Tynes v. Ill. Veterans Homes
| Decision Date | 16 July 2012 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 12-2082 |
| Parties | CELESTE TYNES, Plaintiff, v. ILLINOIS VETERANS HOMES and COUNSEL 31 AFSCME, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Central District of Illinois |
In March 2012, Plaintiff Celeste Tynes, acting pro se, filed a Complaint (#1) against Defendant Veterans Home in Manteno IL and Defendant Council 31 AFSCME. Plaintiff brings her claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Subject matter jurisdiction is based on federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
In April 2012, Defendant AFSCME Council 31 filed Motion of Defendant AFSCME Council 31 to Dismiss (#10). Plaintiff filed a Response to Motion of Dismissal (#14) and a Memorandum in Support of Response to Motion of Dismissal (#15). In June 2012, Defendant Illinois Department of Veterans' Affairs filed a Motion to Dismiss (#16).1 Plaintiff filed a Response to Motion of Dismissal (#19). After reviewing the parties' pleadings and memoranda, this Court recommends, pursuant to its authority under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), that Motion of Defendant AFSCME Council 31 to Dismiss (#10) be GRANTED and that Defendant Illinois Department of Veterans' Affairs' Motion to Dismiss (#16) be GRANTED.
The following background is taken from Plaintiff's Complaint (#1). Plaintiff worked as anurse's assistant at the Illinois Veterans Home in Manteno, Illinois for over six years. Plaintiff alleges that she was wrongfully discharged on March 20, 2011.2
As background, Plaintiff notes that a supervisor at work, Ms. Johanna Housh, apparently had a longstanding conflict with Plaintiff. In 2008, Plaintiff reported to a lead supervisor, Ms. Kathy Diangikes, that Ms. Housh had asked Plaintiff to administer medication to a patient, even though it was against policy for Plaintiff to do so because she wasn't certified to administer. (#1, p. 6; #15). Plaintiff indicates that, in the years following this incident, Ms. Housh continually retaliated against Plaintiff, and though Plaintiff reported this behavior to her employer and her union, no action was taken. (#15).
In the events leading up to her discharge, Plaintiff alleges that, in January 2011, Ms. Housh wrote up an incident report about Plaintiff's work. Plaintiff implies that Ms. Housh fabricated this report, and she pressured two other employees to do the same. Based on these three incident reports, the head security guard, Chief Alexander, spoke to Plaintiff about the incident. Plaintiff alleges that, in this meeting, she was discriminated against. This incident led to her termination. Plaintiff alleges that, with respect to this incident, she was never given a fair hearing or fair representation from her union, Defendant AFSCME.
Plaintiff attaches a Charge of Discrimination and a right to sue letter from the EEOC pertaining to both Defendants. In both charges, she alleges that Defendants discriminated against based on her race and retaliated against her for complaining of discrimination. Plaintiff filed her charges of discrimination on January 19, 2012, and the EEOC mailed the notice of suit rights on January 31, 2012.
The purpose of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is to test the sufficiency of the complaint, not to decide the merits of the case. Gibson v. City of Chi., 910 F.2d 1510, 1520 (7th Cir. 1990). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The complaint must give fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests. E.E.O.C. v. Concentra Health Servs., Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 776-77 (7th Cir. 2007). However, fair notice is not enough by itself; in addition, the allegations must show that it is plausible, rather than merely speculative, that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1083 (7th Cir. 2008).
When considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the Court is limited to the allegations contained in the pleadings. Venture Assocs. Corp. v. Zenith Data Sys. Corp., 987 F.2d 429, 431 (7th Cir. 1993). The Court must treat all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. McMillan v. Collection Prof'ls, Inc., 455 F.3d 754, 758 (7th Cir. 2006); see Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (). In considering the plaintiff's factual allegations, the Court should not accept as adequate abstract recitations of the elements of a cause of action or conclusory legal statements. Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009). The application of the notice pleading standard is a context-specific task, in which the height of the pleading requirement is relative to circumstances. Cooney v. Rossiter, 583 F.3d 967, 971 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009)). Furthermore, district courts are required to liberally construe complaints filed by pro se litigants. Marshall v. Knight, 445 F.3d 965, 969 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)).
