96. In other words, both elements require the same knowledge, an awareness of the fact. See Model Penal Code § 2.02(2)(b)(i) (Am. Law Inst. 1985). Before Rehaif , we consistently held that the government needed to prove that § 922(g) defendants knew only that they possessed firearms or ammunition, not that they knew their status or that their possession was unlawful. See, e.g., United States v. Stein , 712 F.3d 1038, 1041 (7th Cir. 2013) ("[T]he word ‘knowingly’ made applicable to § 922(g) by § 924(a)(2) requires knowledge of the factual elements of the offense and nothing more."); United States v. Wilson , 159 F.3d 280, 289 (7th Cir. 1998) ("[T]he fact that [the defendant] did not know about the statute does not mean that he could not have committed a ‘knowing’ violation of it."). Rehaif did not overturn such holdings with respect to the possession element; it applied the same knowledge requirement to the status element.

Next, Rehaif ’s discussion of "the well-known maxim that ‘ignorance of the law’ (or a ‘mistake of law’) is no excuse" makes doubly clear that § 922(g) requires knowledge only of status, not knowledge of the § 922(g) prohibition itself. As the Court explained, the maxim means that a defendant normally cannot argue that he was "unaware of the existence of a statute proscribing his conduct." 139 S. Ct. at 2198, quoting ...