Tynes v. Tynes

• Decision Date: 18 November 2003
• Docket Number: No. 2002-CA-01091-COA.,2002-CA-01091-COA.
• Citation: 860 So.2d 325
• Parties: Sue Carol TYNES, Appellant, v. Ronald Price TYNES, Appellee.
• Court: Mississippi Court of Appeals

860 So.2d 325

Sue Carol TYNES, Appellant, v. Ronald Price TYNES, Appellee.

No. 2002-CA-01091-COA.

Court of Appeals of Mississippi.

November 18, 2003.

Glenn Louis White, Petal, attorney for appellant.

David Alan Pumford, attorney for appellee.

Before KING, P.J., BRIDGES, and LEE, JJ.

BRIDGES, J., for the Court.

¶ 1. Sue and Ronald Tynes were married on November 2, 1975. Sue Tynes filed for a divorce on October 9, 2000. The parties consented to a divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable differences on January 30, 2002. On that same day, a hearing was conducted by the chancellor regarding issues of equitable distribution, alimony, and support. On May 13, 2002, the chancellor rendered an opinion to which Sue Tynes filed a motion to reconsider or for a new trial. This motion was denied and she now appeals to this Court.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

I. WHETHER THE CHANCERY COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO AWARD ALIMONY TO SUE TYNES.

II. WHETHER THE CHANCERY COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER RONALD'S RETIREMENT AS MARITAL PROPERTY.

III. WHETHER THE CHANCERY COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING RONALD'S PERSONAL INJURY SETTLEMENT AS NON-MARITAL PROPERTY.

IV. WHETHER THE CHANCERY COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO AWARD ATTORNEYS FEES TO SUE TYNES.

FACTS

¶ 2. Sue Carol Tynes (Sue) and Ronald Price Tynes (Ron) were married on November 2, 1975. Of their marriage, there are two children, Ronnie and Leslie. Starting in 1976, Ron began working as a trainman with Norfolk Southern Company. In 1997, Ron was severely injured on the job and lost his entire left leg as well as three fingers and became permanently disabled as a result of the accident. The next year, Ron entered into a settlement agreement with The Alabama Great Southern Railroad Company.

¶ 3. The couple separated in August 2000, and in October 2000, Sue filed for divorce, alleging fault grounds and irreconcilable differences. In January 2001, the parties filed a joint motion to dismiss the fault grounds and withdraw the pleading together with a consent to divorce on the ground of irreconcilable differences. The court entered an order dismissing the fault grounds, leaving the issues of equitable distribution, alimony, and support before the court.

¶ 4. A hearing was held on January 30, 2002, in regards to the division of property, alimony and support. The chancellor rendered his opinion on May 13, 2002. Sue then filed her motion to reconsider or for a new trial which was later denied by the court on June 5, 2002.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 5. The standard of review employed by this Court in domestic relations cases is limited by the substantial evidence/manifest error rule.

This Court may reverse a chancellor's findings of fact only when there is no substantial credible evidence in the record to justify his findings. Our scope of review in domestic relations matters is limited under the familiar rule that this Court will not disturb a chancellor's findings unless manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous, or if the chancellor applied an erroneous legal standard.

Jundoosing v. Jundoosing, 826 So.2d 85, 88(¶ 10) (Miss.2002) (citations omitted).

ANALYSIS

I. WHETHER THE CHANCERY COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO AWARD ALIMONY TO SUE TYNES.

¶ 6. In the area of domestic relations, the division of marital assets is governed under the law as stated in Hemsley and Ferguson.¹

First, the character of the parties' assets, marital or nonmarital, must be determined pursuant to Hemsley. The marital property is then equitably divided, employing the Ferguson factors as guidelines, in light of each parties' nonmarital property. If there are sufficient marital assets which, when equitably divided and considered with each spouse's nonmarital assets, will adequately provide for both parties, no more need be done.

Johnson v. Johnson, 650 So.2d 1281, 1287 (Miss.1995) (citations omitted).

¶ 7. Whether to award alimony is governed under the law as stated in Armstrong. The Mississippi Supreme Court stated that "alimony awards are within the discretion of the chancellor and his discretion will not be reversed on appeal unless the chancellor was manifestly in error in his finding of fact and abused his discretion. In the case of a claimed inadequacy or outright denial of alimony, we will interfere only where the decision is seen as so oppressive, unjust or grossly inadequate as to evidence an abuse of discretion." Armstrong v. Armstrong, 618 So.2d 1278, 1280 (Miss.1993) (citations omitted). The factors to be considered by the chancellor in arriving at findings and entering judgment for alimony are as follows:

(1) The income and expenses of the parties;

(2) The health and earning capacity of the parties;

(3) The needs of each party;

(4) The obligations and assets of each party;

(5) The length of the marriage;

(6) The presence or absence of minor children in the home, which may require that one or both of the parties either pay, or personally provide, child care;

(7) The age of the parties;

(8) The standard of living of the parties, both during the marriage and at the time of the support determination;

(9) The tax consequences of the spousal support order;

(10) Fault or misconduct;

(11) Wasteful dissipation of assets by either party; or

(12) Any other factor deemed by the court to be "just and equitable" in connection with the setting of spousal support.