Defendant Illinois Department of Veterans' Affairs seeks dismissal of Plaintiff's § 1983 claim and her Title VII claim. The Court will consider each of these claims in turn.
A. § 1983
First, Defendant argues that the Court should dismiss Plaintiff's § 1983 claim because "Veterans Home in Manteno IL" is not a suable entity, it is not subject to liability under § 1983, and Plaintiff fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted. Additionally, Defendant argues Plaintiff's § 1983 claim should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because Defendant has Eleventh Amendment immunity against Plaintiff's claim.
The Seventh Circuit has addressed claims regarding Eleventh Amendment immunity in both Rule 12(b)(1) motions and 12(b)(6) motions. Am. Soc. of Consultant Pharmacists v. Patla, 138 F. Supp.2d 1062, 1065-66 (N.D. Ill. 2001). Under either rule, all well-pleaded facts are taken as true, all reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of plaintiff, and all ambiguities are resolved in favor of the plaintiff. Id.
To begin, Defendant correctly notes that the Illinois Veterans Home in Manteno is not a suable entity. Rather, the Illinois Department of Veterans' Affairs operates this facility, and the facility is staffed by employees of the Department. The Veterans Home has no legal existence separable from the Department. See 20 ILCS 2805/1.5. As such, the proper defendant in this case is the Illinois Department of Veterans' Affairs.
As a state agency, Defendant Illinois Department of Veterans' Affairs may claim the privileges of sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. "The Eleventh Amendment bars private litigants' suits against nonconsenting states in federal courts, with the exception of causes of action where Congress has abrogated the states' traditional immunity through its powers under the Fourteenth Amendment." Joseph v. Bd. of Regents, 432 F.3d 746, 748 (7th Cir. 2005). States and "arms of the state" may invoke Eleventh Amendment immunity to bar claims against them brought under § 1983. Id. at 749. The Eleventh Amendment operates to bar anyclaims for money damages. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974). Furthermore, the Eleventh Amendment bars injunctive relief against the state itself. Luder v. Endicott, 253 F.3d 1020, 1024-25 (7th Cir. 2001). In this case, Plaintiff seeks money damages and reinstatement. Both forms or relief are unavailable due to the Defendant's Eleventh Amendment immunity.
As such, Plaintiff's § 1983 claim against Defendant Illinois Department of Veterans' Affairs should be dismissed. Given this determination, the Court does not reach Defendant's remaining arguments with respect to dismissing Plaintiff's § 1983 claim.
2. Title VII
Second, Defendant argues that Plaintiff failed to timely file her Title VII claim with the EEOC. Defendant indicates that a plaintiff must file a charge with the EEOC within 300 days after the date on which the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(e)(1). Defendant further argues that Plaintiff's failure to file timely bars her from pursuing her claim.
Title VII provides that a charge of racially discriminatory employment practices shall be filed with the EEOC within 300 days "after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1).3 Failure to file a timely charge with the EEOC precludes a subsequent lawsuit under Title VII. Beamon v. Marshall & Ilsley Trust Co., 411 F.3d 854, 860 (7th Cir. 2005). For purposes of this statute of limitations, discrete discriminatory employment actions such as termination are deemed to have taken place on the date they occurred, even if they form part of an ongoing practice or are connected with other acts. Id. However, the statutory filing period is subject to equitable modification, such as equitable tolling or equitable estoppel. Chakonas v. City of Chi., 42 F.3d 1132, 1135 (7th Cir. 1994). A district court maygrant a motion to dismiss based on a statute of limitations issue, but at this stage in litigation, must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of plaintiff, especially with respect to the potential applicability of equitable modification. Vargas v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., No. 96-3636, 124 F.3d 206, 1997 WL 413581 (7th Cir. July 8, 1997) (unreported).
In this case, Plaintiff was terminated on March 20, 2011 (#1, p. 10). The Court uses this date in its analysis of the statute of limitations. Plaintiff filed her Charge of Discrimination against Defendant on January 19, 2012. This is 305 days after Defendant terminated her employment, and thus beyond the statute of limitations established...
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