Tyler v. Williams

• Decision Date: 20 October 1898
• Parties: TYLER et al. v. WILLIAMS et al.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

31 S.E. 298

53 S.C. 367

TYLER et al. v. WILLIAMS et al.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

October 20, 1898

Appeal from common pleas circuit court of Orangeburg county; Ernest Gary, Judge.

Action by Warren V. Tyler and others against Braxton B. Williams and another. Judgment for defendant. Plaintiffs appeal. Affirmed.

The charge of the court below is as follows:

"As you have gathered from the arguments in this case, this is a case for the equity side of the court. One of the defendants sets up as a defense that the estate should not be partitioned, by reason of the fact that the plaintiffs are not the owners of the land sought to be partitioned, but that B. B. Williams is the owner in fee of the land. That question of title must be passed upon by the jury, before the equitable issues can be passed upon by the court. You are to pass upon by the question which has been submitted to you which is as follows: Is B. B. Williams, the defendant, the owner in fee of the tract of land described in the complaint and has B. B. Williams, the defendant, a good and valid title thereto? If the defendant Williams is the owner in fee, the land cannot be partitioned; but, if not, then the case goes on the equity side of the court, where the rights of the parties are to be determined by the court, and not by the jury. One is said to be owner in fee of land when he is the absolute owner of it. That question you are to pass upon. Both parties claim through a common source. They admit that it was originally the property of Mr. Thomas W. Tyler. They admit that at one time it was originally the property of T W. Tyler. Both claim through him. The plaintiffs claim that they are the heirs at law of time it was the absolute property of T. W. Thomas W. Tyler, and that the land descended to them at his death under the statute of distributions. The defendant Williams claims that they can inherit none of that property, by reason of the fact that during his lifetime Thomas W. Tyler contracted a debt, which was executed, and, under that execution, all the right, title, and interest of T. W. Tyler was sold and purchased by his wife, and that she conveyed it to others, until it got into the hands of Williams by purchase. This issue depends on the validity of the sheriff's sale. If that sale was a valid sale, and conveyed the interest of Mr. Tyler, then his heirs could not inherit that property, because his interest had been sold under the sheriff's deed. Your inquiry will be then: Was that a valid sale? That is the basis of Mr. Williams' title, claiming under the sheriff's deed and claiming under successive sales until it comes to him.

"The plaintiffs' counsel request me to charge you the following propositions of law:

"(1) 'That if the jury believe from the evidence that W. H. Wroton had accepted $500 from the judgment debtor, Thomas W. Tyler, in full settlement of judgment debt to him, any subsequent levy thereunder on property of Thomas W. Tyler would be void, and would not support a sheriff's deed.' I charge you that to be good law.

"(2) 'That the recital of levy in the sheriff's deed is not evidence of the fact, and it must be proved by other evidence.' That is the law.

"(3) 'That if the jury believe from the evidence that there was a levy on the lands of Brown, under the execution in Williams vs. Brown and others, that it would not be lawful for the sheriff to levy on other property of the judgment debtors in that case, unless it be made to appear that the levy was insufficient, or that the levy was otherwise disposed of, without satisfying the plaintiff's judgment.' I cannot charge you that, not because it is not a good proposition of law, but the question of fact is a matter of record. That is what is known as 'documentary evidence.' The court construes documentary evidence. The words, '140 acres land Brown 12th,' I charge you that that is not a levy. Where the levy has been made, it is entered upon the execution; and I charge you that that entry is not sufficient to establish the fact that a levy was made. So, I charge you that that proposition of law does not apply to this case.

