Labella v. Burlington Northern, Inc.

Decision Date05 June 1979
Docket NumberNo. 14493,14493
Citation36 St.Rep. 1016,595 P.2d 1184,182 Mont. 202
PartiesMichael A. LABELLA, Jr., Plaintiff and Appellant, v. BURLINGTON NORTHERN, INC., a corporation, Defendant and Respondent.
CourtMontana Supreme Court

Hoyt & Lewis, Great Falls, John C. Hoyt argued, Great Falls, for plaintiff and appellant.

Kurt W. Kroschel argued, Billings, for defendant and respondent.

HASWELL, Chief Justice.

Plaintiff appeals from an order of the District Court for Lewis and Clark County dismissing his complaint on the ground that suit was brought in an inconvenient forum.

Plaintiff is a resident of Spokane, Washington and has been employed by defendant railroad since 1947. Defendant, a Minnesota corporation, is a common carrier doing business in Montana and throughout the northwest. Plaintiff alleges that while inspecting and engaging air hoses between freight cars in defendant's Spokane train yard he tripped on some loose boards and was seriously injured. He filed a personal injury suit in Lewis and Clark County District Court under the Federal Employer's Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq., and defendant moved to dismiss on the ground of Forum non conveniens.

After argument on the motion and consideration of both parties' affidavits, the District Court issued a memorandum decision and ordered the action dismissed. The trial judge noted the pertinent Montana case law and concluded that the application of Forum non conveniens was within his discretion. State ex rel. Great Northern Ry. v. District Court (1961), 139 Mont. 453, 365 P.2d 512; Bracy v. Great Northern Ry. (1959), 136 Mont. 65, 343 P.2d 848. The issue on appeal is whether a District Court of this state may dismiss a FELA action because it deems itself an inconvenient forum. We hold that it may not.

Simply stated:

"The rule of Forum non conveniens is an equitable one embracing the discretionary power of a court to decline to exercise the jurisdiction it has over a transitory cause of action when it believes that the action before it may be more appropriately and justly tried elsewhere." Leet v. Union Pac. R. Co. (1944), 25 Cal.2d 605, 609, 155 P.2d 42, 44.

Under the doctrine, "a court may resist imposition upon its jurisdiction even when jurisdiction is authorized by the letter of a general venue statute." Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert (1947), 330 U.S. 501, 507, 67 S.Ct. 839, 842, 91 L.Ed. 1055, 1062. The policy behind the rule is to allow the court to dismiss an action when it feels the cause can be more easily disposed of in another court. Once dismissed, the action is normally commenced anew in a different, more convenient forum.

The applicability of Forum non conveniens to FELA actions has previously been before this Court. State ex rel. Great Northern Ry. v. District Court, supra; Bracy v. Great Northern Ry., supra. In those cases defendant railroad moved to dismiss on the ground of Forum non conveniens and in each instance the trial court denied the motion. In Bracy, 136 Mont. at 68, 343 P.2d at 849, the trial court "expressed doubt as to whether the doctrine . . . has any application in Montana," but ruled if it did, the facts of the case did not warrant its application. On appeal, this Court expressly declined to decide if the doctrine was viable. Bracy, supra at 68, 343 P.2d 848. The basis of the decision was that, Assuming the doctrine's existence, there was no abuse of discretion in failing to dismiss. In State ex rel. Great Northern Ry., supra, Bracy was followed. The court stated: "(W)e do not feel justified in this instance to establish the rule." State ex rel. Great Northern Ry., supra, 139 Mont. at 457, 365 P.2d at 514.

This is the only case to come before us where a District Court has dismissed an action on the ground it considers itself an inconvenient forum. We are thus for the first time squarely faced with the relation of Forum non conveniens to FELA actions.

Section 6 of the FELA, 45 U.S.C. § 56, reads as follows "Under this chapter an action may be brought in a district court of the United States, in the district of the residence of the defendant, or in which the cause of action arose, Or in which the defendant shall be doing business at the time of commencing such action. The Jurisdiction of the courts of the United States under this chapter shall be concurrent with that of the courts of the several States." (Emphasis added.)

The District Courts of Montana clearly have jurisdiction. Whether they have discretionary power to dismiss is determined by state policy, as discussed infra, and by an examination of Congressional intent in enacting and later in amending the FELA. Ch. 149, § 1 et seq., 35 Stat. 65 et seq. (1908), amended Ch. 143, § 1, 36 Stat. 291 (1910).

The refusal of the nation's railroads to compensate injured workmen was notorious; in a 1907 message urging Congress to pass the FELA, President Theodore Roosevelt noted:

"The practice of putting the entire burden of loss to life and limb upon the victim or the victim's family is a form of social injustice in which the United States stands in unenviable prominence." 45 Cong.Rec. 4040 (1910).

The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly noted that the FELA is to be given a liberal construction in favor of injured railroad employees so that it may accomplish humanitarian and remedial purposes. See Urie v. Thompson (1949), 337 U.S. 163, 69 S.Ct. 1018, 93 L.Ed. 1282; Coray v. Southern Pacific Co. (1949), 335 U.S. 520, 69 S.Ct. 275, 93 L.Ed. 208; McGovern v. Philadelphia & Reading R. R. (1914), 235 U.S. 389, 35 S.Ct. 127, 59 L.Ed. 283; Steinberg, The Federal Employer's Liability Act and Judicial Activism: Policymaking by the Courts, 12 Willamette L.J. 79 (1975).

In a Senate Committee Report, the purpose of the amendment to section 6 H.R. 17263, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. (1910), was said to be:

". . . to make entirely manifest the good faith of the legislature in the enactment of the employer's liability law, which places such stringent liability upon the railroads for injuries to their employees as to compel the highest safeguarding of the lives and limbs of the men in this dangerous employment. The tremendous loss of life and limb on the railroads is appalling . . .

"It was the intention of Congress in the enactment of this law originally and it may be presumed to be the intention of the present Congress to shift the burden of the loss resulting from these casualties from 'those least able to bear it' and place it on those who can . . . 'measurably control their causes'." Sen.Rep.No.432, 61st Cong., 2d Sess., (1910), 45 Cong.Rec. 4041 (1910).

In reporting the bill out of committee, Senator Borah stated his objection to the law as it existed:

"Plaintiff may sometimes be compelled to go a great distance in order to have his cause of action against the defendant by reason of the fact that now the action must be brought in the district in which the defendant is an inhabitant . . .

". . . If this bill should be passed the law will be remedied in that respect, enabling the plaintiff to bring his action where the cause of action arose or where the defendant may be doing business. The bill enables the plaintiff to find the corporation at any point or place where it is actually carrying on business and there lodge his action, if he chooses to do so." 45 Cong.Rec. 4034-4035 (1910).

The strength of the policy behind section 6 can be further gleaned from Congress' refusal to pass the Jennings Bill in 1947. It would have repealed most of section 6 and limited the forum choices of injured railroad workers to the district where the cause of action arose or where the plaintiff resided. If process could not be served in either of those places, an action could be brought where defendant was doing business. H.R. 1639, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., (1947).

In the leading case on Forum non conveniens, Gulf Oil Co. v. Gilbert, supra, 330 U.S at 505, 67 S.Ct. at 841, the United States Supreme Court noted:

"It is true that in cases under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (, 45 U.S.C.A. § 51 et seq.,) we have held that plaintiff's choice of a forum cannot be defeated on the basis of Forum non conveniens. But this was because the special venue act under which ...

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