Armstrong, 618 So.2d at 1280, citing Hammonds v. Hammonds, 597 So.2d 653, 655 (Miss.1992).

¶ 8. In his findings of facts and conclusions of law, the chancellor conducted a thorough analysis of all of the relevant Armstrong factors in this case. Upon reviewing the detailed analysis taken by the court of the position and needs of the parties, we find that the chancellor in no way abused his discretion in finding that Sue was not entitled to an award for alimony. Therefore, we find this issue is without merit.

II. WHETHER THE CHANCERY COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER RONALD'S RETIREMENT AS MARITAL PROPERTY.

¶ 9. When reviewing questions of equitable distribution, this Court looks to the chancellor's application of the Ferguson factors. Ferguson, 639 So.2d at 928; see also Johnson v. Johnson, 650 So.2d 1281, 1287 (Miss.1995); Hemsley v. Hemsley, 639 So.2d 909, 914-15 (Miss.1994). In Ferguson, the Mississippi Supreme Court held, that when "attempting to effect an equitable distribution of marital property," chancery courts should consider the following guidelines:

(1) Substantial contribution to the accumulation of property

a) direct or indirect economic contribution

b) contribution to stability and harmony of the marital relationship measured by quality, quantity of time spent on family duties and duration of marriage

c) contribution to the education, training or other accomplishment bearing on the earning power of spouse accumulating assets

(2) Degree to which each spouse has expanded, withdrawn, or otherwise disposed of marital assets and any prior distribution of assets.

(3) Market value and emotional value of assets subject to distribution.

(4) Value of assets not ordinarily absent equitable factors to the contrary, subject to such distribution, such as property brought to the marriage by the parties and property acquired by inheritance or inter vivos gift or by an individual spouse.

(5) Tax and other economic consequences, and contractual or legal consequences to third parties, of the proposed distribution.

(6) Extent to which property division may be utilized to eliminate periodic payments and other potential sources of friction.

(7) Needs of the parties.

(8) Any other factor which in equity should be considered.

Ferguson, 639 So.2d at 928.

¶ 10. "The chancellor is not required to address each and every factor and may consider only the factors which he finds applicable to the marital property at issue." Burnham-Steptoe v. Steptoe, 755 So.2d 1225, 1233(¶ 24) (Miss.Ct.App. 1999) (citing Weathersby v. Weathersby, 693 So.2d 1348, 1354 (Miss.1997)).

¶ 11. In his findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is clear that the chancellor divided all of the property, including marital home, acreage in Jones County, a tractor, a Cessna 170, and personal items, in accordance with the Ferguson factors and applied established case law.

¶ 12. Sue claims that the chancellor erred in failing to consider Ron's retirement income as marital property. In her brief, Sue cites cases involving mostly pension plans and funds which can be subject to distribution upon divorce. The chancellor has discretion in the equitable distribution of marital property, to divide such property after consideration of the evidence, in a manner in accordance with Arthur v. Arthur, 691 So.2d 997, 1002-03 (Miss.1997) (citing Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So.2d 921, 928-30 (Miss.1994) and Hemsley v. Hemsley, 639 So.2d 909, 915 (Miss.1994)).

¶ 13. The record reflects that Sue will become eligible for a divorced spouse annuity from the U.S.A. Railroad Retirement Board upon her reaching sixty-two years of age by virtue of her marriage to Ron. The record also reflects that Sue is a participant in the PERS state retirement system and that the chancellor declined to include this in the equitable distribution of marital property. There is also evidence that Sue cashed out an earlier state retirement plan; however, the reasons for doing so were not revealed to the lower court. Since the judge did not have the benefit of this information, his findings were brief but sufficient as the same concerns his reasoning for not awarding Sue any amount from Ron's retirement benefits. Additionally, the record does not reveal when Sue may start receiving her retirement and the amount thereof, but it is apparent that the judge took this into consideration and made adequate and sufficient provisions for Sue.

¶ 14. Given the evidence presented in the record sub judice, we find that the chancellor made distribution of the marital property in accordance with Ferguson and Arthur, and the evidence presented in the case and did...