"(4) 'That a levy is prima facie a satisfaction of an execution, and the burden is on the party endeavoring to sustain a second levy, to rebut that presumption.' That is a good proposition of law if the fact of the levy had been already established, but that entry is not sufficient to establish the levy. The sheriff speaks through his record. That indorsement would not be sufficient to support the fact that a levy was made. If you find that this judgment was paid, I charge you that a sale under a judgment that has been paid would convey no title. A judgment is the legal determination that a debt exists against the individual; and an execution is the process of the court to enforce the payment of that debt. It is therefore necessary that there should be a judgment to get a sheriff's sale. The execution is to enforce the payment of that debt. If, therefore, the debt was paid, there was nothing on which the execution could operate. A forced sale could not be had to pay that which was already paid. So, if there was no existing judgment, or if the execution had been satisfied, it would not support a sale. But I charge you, further, that if you find that there was a judgment and execution which was a lien on this property at the time, which was not paid or satisfied, although the sheriff undertook to sell under a paid execution, if at the time he undertook to make that sale there was in his office a valid execution not satisfied, the law would refer the sale back to the unsatisfied execution, and that would support the sale. Where the sheriff has a number of executions, and some are void, and others are not, and he sells under one that is void, and at the time there are others in his office that are not void, although the one he sold under would not support the sale, yet, if there were valid executions which were liens on the property at the time, the law would refer the sale to the valid execution, and that would support a good title to the purchaser. It mattered not under which execution the sheriff sold, if, at the time, there were valid executions which were liens on the property existing at the time of the sale. Now, it matters not as to the amount. A judgment for $50 or $60 can create as binding a lien on real estate as a greater sum.

"You will see that your first inquiry would be, was there a sale? If you find that there was not at the time a binding execution against that property, then there could be no sale, because the execution is necessary to support the sale. It is a forced sale, and that is the authority by which the sheriff gets his right to sell. As I have already explained, it matters not under which execution he sells, if, at the time he sells, there is a valid, binding execution against the property.

"Where one comes into court to establish title to real estate,--and the defendant assumes that burden in this case,--the law requires him to make out a perfect claim of title, or he must show that he has been in open adverse possession for twenty years. In that case the law would presume that he had a grant. Or he must have held adversely and continuously for a period of ten years. That would give him a good title. Or he must go back to a common source, from which both parties claim title, and then you determine which has the better title. The presumption of a grant does not run against a minor. It takes the full twenty years after the minor has attained his majority before the presumption can run against a minor. The ten years' adverse possession must be continuous. If A. holds for five years, and sells to B., and B. holds for five years, those two cannot unite their possessions to make out the statutory period of ten years. The statutory period must be continuous. In the presumption of a grant the parties can link their possessions to make out the term of twenty years; but that presumption will not run against a minor, but must run for twenty years after his disability has ceased.

"The burden of proof is on the party who affirms title, B. B. Williams; and, if the testimony shows you that the party from whom he traces his title had a valid title at the sheriff's sale, then the deeds are sufficient in form to have conveyed that title to him. But if he did not get a title at the sheriff's sale, and has not held adversely and continuously for ten years since the majority of the youngest of the co-tenants, then his title could not accrue under adverse possession. That is the issue for you to determine. Is B. B. Williams, the defendant, the owner in fee of the tract of land described in the complaint, and has he a good and valid title thereto? If that sheriff's sale was a valid sale, then the deeds introduced are sufficient in form to have conveyed the interest of Mrs. Tyler, who claims to have bought the interest of her husband at that sheriff's sale. But if that sale was not under a valid judgment, or if there was not a binding execution at the time of the sale, then Mrs. Tyler would not have bought anything, and could not convey anything. But if the sheriff's sale was valid, and she bought the interest of her husband at that sale, then the deeds she has made to other parties would be sufficient to convey that title to the defendant. If you find for the defendant B. B. Williams, you will answer the question submitted to you 'Yes.' If you find for the plaintiff, you will answer 'No."'

S. Dibble and Moss & Lide, for appellants.

Raysor & Summers and Izlar Bros., for respondents.

McIVER C.J.

This action was brought on for the partition of a certain tract of land situate in Orangeburg county, the plaintiffs alleging in their complaint that they and ...